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Abstract
Despite its centrality in all human cultures and throughout human history, philosophy of mind
and cognitive science have historically had very little to say about vernacular dance. Vernacular
dances are cultural dances, the ones we do at parties, clubs, rituals, festivals, competitions, in the
studio, and sometimes at home in the mirror. Vernacular dances are, as I argue, forms of life.
Despite its importance, most of our current frameworks within the philosophy of mind and
cognitive science still treat dance as an afterthought. This dissertation argues that
representational and computational philosophy of mind and cognitive science cannot adequately
account for vernacular improvisational dance. Instead, we need a dynamic systems based
enactivist account of vernacular improvisational dance which emphasizes self-organization and
affordances. I argue that in improvisational dance, the dichotomy between being in control and
not in control of one’s actions does not neatly map on to the phenomenon. Rather, vernacular
improvisational dance is characterized by distributed control; the dancer, other agents, the
environment, the music, culture, and other factors co-constitute the dance system. In other words,
improvisational dance is an emergent product constituted by the totality of the dance context.
Instead of reconstructing the world in an inner simulation, dancers are in direct commerce with
the world, regulating the environment through affordances as the world regulates the dancer. In
this model, skill is not just the ability to assert one’s agency but also the ability to let oneself be
regulated by the environment. When we aesthetically evaluate an improviser, we are (amongst
other things) analyzing how well they can dynamically couple themselves with minute forces in
the environment.
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Introduction: Vernacular Dance and Everyday Aesthetics
In 2019 I interviewed a series of dance professionals about their improvisational practice
(Kronsted, in press). Interview after interview, the story was the same, and a seemingly
paradoxical conclusion began to emerge; when dancers are doing their peak improvisation, they
are both fully in control and not in control at all. The dancers would independently of each other
report that in their best moments, the movements were being pulled out of them by the
environment. Nevertheless, at the same time, they would also masterfully command every
movement and the whole situation. As Cody Coflo of the Soul-Shifters Crew puts it:
Catching the ghost is like it's these weird moments. It's a different plane of your
conscious and subconscious element it's like you become so much inside of yourself but
so much outside of yourself that you're hyper aware. But you're maybe not necessarily
consciously choosing to do certain things. I might become aware of all the nuances and
rhythmic components of a song like I might start hearing things in a song that I would
never notice normally. All of a sudden, I can become hyper aware of these things and
then there's this weird subconscious component where my body is able to do things and it
might be physically stuff I didn't know I was capable of doing. It is just the creative way
it comes out, it is almost uninhibited. (Coflo interview, 08/13/19)
While Coflo is not a philosopher and arguably has a lot of metaphysical baggage that he is
loading into his description of the ideal improvisational moment, his account is still
representative of what many dancers have described to me during my eighteen years of dancing;
somehow, improvisational dance seems to include the contradictory experience of being both
masterfully in control and fully at the mercy of the moment at the same time.1 Thinking about
this tension, it is natural to ask how the mind can accomplish such a feat. Thus, this dissertation
is about vernacular dance improvisation and how the mind accomplishes something as
astoundingly difficult and complex as dance improvisation. In this dissertation, I will argue for
four overarching claims;

1

In the phenomenology of music, musicians sometimes report similar experiences (Høffding, 2018).

1

The Form of Life Thesis:
I.

Vernacular improvisational dance is a meaning-bearing and meaning-making
cultural practice, a complete form of life that we step into and live through as we
dance.

The Inadequate Framework Thesis:
II.

Representational philosophy of mind and representational cognitive science as
they exist today cannot adequately account for vernacular dance improvisation.

The Distributed Control Thesis:
III.

Vernacular dance improvisation is the process of simultaneously being in control
and not being in control of one’s movements.

The Aesthetic Appreciation Thesis
IV.

When we aesthetically or critically evaluate dance improvisation, one of the core
things we evaluate is how well the improviser dynamically couple themselves to
other systems in the environment.

The dissertation then is half a negative project, using dance as a case study to critique
representational theories of the mind, and half a positive project demonstrating how I believe the
mind achieves vernacular dance improvisation. I will use dynamical systems theory and the
growing framework of enactivism to make my case for vernacular improvisational dance as a
process of distributed control. In such a process, a binary of being in control or not in control of
one’s actions does not adequately cover the process. Similarly, the phenomenological experience
of being the author of one’s actions (the sense of agency) is blurred in the moment of vernacular
dance improvisation. Additionally, the distributed control thesis of improvisation means that we
must re-think what we evaluate when we artistically evaluate improvisational vernacular dance.
Coupling with the environment and reaching full distributed control is a difficult skill. In
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consequence, we must, among other things, aesthetically evaluate the dancer on their ability to
couple with the environment.
Before we can talk about how the mind achieves the act of vernacular improvised
dancing, we need to understand what vernacular dancing is; put simply; we need an operable
definition of improvised vernacular dance. In the philosophy of dance, there is widespread
debate regarding the metaphysical status of dances and dance works. What is a dance work, and
can it be reproduced? (McFee, 1992; 2012; 2018). How do we know that we see the same work
of dance, and who can we rightly contribute as the author of the dance work? (Pakes, 2019;
2020). How much does choreographic choice matter in determining the dance work as a work of
dance? (Conroy, 2019; Franko, 2015; Pakes, 2018). Furthermore, can dance movements and
dance works be copyrighted? (Kraut, 2016) As the list goes on, I here choose to gracefully
sidestep all of these discussions since they pertain to dance as “art,” “high art,” and the
“ontological status of dance.” What concerns us here is dance as a practice, specifically
vernacular improvisational dance. As fascinating as some of the before mentioned debates are,
they do not touch upon our subject matter.
For our purposes (defining vernacular dance), I wish to invoke a pragmatist and everyday
aesthetics inspired by John Dewey (Dewey, 1934/2005) and Yuriko Saito (Saito, 2007; Saito,
2017). While Western aesthetics have long been preoccupied with art and art objects, everyday
aesthetics returns to the origin of aesthetics as an investigation of experience (Saito, 2007). The
central idea is that our daily lives, even in the mundaneness of the every day, are rife with
aesthetic experiences (Irvin, 2008). Here “aesthetic” is not only meant as an honorific (we often
use the word when we feel positive about an object or experience), but also meant to indicate our
analysis of concepts such as neat, messy, clean, dirty, cozy, cute, and more (Dale et al., 2016;
Leddy, 1995; 2012). Those interested in phenomenology will quickly notice the strong
similarities between the original meaning of aesthetics and phenomenology; the careful
investigation of experience.
Importantly everyday aesthetics not only concerns itself with the mundane but also with
events that are, although not mundane, still fairly normal; birthdays, funerals, parties, fancy
dinners, concerts, and in our case, vernacular dancing. So, while these activities may or may not
be art (it matters not), they have aesthetic qualities that matter to human beings. Such aesthetic
3

qualities generate joy, hope, fear, dread, excitement, beauty, harmony, and so on. In other words,
these aesthetic qualities can generally be said to be meaningful to the perceiver, or as Saito puts
it, the aesthetic of the everyday is part of our social, cultural, world-making (Saito, 2017).
Human beings create a social-cultural world in part through the aesthetic qualities of places,
objects, and practices.
When trying to understand the world-making function of everyday aesthetic objects,
spaces, and practices, we can look to John Dewey’s pragmatist account of aesthetic experience.
Dewey is important for our understanding of the aesthetic since he argues that aesthetic
experiences are simply special kinds of experiences that can be brought about by most objects in
the right context (Dewey, 2005, Chapter 3). Dewey separates ordinary experience from having
an experience, where an experience happens when sensory input makes the agent act upon the
environment in an ongoing engagement until they reach a felt sense of harmony and completion.
For example, going to a fancy restaurant for a nice meal is an experience. Entering the
restaurant, being sat down, feeling the ambiance, having the menu presented, seeing the
ornamented food are all sub-events that lead the agent into a state of “harmony.” The harmony
then moves towards the “consummation” or “completion” of the experience. Note, however, that
one could have a very similar experience going to grandma’s house and eating her famous
lasagna.
While there is plenty of debate regarding Dewey’s notion of an experience, the important
takeaway is that we do not need special elevated art objects to engage with the aesthetic
dimension of our lives. Rather, encultured human life is full of quotidian practices that have
strong aesthetic aspects built into those practices (Leddy, 1995; 2012; Saito, 2007; 2017).
Furthermore, experiencing these aesthetic aspects of practices come from the standard
mechanisms of perception and action; we do not need to pose any new mechanism for
appreciating the aesthetic over and above everyday cognition.
Vernacular dances are great examples of the aesthetic dimension of the mundane.
Vernacular dances are those that take place at parties, clubs, venues, rituals, ceremonies,
birthdays, and so on. They are, in other words, meaning bearing cultural practices, often with
their own norms, traditions, rules, events, social hierarchies, histories, and spaces. These are the
dances that we often know by names such as salsa, bachata, hip-hop, breakdance, tap, waltz, but
4

also include activities such as wedding dancing, club dancing, dancing at the corner store or
doing social media dancing such as TikTok dances. These dances serve cultural functions and
therefore need not have an audience. They are typically participatory rather than for artistic
appreciation, and importantly do not need to have “works” the same way that the arts produce
artworks. While vernacular dances have much in common with art dances (those that happen on
stage with an audience), they are much broader in scope and function.
Vernacular dances are cultural aesthetic practices that create aesthetic experiences in the
Deweyan sense. They create a complete encompassing experience from start to finish that the
practitioner can live through. It is, while perhaps a bit poetic, not wrong to say that we are inside
the world of the dance as we perform the dance.
For Dewey, art is a universal language that creates community by teaching people about
their civilization and culture. Any practice meant to enculturate people through aesthetic
experiences then can in some sense or form be called art (Dewey, 2005, Chapter 14). Everyday
aesthetics takes up this notion of art and argues that mundane activities such as hanging laundry
should be considered, not art, but “everyday art” (Saito, 2007; 2017); an aesthetic practice that
need not be in a museum or gallery, but nonetheless center around aesthetic qualities and
aesthetic experiences. Vernacular dancing then is an everyday art. It is a cultural meaning
bearing practice centered around aesthetic quality and aesthetic experiences that enculturates the
participant.
My definition of vernacular improvised dance as everyday art, as living meaning bearing
cultural practice, will tie into both my critique of the representational cognitive sciences and into
my enactivist model of dance improvisation. Dances are meaningful practices that we live and
act through (The Form of Life Thesis). Every time we do a two-step or spin a stranger, we are
moving through a rich world of context, a world of context that would overburden a
representational system. Furthermore, this rich meaning-laden context also constitutes the
landscape of affordances that enable vernacular improvisational dance cognition.
Next, I will spend a few paragraphs explaining the gap in the literature that this
dissertation aims to fill. While the literatures on dance and cognitive science and the literature on
improvisational dance have grown recently, there is still much work to be done.
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Dance is ubiquitous throughout human history and culture. Yet, the philosophy of dance
only comprises a small corner of philosophical discourse. While this is changing, and dance
philosophy is rapidly growing (especially since the 2010’s), dance philosophy is still nascent.
Furthermore, very little philosophy of mind or cognitive science considers dance in its own right.
To make matters worse, throughout the history of Western philosophy, several thinkers have
rejected dance as worthy of consideration. As Sparshott reminds us, Hegel rejected dance as an
artform altogether. Rather than adjusting his framework so that it can accommodate dance, Hegel
rejects all of dance (Sparshott, 1982; 1983). In fact, according to Sparshott, one reason why there
is so little writing on dance in philosophy prior to the twentieth century is that the two most
popular systems of art analysis used by Anglo American aestheticians, Aristotle and Hegel, do
not accommodate dance (Sparshott, 1983, 99). While I shall not dive into the reasons why
Western scholarship for long has neglected dance (although I do have a theory about this), it will
here suffice to say that there is a substantial gap in the philosophical literature. Philosophy of
mind, cognitive science, and even aesthetics have, up until recently, not fully considered dance.
This dissertation begins the work of filling the gap in the literature.
While the aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and the overlap between the two is beginning
to consider dance, it is important to note that even today, we see aestheticians and philosophers
of mind developing frameworks that do not include or even consider dance – even aestheticians
who claim to be enactivists and care about the body make this mistake. For example, in Strange
Tools, Alva Noë provides a definition of art that excludes dance from being art or artistic in all of
its manifestations except concert dance (Noë, 2015). Noë divides the universe into level one and
level two activities. Level one activities are pragmatic, contextual, and for the sake of something
else, that is, they are instrumental. Level two activities are intentionally reflective; they do not
serve a pragmatic function but are instead meant to induce reflection in the appreciator. For Noë,
dancers are not artists; rather, they are tools who display the “real” art, which is the
choreography on display. Only as an intentional reflective object can a dance be art, and the
dancer themselves can never be the artist unless they are also the choreographer. While I have
many reservations regarding Noë’s theory of art, I shall here bracket those criticisms. What I
wish to highlight is the continuation of contemporary philosophy and aesthetics to create
philosophical frameworks that cannot fully accommodate dance or relegate dance to the realm of
afterthoughts (especially vernacular dance). Noë is a particularly striking case of this tendency
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since he is part of the enactivist school of thought that bases the foundation of their thought in
embodiment and action (Noë, 2009; O'Regan & Noë, 2001). Action and embodiment are two of
the core characteristics of dance, and yet Noë is quick to render the vast majority of dance
aesthetically non-salient.
Similarly, in the non-enactivist overlap between aesthetics and philosophy of mind Bence
Nanay creates a theory of aesthetic experience that does not mention and cannot accommodate
dance. Nanay argues that aesthetic experiences are a special class of experience in which the
agent pays close attention to multiple features of the same object (Nanay, 2016). Nanay’s point is
that human attention can be focused or distributed across either objects or features of objects. In
most everyday cases, as we pragmatically move through the world, we switch between
distributed and focused attention to achieve our daily goals. For example, if I am hanging a shelf,
I will have focused attention with regards to the object, the shelf itself, but only scant attention
towards its features. For Nanay, aesthetic experiences are the ones in which we focus our
attention on one object and its features (ibid, chapter 2). Nanay’s attentional account of aesthetic
experience works for painting, sculpture, and perhaps even music. However, the attentional
account has a hard time explaining aesthetic experiences of dance. Perceiving dance requires that
our attentional processes are distributed across music, environment, dancer, and the movements
of the dancer. In consequence, according to Nanay’s account, it should be impossible to have an
aesthetic experience of dance. This problem is compounded even more when we consider the
fact that dances are dynamically unfolding emergent systems. The kind of static attention that
carefully reviews each of the features of an object cannot be applied to the rapid unfolding of
dance movements.
Nevertheless, plenty of dancers, dance critics, and dance audiences list the beauty or
aesthetic experience of dance as one of the reasons they return to do and watch dance again and
again. Nanay’s treatment is another example of philosophers not only over-prioritizing the visual
but also creating art and aesthetics frameworks that cannot accommodate dance and simply
choose to ignore dance.
The story of the relationship between dance and cognitive science has many elements
similar to the story concerning aesthetics and dance. First, cognitive science has not been
interested in dance until very recently, and even today, that interest is slim and often considered a
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niche area of study. It is rare to find work in cognitive science that investigates dance
specifically. Rather, the cognitive science of performance has focused mostly on sports,
assuming that conclusions about performance in one domain can be easily applied to conclusions
in other domains. For example, in a recent anthology, The Neurocognition of Dance (Bläsing et
al., 2019), the majority of the authors are not dancers and draw mostly from research unrelated
to dance. Similarly, much cognitive science on group cognition creates elaborate frameworks and
then adds dance as an underdeveloped example post-hoc (Butterfill, 2018; Vesper et al., 2010).
In other words, both within the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, there is a pervasive
tendency to argue for one or the other conception of mind and then assume that dance as a
phenomenon fits that conception; without doing further investigation into dance itself
(Cappuccio, 2019; Davids et al., 2008; Rosenbaum, 2019; Searle, 1990). Even in recent
cognitive science literature dedicated specifically to dance, dance is still being treated much like
an afterthought.
Taking dance seriously in relation to the mind also means that we cannot study the mind
in abstraction from culture, history, or the material conditions that make dances emerge; the
achievement and execution of dance are intrinsically tied to sociality. Looking at the mind
through dance provides credence to the “social turn” in the mind sciences. When thinking about
how cognitive systems achieve something as difficult as dance, the explanation ends up being
irreducibly social. Simply put, we cannot explain dance as a cognitive achievement without
bringing in other minds, the environment, the body and bodies, and a slew of other
considerations, all of which are fairly recent additions in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
science. As phenomenologists have shown us time and time again, the mind is deeply tied in
with our embodiment (Iris Marion Young, 2005; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Ortega, 2016; Welch,
2019). Especially, the dancing mind is a mind deeply involved with its own corporeality.
However, the sciences of the mind have long thought of the mind as something mostly involved
in abstract information processing (Carruthers, 2006; Clark, 2016; Fodor, 1975; Goldman, 2012).
Accordingly, it is not surprising that dance has been mostly left untouched by the mind sciences.
Movement has for a long time been seen as a problem of computation, rationalization, and
internal mechanisms. Even the corner of philosophy that concerns itself with actions, action
theory, has primarily looked at action as something that had to be solved in terms of reasons and
mental intentions (Bratman, 1987).
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On much philosophy of mind, action theory, and cognitive science, what it means to be in
control of one’s actions is to make the right kinds of rational inferences, and importantly make
those inferences before the body moves. As we look at vernacular improvised dance, we will see
that a dichotomy of being in control or not being in control of one’s actions does not
meaningfully map onto the phenomenon. Rather, we should think of improvised vernacular
dance as controlled non-control or put differently as distributed control (The Distributed
Control Thesis). Overall, what I wish to underscore again is that there is a substantial need for
cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and even aesthetics, to examine vernacular improvised
dance carefully and on its own terms.
Roadmap of the Dissertation
The dissertation will take the following path; first, I will go over some of the literature that
attempts to define dance. I will borrow bits and pieces from some of these frameworks to provide
my own definition of vernacular dance as an encultured practice of meaning-making; vernacular
dances are forms of life that we live through as we dance (The Form of Life Thesis). Next, I
give a broad overview of mainstream philosophy of mind, especially with regards to the notion
of “representation,” and argue that these accounts cannot or at least struggle to accommodate
improvised vernacular dance (The Inadequate Framework Thesis). I pay special attention to
the newest theory on the market, “predictive processing,” and argue that this theory likewise
cannot accommodate dance. However, there are some aspects of predictive processing regarding
anticipation that I later implement into my own account of vernacular dance improvisation. I
then move on to action theory and similarly argue that the standard framework cannot account
for vernacular improvisational dance.
Once my critiques of the standard frameworks have been established, I provide my own
dynamical systems and enactivist account of dance cognition. This account is heavily based on
the physics of dynamical systems, affordances, sensemaking, and sensorimotor schemes. Hence,
I spent significant page space fleshing out these concepts and applying them to improvisational
vernacular dance. On this view, dancers are joint enculturated dynamical emergent systems,
distributed across brains, bodies, and environments, in which the locus of control is likewise
distributed; the movements that unfold are the product of the entire non-representational system
(The Distributed Control Thesis).
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With my cards on the table, I proceed by criticizing some recent theories and claims
made within the philosophy of dance and within the cognitive science of dance. These theories
generally tend to reproduce the same problems as in the standard frameworks despite coming
from within the literature on dance. I also look at recent arguments made within the literature on
expert performance and similarly suggest that these cannot adequately accommodate dance due
to their mistreatment of the attentional processes that take place during an expert bodily
performance, such as improvised vernacular dance.
The next chapter surveys the literature and cognitive science on joint action. I
demonstrate why this literature suffers from a lack of ecological validity and again put the
mainstream view under pressure by showing how it cannot easily accommodate the case of
vernacular improvised dance. I argue for a conception of joint action that is scalar and based on
alignment dynamics. In cases like improvised vernacular dance, we should think of joint action
as constituted by various relationships which are constantly shifting. I focus on the case of
“clubbing” to show how vernacular improvised dance interactions quickly and fluently morph in
and out of various kinds of jointness. I demonstrate how the framework of joint attention is
especially useful when analyzing joint dance group improvisation. As part of the distributed
control thesis, I show that shared attention highly scaffolds the joint dance system and facilitates
a shared landscape of affordances.
In the concluding chapter, I paint with broader strokes and demonstrate what
consequences the enactivist account of vernacular dance improvisation has for aesthetics and
dance therapy. I show that given what I have said, we should rethink our notions of control and
skill in physical performance. When we evaluate a dance improviser, one of the core tenants of
our evaluation should be how well they couple to systems in the environment. Dance therapy is
effective for some psychopathologies and problems, in part because it teaches the participant
novel ways of coupling to the environment and how to reconnect with the body. All in all, as a
reminder, in this dissertation, I will be making three interconnected claims and outline one future
project;
The Form of Life Thesis: vernacular dances are meaning-bearing cultural practices that
we live through.
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The Inadequate Framework Thesis: Mainstream philosophy of mind and mainstream
cognitive science cannot account for vernacular improvised dance.
The Distributed Control Thesis: the locus of control is neither in the dancer nor in the
environment but across the entire system.
The Aesthetic Appreciation Thesis (a prospective project): in aesthetic appreciation of
improvisational vernacular dance, one of the core aspects evaluated is how well the
mover couples with systems in the environment.

1. What is Dance?
In this chapter, I will define vernacular improvisational dance as a meaning-bearing cultural
practice that we live through. I will look at various attempts at defining dance as an activity and
borrow from these definitions to provide my own definition of vernacular improvised dance. I
will focus on what dancing is as a practice and not what makes dance art or what makes
something a dance work. Furthermore, I will not dive into the discussion on whether or not dance
works can be reproduced. Ultimately, I use the notion of everyday art from everyday aesthetics
to argue that improvisational vernacular dances are meaning-bearing and meaning-making
cultural practices; they are forms of life that we embody and live through as we dance (The
Form of Life Thesis). I furthermore use a pattern theory exemplar definition of dance that
allows us to categorize any activity as being either thickly, thinly, or not vernacular
improvisational dance. On my account, the prototypical exemplar of a vernacular dance as
meaning-bearing cultural practice at its core;
•

Has a culturally developed dance system.

•

Has culturally determined functions.

•

Has a rich history (oral, embodied, and sometimes written).

•

Adheres to implicit or explicit organizing principles.

•

Expresses meaning either virtually or through self-expression.

•

Is more expressive than what is necessary for daily instrumental movements.

•

Is performed with music.

•

Contains rhythmic human movement.
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These core features of a prototypical vernacular dance concept allow us to judge for each activity
how close or far away the activity is from the core concept of a vernacular dance as a meaningbearing cultural practice that we live through. With this in mind, before we can begin our
overview of the literature on dance definition, a little housekeeping is in order. Historically
attempts to define dance have become conceptually entangled and easily lead to
miscommunication. For the reader unfamiliar with dance, it is useful to briefly straighten out
some concepts.
A Little House Keeping – Cleaning up our Concepts
As I began working on this dissertation, I had several conversations with established
philosophers who work on the philosophy of dance. As I explained my project, I was met with
excitement across the board. However, there was an agreement amongst these thinkers that an
opening chapter asking what dance is would lead down a conceptual rabbit hole from which
there might not be a way out. Renee Conroy said, “Don’t waste your time defining dance”
(personal communication, 09/29/2020). As she explained, dance philosophers have long
grappled with the inherent tension within the ontology of dance. On the one hand, dancers and
dance philosophers agree that there must be some ontology of dance and dance works; on the
other hand, there is little consensus on what that ontology is, especially due to the ephemeral
nature of dance. As Anthea Kraut puts it: “dance… is (in)famous for its lack of ‘thingness’”
(Kraut, 2016, 14). Part of the problem is that dance perpetually seems to disappear in the
moment of its creation and leaves behind no consumable product; a reason why some have
argued that dance is inherently an anti-capitalist practice (Phelan, 1993). In fact, it has become
almost a dogmatic slogan within dance studies and dance philosophy, to quote Marcia Siegel,
that “Dance exists at a perpetual vanishing point” (Siegel, 1972). Although, some claim that the
proposed ephemerality of dance must be taken with a grain of salt and that dance and dance
works do have some concreteness (Conroy, 2012a; Pakes, 2020). Furthermore, some have argued
that dance practitioners and even some dance scholars refuse to define dance as a gatekeeping
mechanism. That is, if we do not define dance then only dance insiders can talk about dance
(Bakka, 2020).
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All in all, the important first step in investigating dance is to gain some conceptual clarity
(Conroy, 2012; Pakes, 2020). As Conroy argues, dance studies and the philosophy of dance has
long suffered under conceptual confusion and equivocation (Conroy, 2019). Much like the
philosophy of mind has suffered from vagueness and equivocation with regards to the concept
“representation” (Rowlands, 2017), dance studies and philosophy of dance have struggled when
trying to define dance. But Conroy is helpful in providing the following list of concepts that must
be carefully distinguished:
•

Dance; as an activity.

•

Dance works; structures made out of dance activity, which can be choreographed,
reproduced, scored, and maybe copyrighted.

•

A dance work: a specific dance work. This structure can be a token of a type, a one-off, or
exist in some other relationship to dance works depending on one’s ontology.

•

Performance: the event in which a dance work is being manifested by dancers through the
act of dancing.

•

Dance production: the act of repeatedly putting on the same performance.

•

Improvisation: the act of dance activity through a pre-existing style but where the
movements and their sequence are unplanned and unchoreographed.

•

Dance art: a list of criteria that make some dancing or dance works qualify as art.

As both Pakes and Conroy point out, the issue is that dance studies, and the philosophy of dance
in the past have had the tendency to blur these different concepts together. For example,
Beardsley provides an often-cited definition of dance as movement that is more expressive than
what is needed for its functional purpose: “If, in other words, there is more zest, vigor, fluency,
expansiveness, or stateliness than appears necessary for its practical purposes, there is an
overflow or superfluity of expressiveness to mark it as belonging to its own domain of dance”
(Beardsley, 1982, 35). Nonetheless, while doing so Beardsley blends together dance as an
activity, dance works, and the question of dance as art. In other words, we are not sure if all
dance activity has this character, or if superfluous expressiveness is a necessary condition for a
dance work, or for dance to be art.
It is important to understand that the concepts mentioned above and the questions that
naturally follow from these concepts are interconnected. However, moving forward I agree with
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Conroy that we ought to aim for conceptual clarity (Conroy, 2019). Accordingly, in this
dissertation I will focus on dance as cultural practice, an improvised cultural practice.
Furthermore, rather than looking at concert dance, I am here particularly interested in improvised
vernacular dance. That is, my account of the cognition involved in improvised dance not only
covers stage dance but mostly the dancing that takes place at/in nightclubs, parties, public
spaces, jam sessions, rituals, ceremonies, dance battles, competitions, etc. Put simply; we will be
talking about dance as a practice as the practice is being carried out in fully contextual cultural
environments.

Dance as an Imitation of Life
Defining dance is an endeavor that dates, at minimum, back to the ancient period. Aristotle
famously categorized dance as a subgenre of the mimetic arts: that is a sub-genre of theater
(Kenny, 2013). In fact, as Selma Jeanne Cohen observes:
Rhythm alone, without harmony, is the means of the dancer’s imitations’ wrote Aristotle,
who then added – a bit grudgingly – ‘for even he, by the rhythms of his attitudes, may
represent men’s characters as well as what they do and suffer’ (Poetics: 1147a). (Cohen,
1953, 15)
Cohen is here pointing out not only Aristotle’s reluctance to appreciate dance but also the idea
that dance is ultimately an artform that imitates life. For Aristotle, dance has both educational
and destructive potential. For example, Aristotle warns against crowds who perform a wild
percussion-based group dance, which by today’s classifications could be considered the Ancient
Athenian version of a rave (Shaw, 2005). He warns against this dance since unharmonious music
and unharmonious dancing create disharmony in the soul, while harmonious music and dance
create harmony (POL.8.5.1340b8-10). Here, rhythm has an especially strong impact on the
organization of the soul, and therefore only select harmonious (non-rowdy) rhythms can be used
to educate the youth.
In fact, one way to educate the young and keep citizens involved in the ideal state is by
having them engage with ethical questions and scenarios through music and dance. Music and
dance have this capacity because, according to Aristotle, the emotions and affect, imitated in
music and dance are real. Thus, music and dance are the perfect tools to run practice simulations
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through which the young citizens of the polis can develop virtue (Woerther, 2008; Woodruff,
1992).
Consequently, early on, we get the idea that dance, at least to some degree can imitate or
replicate the social, affective, emotional, and political life of human beings. Dance displays these
different characteristics of life through the human body. In short, dance is essentially an artform
that imitates through the body.
The conception of dance as imitation has been re-invigorated and re-challenged at several
points in dance history and scholarship. For example, balletmaster and scholar Jean-Georges
Noverre argues in the eighteenth century that ballet is ultimately an art of imitation (1760). For
Noverre, given the expressive imitative capacities of dance, ballet can be displayed and enjoyed
without necessarily being accompanied by costume, spoken narrative, or stage set (effectively
distancing dance from theater and making it a unique artform). The imitative expressions created
by the dancing body are sufficient on their own to create artistic spectacle (Cohen, 1953, 17).
While much of the history of ballet sees dancing as an appendage to theater or opera, Noverre
changes the public and scholarly view on ballet by pointing to the intrinsic features of dance as
worthy of appreciation in its own right. For example, when lamenting why ballet is not
appreciated to the same extent as other arts Noverre writes:
I think, sir, that this art has remained in its infancy only because its effect have been
limited, like those of fireworks designed simply to gratify the eyes; although this art
shares with the best plays the advantage of inspiring, moving and captivating the
spectator by the charm of its interest and illusion. No one has suspected its power of
speaking to the heart. If our ballets be feeble, monotonous and dull, if they be devoid of
ideas, meaning, expression and character, it is less, I repat the fault of the art than that of
the artist: does he ignore that dancing united to pantomime is an imitative art? (Noverre,
1966, 11)
We see that Noverre thinks of dance as essentially imitative, and this attribute is what makes it
capable of expressing affect, emotion, represent people, places, and events, and be at the same
level of quality as the other arts. The state of ballet in the eighteenth century then is entirely the
fault of incompetent ballet masters and not the medium of dance.
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The insistence on dance being ultimately mimetic also means that dance cannot be about
itself. Unlike certain kinds of expressive, minimalist, or post-modern visual artworks that are
seemingly about their own form, dance on this definition seems to be relegated to always be the
medium through which we appreciate other things. On this conception of dance, we appreciate
dance because it gives us insight into the world. Dance, on this view, cannot be beautiful,
interesting, creative, and so forth without referring to something outside itself. The upshot of
such a view is that the medium is only interesting because of its content.
In fact, thinking of dance as having features that are non-representational is at least a
mid-twentieth-century idea. For example, famous Russian dancer and choreographer Michel
Fokine insisted that dance movements always signify, and when performed well, signified
clearly. Allegedly he was shocked when he met American dancer and choreographer Martha
Graham in 1931, whose movements he found to lack idealization (Cohen, 1953, 19). Dance
philosopher Julie Van Camp summarizes the trajectory of dance discourse in the following way:
Oversimplifying somewhat, views among historical dance writers on the primary
characteristics of dance have shifted from (1) formalized human movement, with a very
peripheral dramatic element, to (2) dramatic spectacle using mime and human movement
as the vehicles for telling a story, to (3) a re-emphasis on human movement, but with an
integral role for dramatic expression, whether or not a narrative is involved. (Van Camp,
1981, 19)
The important thread throughout western writing on dance is that there is an emphasis on dance
as an expressive artform. However, expression does not have to equate to imitation.
Additionally, dance scholarship contains a lively debate regarding the dancer’s own affect,
emotions, narrative, and style. In other words, the question of self-expression also becomes
prominent. Furthermore, whether or not dance is or should be narrative in structure becomes an
increasingly contested question the closer we move to the twenty-first century. While ballet in
the fifteenth and sixteenth century was almost always tied to a narrative, with modern, postmodern, and contemporary dance, the assumption that dance must be narrative becomes
increasingly challenged (Pakes, 2020).
The assertation that dance is about imitation is tightly tied to the notion that dance either
must or should deliver a narrative. As practices around dance change toward non-narrative
16

dances and dance works, it becomes clear that we can easily have dance without narrative. Dance
without a narrative can, of course, still be imitational. Nonetheless, the strong notion of imitation
we find in Aristotle begins to falter when dance does not have to imitate anything specific but
can simply just “imitate” anger, sadness, or joy, in the abstract.
Further, saying that imitation is essential to dance does not provide enough of a line
between dance and theater, since this seems to be true of theater as well. Furthermore, the word
imitation is in this context rather vague. While it is possibly true that all dances are expressive,
and expressions can only express things that are of this world, it is not quite clear if there is a
difference between saying dance is expressive and dance is imitational. Imitation implies that
dance picks out specific objects, people, tokens of types, while expression can refer to concepts
abstractly. As we shall see shortly, some accounts of expression in dance are similar to MerleauPonty’s version of expression (1945/2012), in which the thought and the movement are one and
the same. On such a view, dance does not need to be imitative or point to something external.

Gesture, Virtual Powers, and Embodied Meaning
In a famous essay from her book Feeling and Form, Susanne Langer argues that the defining
characteristic of dance is its display of virtual powers – dance primarily functions through
gesture, and those gestures create an illusion of various forces at work through the human body.
For Langer, all arts have a “primary illusion,” and in the case of dance, that illusion is the use of
the body to display various powers (Langer, 1983).
Here we need to look closer at the notion of virtual powers. Langer is arguing that in
dance, the dancer display forces such as being ephemerally pushed upwards, slowly dragged
downwards, violently thrown to the side, gently gyrated back and forth, chaotically shuffled
about, being determinedly still, etc. The dancer, through the intentional use of their body,
manifests various types of force. However, such forces are not only restricted to what we might
call physical forces. The virtual powers at display in dance also include “subjective forces,” that
is, our emotions, affect, bodily feelings, and thoughts. For Langer, our inner subjective life is
also a life of dynamic forces that can be directly displayed in dance through the use of the body
(ibid, 30).
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Dance then consists of gestures that display virtual powers, whether physical or
subjective. Langer argues that the “virtual” is crucial for dance. Langer points out that many
dance theorists and practitioners have argued that dance is the display of actual emotion, actual
affect, and so forth. In other words, in 1953 when Langer wrote her book, as today, many
dancers and non-dancers alike are under the impression that dance is about “self-expression”
(ibid, 30-31). While it is true, as Langer also acknowledges, that frequently, dance does
genuinely display self-expression, this is not a necessary condition for dance. In fact, Langer
argues that the use of gesture allows for dance to display virtual powers that are not selfexpressive. The use of gesture allows the dancer to display things even when those things do not
map onto the subjective states of the dancer: hence virtual powers (ibid, 32).
To underpin the account, Langer provides us with a broad definition of gesture. On this
view, gesture can be either self-expressive movement or “logically expressive movement” (ibid,
32). Logically expressive gestures are those movements that function as a symbol or a sign:
It may be either self-expressive, or logically expressive, or both. It may indicate demands
and intentions, as when people signal to each other, or it may be conventionally
symbolic, like the deaf-mute language, but at the same time the manner in which a
gesture is performed usually indicates the performer’s state of mind; it is nervous or
calm, violent or gentle etc. Or it may be purely self-expressive, as speech may be pure
exclamation. (ibid, 33)
What we learn here is that in dance, the performer often ends up displaying both the virtualexpression and self-expression. When the dancer performs a gesture that indicates a virtual
power, some of the dancer's own subjective states often seep through in the execution of the
movement. However, that still does not mean that the primary function or primary illusion of
dance is self-expression. Rather, the two are often mingled together because it is performed by
humans and not robots. Langer insists that dance is the use of gestures to display virtual powers,
so the dancer does not need to feel that which they display (ibid, 34-35).
Rather poetically, Langer points out that we can metaphorically think of the world as
consisting of powers that are constantly dynamically interacting. When we display these powers
and their interplay through the body then we are dancing (ibid, 36). Dance is the display of
virtual powers through gesture, and dance does not need to represent anything concrete. While
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dance often does make reference to specific objects, stories, propositions, and more, it is
sufficient for dance to be dance that it displays virtual powers.
In a recent article Renee Conroy both further develops Langer’s definition of dance and
explores some of its pitfalls (Conroy, 2015). As Conroy summarizes: “One might gloss Langer’s
thesis as follows: dance is the art in which human movements are transformed into fictional
gestures, thereby revealing the psychological ‘shape’ of human experiences” (ibid, 286).
Conroy points out that Langer’s division between virtual gesturing and gesturing begins
to break down during dance. While it is true that we can abstractly create a line between that
which is being expressed virtually and that which is being self-expressed, in practice, the
distinction is not so clear cut; the virtual and the real are always blended in the moment of dance.
Nonetheless, on Langer’s account, what we are told to appreciate is not the affect of the dancer
or their virtuosity, but simply only the virtual powers they generate and the work as it is put
together. In other words, on Langer’s account of dance, the dancer disappears; the dancer is not
an object of appreciation (Conroy, 2015, 289). Here is Langer on what we truly appreciate when
we experience a dance:
What dancers create is a dance; and a dance is an apparition of active powers, a dynamic
image. Everything a dancer actually does serves to create what we really see; but what we
really see is a virtual entity. The physical realities are given: place, gravity, body
muscular strength, muscular control, and secondary assets such as light, sound of things
(usable objects, so- called ‘properties’). All these are actual. But in the dance they
disappear; the more perfect the dance, the less we see its actualities. (Langer, 1957, 5-6)
We can see Langer’s commitment to illusion. The dancer and everything else that makes up the
illusion becomes transparent and allows the audience to instead experience the illusion. In dance
appreciation, we do not appreciate the dancer or their movements but the illusion that they
generate.
While a definition of dance is logically distinct from dance appreciation, our definition
should generate a theory of appreciation that is not contrary to the actual on-the-ground practice
of dance appreciation. We can compare this to debates on ideal versus non-ideal theory in ethics;
if our theoretical assertions about ethics are contrary to how people actually live and thrive, then
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it gives us good reason to re-evaluate our ethical theories. In the case of dance, it does seem
suspicious if the definition of dance that we provide only lets us appreciate abstract forms and
not the actual dancers.
While Langer is, in my opinion, certainly on to something when she speaks of virtual
powers that course through the body in dance, the sharp separation between what the dancer
displays and what the dancer does and feels stops us from capturing dancing in its full richness.
Here Conroy’s comments are especially illustrative:
If all gestures that count as dances (or parts of an occasion of art dance) not only present
virtual entities but are successful to the extent that the dancer ‘disappears’, leaving only
the ‘forms of feeling’ suggested by her movements, how do we describe the rehearsal
process?... When dance artists practice a difficult lift to perfect its nuances, the
choreographers and style coaches who are their first audiences do not attend to anything
remotely virtual. Instead, they focus on the dancer’s actual efforts, acknowledging her as
a person who tackles a specific set of physical challenges as she becomes facile with the
choreography. Must we say that what the dancer does in rehearsal is not ‘art dancing’
because she is not yet skilled enough to present movement material without making her
efforts evident? (Conroy, 2015, 290-291)
Conroy’s critique is apt. In many dance activities, including rehearsal, we are not paying
attention to the “illusions” of dance. Rather, we are paying attention to the body of the dancer, its
efforts, and the form of the movements. Many types of dance aim to highlight the embodiment of
the dancer, their efforts, and form itself; that is, they do not aim to gesture at something more
abstract. For example, many of the works by Merce Cunningham, Trisha Brown, or Lucinda
Child, are explicitly designed to be about the movements themselves without appealing to
anything beyond the movements. Furthermore, many competitive vernacular dances display the
effort, affect, and skill of the dancer and have little or no intention to gesture. Of course, more
than often, such dances do display virtual powers. Breakdancing is a prime example of force
coursing through the body, but such dances do so for the sake of the aggrandizement of the
performer. In other words, many forms of dance are about the movements themselves and about
the dancer, not some abstract concept behind the dance.
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In particular, improvisation seems to problematize Langer’s account. In improvisation,
the actual mental states, affect, emotions, skill, and style, of the performer dictate the dance.
Hence, when the body is moving in improvisation, it is rarely gesturing towards something else.
Rather, in improvisation, it is typically the dancer’s subjective world that is on display. In this
way, improvisation seems “real” rather than “virtual.” As Conroy points out, in moments of
improvisation, the appropriate foci of appreciation are not images created by the dancing body
but the actual actions of the dancing body (Conroy, 2015, 291). The important takeaway, which
is much in line with the enactivist thesis I will develop in this dissertation, is that in dance
improvisation, the movements “expressed” and the underlying affect and mental states are
ontologically the same. As Michelle Merritt puts it, in dance, thinking and moving are the same
thing (Merritt, 2013). Thus, the idea that dance displays “virtual” powers must be augmented to
fit the phenomenon. Sometimes dance simply displays powers. As Conroy puts the point when
talking about self-expressive dance works: “The dancers present the affective contours of such
choreographic artworks simply by being present in them physically” (Conroy, 2015, 292). This
form of thought and movement being one is not unique to dance, Merleau-Ponty provides a
similar account of expression in conversation in which the words spoken and the thoughts are
one and the same; we often do not know what we are going to say until we are in the middle of
saying it (Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
Langer’s account does capture something important about dance. Gesture does seem to
feature prominently in many forms of dance. Sometimes the gesturing is fairly concrete, while
other times it can display the more abstract sense of a force or power at play through the body.
Nevertheless, understanding dance purely in terms of gesturing will not do. Untrained dance
audience members are often turned off by dance, particularly because they go looking for the
meaning behind the dance. Dance is multifaceted, and sometimes there is a meaning behind the
dance; other times, dance is about itself. There is no hidden meaning to be found; all the meaning
is in and about the form on display.
To complicate things even further, several dance theorists and critics believe that dance
expresses meaning but that this meaning is ineffable. That is to say, that dance is meaningful and
expresses that meaning, however, the meaning that is expressed can only be understood in a felt
and direct manner; it cannot be translated into propositions. For example, John Martin argues,
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that dance is the direct transfer of affect and emotion from dancer to audience member, without
the need for any mediating translation or analysis. The audience, who is a human who knows
what it is like to move the body, sees the dancer move their body, and through this empathetic
experience, affect, emotion, and meaning is directly transferred (Martin, 1965). In fact, Martin
claims that there is “nothing modern about modern dance” since it utilizes dance’s ancient
mechanism of direct meaning transfer. In the same way that some parts of the visual arts are
often said to be non-propositionally meaningful, modern dance can express things that are
directly felt and understood by the audience (Martin, 1965). Think, for example, of the
meaningful but non-propositional experience of abstract expressionism.
This attitude towards modern dance is not unheard of; with the growing influence of
dance educator Rudolf Laban (1920), contemporary dance becomes conceptualized as a nonpropositional universal human language. Historically on this conceptualization, contemporary
dance is thought of as removed from cultural traditions and dance systems. On this view,
contemporary dance exists as a platonic form of dancing that directly transfers meaning between
dancer and audience, free from cultural heritage (Bakka, 2020).
While it is impossible to have a dance free of cultural heritage, the notion of ineffable or
directly transferred dance meaning, does frustrate Langer’s account of dance as virtual gesturing
since Langer believes that gestures must be translatable into propositionally understood meaning.
For Langer, one of the essential features of dance is that it is made from gestures that can be
“understood” intellectually. But as Martin and other scholars point out, there is a large
component of dance movements that are expressive yet not understood in a conventional sense.
Rather these movements are understood in a fashion that is best described as direct or felt.
While it is easy to think of felt or direct meaning as an exotic position, there are several
empirical and theoretical sources that show that we should take this notion seriously. First, fMRI
and EEG studies of dancers have demonstrated that the more dance training a person has
undergone, the more activation takes place across various brain regions typically associated with
motor control, empathy, and affect (Cross et al., 2006; Karpati et al., 2015; Orgs et al., 2008;
Seon Hee Jang & Frank E Pollick, 2011; Teixeira-Machado et al., 2019). Furthermore,
qualitative studies have shown that audience members are subject to affect contagion: whatever
affect the dancer display is directly felt by the audience (Reynolds, 2013). In fact, Peterson has
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argued that in improvisation, we have a direct emotional connection to the performer and the
work (Peters, 2017). In a related vein, Bresnahan (2019) argues for an embodied anticipationbased approach to improvisational art (a point I will return to shortly). Of course, in the realm of
cognitive science, one of the tenants of enactivism is that meaning often is the movement and is
the interaction (Gallagher, 2017; 2020).
Langer’s account of dance as gesture comes under pressure once we take seriously the
notion of ineffable meaning. While dance often is gestural in a fashion that is propositionally
analyzable, dance is also felt and understood in a fashion that is non-propositional and embodied.
Furthermore, Langer’s account is centered around the audience-artist relationship.
However, in much improvisational dance, the dance is by the performers for the performers.
When dancing takes place in streets, clubs, studios, and many other places, it is distinctly not
about communicating anything to the audience. While every club have people standing by the
wall, the dancing that takes place is not for those people. Much vernacular dance is about
producing real affective, emotional, and propositional states between the dancers and in the
dancers. Contact improvisation might be fun to look at, but the essential feature of the dance is
the relationship between those dancing. Contact improvisation does not trade in meaning that is
being relayed to a passive audience. Rather contact improvisation has meaningful experiences
emerge as a product of interaction. More often than not, vernacular dances do not intend to
express some hidden meaning through gesture because the gesturing being done is intended to
directly impact the co-dancer. As Mingon and Sutton point out, both Western popular culture and
academics often make the mistake of focusing on how something looks rather than how it feels
(Mingon & Sutton, 2021).
Langer’s approach requires a cognitive response in the viewer of dance, that is, a passive
non-bodily analysis in response to something deeply embodied. In many vernacular dances, there
is neither time nor need for such analysis; the dancers are in the midst of making meaning
together. In consequence, the audience, expressive dancer relationship built into Langer’s
account will not capture the activity of most vernacular dance forms.
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Overflowing Expressiveness
The picture of dance drawn so far both relate and clashes with some classic definitions within
dance studies and the philosophy of dance. One suggestion is that dance really is the creation of
“metaphor,” and so the body is not the dance itself, but the thing that represents or carry the
dance (Beiswanger, 1962). On this view, when we are looking at a dance, we importantly see
“past” the body to the metaphor that is being indicated (as we saw with Langer).
Monroe Beardsley famously takes this approach to dance and offers a definition of dance
as movements with excessive expressiveness (Beardsley, 1982). For Beardsley, any string of
possible human movements can generate dance action-tokens (that become dance) if those
motions are meant to gesture at, express, or represent other human actions. Still, these
movements do not constitute dance until they are performed with more expressiveness than what
would normally be required for the task. For example, picking up a hammer and hammering in a
nail with skill, precision, and efficiency is not dance. However, flamboyantly picking up the
hammer and exaggerating the movements involved in skill, precision, and efficiency, is dance.
Beardsley begins his discussion by arguing that dance actions are sortal generative
actions. The generative part here means that the action brings about another action. For example,
swinging a hammer brings about hammering the nail. Doing a dance movement brings about
doing another step. Dance actions are sortal because they are multiple types of actions at once
(Beardsley, 1982, 31). Basic actions such as leg movement can both be a skip and a dancing
skip; the skipping is two types of action at the same time. Instead of using Beiswanger's notion
of metaphor, Beardsley suggests that dance movements are sortal movements, they are both the
type “dance moves” and whatever other type the movement might have, for example,
“stomping.” Acknowledging that dance also consists in pauses, stillness, and freezes, Beardsley
provide us with his first definition:
Thus we may now propose the following: Dancing is sortally generating movings by
bodily motions and posings by bodily pauses. (ibid, 32)
Beardsley brings up an important point: when we look at all possible human movements, there is
not a single movement that is not a candidate for a dance movement (ibid, 33). As post-modern
western dance has demonstrated, any and all movements can be included under the category of
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dance.2 Consequently, we cannot just look at movements in isolation and decide if they are dance
movements. Rather, we must decide what principles turn these movements into dance
movements. For example, when does walking and sitting into a chair become dance? At what
point does jumping back and forth constitute dancing? (I recommend watching some of the
videos in footnote 2, to see examples of works that, amongst other things, challenge the line
between dance and non-dance movement). The insight is that any movement can be considered
dancing under the right conditions; so, something more must be in place for the movement to be
a dance.
Beardsley draws inspiration from Marcia Siegel, by pointing out that dance movements
tend to be expressive to a degree that functional movement is not (ibid, 33). While admitting that
his formulation is not the most precise, Beardsley provide us with the second definition of dance:
When I use the word [expressive] in this context, I refer to regional qualities of a motion,
or sequence of motions: it has an air of momentousness or mystery or majesty, it is
abrupt, loose, heavy, decisive, or languid. To say that the motion is expressive is just to
say that it has some quality to a fairly intense degree. And this is all I mean by
"expressive." We might then try formulating our first answer in this way: When a motion
or sequence of motions is expressive, it is dance. (ibid, 33)
On this definition, movements are transformed into dance once they achieve an added expressive
quality that is unnecessary for carrying out the movement in an everyday context. The notion of
added expressiveness, while at first glance intuitive, is severely challenged by the existence of
post-modern dance and some forms of Butoh; these dance forms at times consist almost entirely
of non-expressive movements. Still, Beardsley solution to the problem is well taken; all
movements can be made into dance by adding an expressive intensity to the movement. A view
he also partly attributes to Selma Jeanne Cohen (Cohen, 1962). Further, as dancer and
choreographer Merce Cunningham says when talking about the specialness of dance:

2

See: Satisfying Lover (Paxton, 1967), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhbhol7o9PM
Carnation (Childs, 1964),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ukbGiRyB8n4&list=PL29A9E65A9E95B29B&index=3
Hidden Voices (Butcher, 2006), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKBkFUJJ47c&t=63s
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I think it has to do with amplification, with enlargement. Dancing provides some-thing an
amplification of energy that is not provided in any other way, and that's what interests
me. (Tomkins, 1978)
Outside of specific high art cases that deliberately attempt to experiment with our conceptual
boundaries, there is good reason to think of dance as including the enhanced expressiveness of
movements. In fact, in many American vernacular dances, there is consensus that dancing must
include the addition of flair, “flava,” style, character, and other categories that center around this
notion of added expressiveness (Goldman, 2010; Kraut, 2016; Salkind, 2018; Schloss, 2009;
Schwadron, 2017). In my own experience, I have heard countless elders in the breakdancing
community preach to their students regarding the virtue of adding “your own style” to
movements.3 In short, the idea of adding extra expressiveness to movement to make it dance is
not unprecedented. In fact, as Beardsley points out, even St. Augustine argues that movement
with too much expressiveness to be practical is dance (Beardsley, 1982, 35).4
It is important to understand that by arguing that dance consists of added expressiveness,
these authors are not arguing that dance is always representational. Sometimes dancing is
representational, it might mime out a functional activities such as starting a car or waving
goodbye, but in many cases, dance is not representing anything specifically. In other words,
dance does not need to have “content”; it does not need to be about anything concrete. The
intentional aspect of dance is often the forms, affect, and powers it expresses without needing to
point to anything specific elsewhere.
While Beardsley’s definition is a good starting point, it is not without problems (Carroll
and Banes, 1982). As we have already seen, much post-modern dance calls the definition into
question by consisting of non-expressive movements. Furthermore, one could argue that
Beardsley’s definition not only ignores the question of music but that it runs the risk of melting
theater and dance together. On this definition, runway modeling, posing for Instagram, engaging
teaching, martial arts demos, and even some forms of pornography all fit the definition of dance.

3

Also, see the documentary The Freshest Kids (2002) on the history of breakdancing and the importance of adding
expressiveness to one’s movements to be a “real bboy.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxoWyGFSGuk.
4

(De Libero Arbitrio, II, xvi, 42)
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As Carroll and Banes aptly point out in their response to Beardsley (1982), performing labor
with unnecessary expressiveness does not make it dance; it is still just labor done in a flamboyant
fashion. More needs to be added to the definition than simply making sequences of movements
overtly expressive.

Dance, Function, and Choreographic Choice
In a recent article, Noël Carroll argues against both Beardsley and Langer’s definitions of dance
(as an activity). In particular, Carroll points out that the movement that followed modern dance,
namely post-modern dance, does not seem to fit Beardsley’s definition of overt expression
(Carroll, 2019). In fact, as I eluded to in the previous section, it is a tenant of many post-modern
dance works that they are not overflowing with expressiveness. As Carroll straightforwardly puts
it: “a superfluity of expressiveness is not a necessary condition for dance” (ibid, 71).
Rejecting Beardsley, Carroll puts forth his counter proposal: ”Something is a dance only
if its choreography contributes indispensably to its constitutive purpose” (ibid,72). First, it is
worth noting that this definition significantly blurs the line between dance as an activity and
dance as a dance work. Still, Carroll does have good reasons to blur the line between dance as
activity and dance works (Pakes, 2020).
Carroll’s choreographically oriented definition argues that all dance has a purpose. That
is, Carroll finds it uncontroversial to claim that dances are done or made for a purpose:
It should be uncontroversial that dances have purposes. Tribal dances may be undertaken
in order to appeal to the gods for fertility and/or rain, to serve as preparation for war, or to
articulate other ceremonial and/or ritual purposes. Constitutive purposes are those that
govern the choreographic choices that make the dance what it is. (Carroll, 2019, 72)
Dancing and dances then consist of specific choreographies or choreographic principles (What
Pakes call organizing principles (Pakes, 2020), that specify how the dance is to be executed in
order to fulfill its purpose. Sometimes such purposes are made explicit; for example, many postmodern dance works are accompanied by writing from the artist discussing the significance of
the work. Other times, the purpose of a dance might develop organically over time in a cultural
milieu. There is no defining text that specifies the purpose of “krumping” which then brought the
dance into existence. Rather the dance developed organically as a product of socioeconomic
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factors in and around the west coast of the United States in the early 2000s. Having organically
developed, however, does not mean that the dance lacks purpose. It simply means that those
purposes are implicit in the dance and must be revealed through cultural immersion (as we shall
see shortly, vernacular dances are fully immersive since they are forms of life). Thus, Carroll
argues that dances have purpose, and the choreography or choreographic principles make the
dancer fulfill that purpose. Dance is about fulfilling one or more purposes through activities
specified by choreography. Carroll provides the example of the vernacular dance Haka:
For example, the constitutive purpose of the Maori dance called the Haka is to challenge
opponents: rivals, enemies, and so on. To that end, the dancers stamp their feet noisily,
executing aggressive jumps in place, making their eyes bulge out, sticking out their
tongues, loudly grunting, and growling. All this is intended to threaten the onlooker.
Here, the constitutive purpose of the dance directs the choice of movements and gestures.
(ibid, 72)
While Carroll mischaracterizes the Haka, the point still stands; dances fulfill different purposes
and do not have to be about overt expression necessarily. Although vernacular dances are very
often brimming with expression, dances often need to fulfill some practical or aesthetic function.
The unifying factor is that the various functions a dance can fulfill are done so through the body.
The choreographic indispensability thesis does run into trouble because it has a hard time
distinguishing between theater and dance. Some could argue that the definition as it is laid out so
far, cannot draw a conceptual or pragmatic difference between dance and theater. Theater also
seems to be constituted by its choreography, purpose and is typically deployed through the
body.5 Hence, Carroll concedes that his definition so far has only provided necessary conditions
for dance; but not sufficient conditions (ibid, 73). Hence, Carroll has located dance within a
family of activities that can be loosely defined as “the choreographic practices.” Yet, more needs
to be added to the definition before it can be considered dance; choreography for the sake of a
function simply is not enough.

5

While I am sure experimental post-modern theater without actors exist, it is outside my area of expertise to
comment on.
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While we might be quick to judge the success of Carroll’s article, given that it concedes
to only provide a few very meta-level necessary conditions for dance, we must remember that
Carroll is upfront about his exploratory aims. The article is, after all, named “Some Stabs at the
Ontology of Dance” (Carroll, 2019). Still, Carroll’s point regarding purpose and choreographic
principles is important when we try to define vernacular dance. In many northern European
countries, such as the one I come from, there is a pervasive implicit assumption amongst lay
people that vernacular dance is unstructured. In other words, there is an assumption that if dance
is performed by a non-professional dancer, then dancing is an unstructured, chaotic free for all.
Anyone who has gone clubbing in Copenhagen between the years 2000 and 2020 can attest to
the chaotic stumble that takes place. Yet, teasing the bad dancing of my countrymen does
illustrate a point; whether we are aware of it or not, all dancing is a highly structured activity.
Even the Danish stumble is structured around cultural practices, norms, narratives, and traditions.
Dancing then is a highly structured activity, even in the cases in which it looks uncoordinated.
The Danes, for example, still only do their stumble in designated spaces (the club dance floor), at
designated times (when certain music is playing, after 1 AM), and under designated conditions
(when they are dangerously intoxicated). Dancing then is always deeply tied to cultural
traditions, practices, norms, etc.
Not only are such moments highly structured, but it is also doubtful whether or not such
activities can accommodate Beardsley’s definition of overt expression or Langer’s notion of
virtual powers. We might think that social dancing, such as the Danish stumble, is bad dancing.
Nevertheless, that should not preclude us from defining it as dancing. One virtue of Carroll’s
definition is that it can still capture activities that push our intuitions about what counts as dance,
even when those activities are conceptually provocative, such as the case of post-modern dance,
or when the activity seemingly lacks virtuosity such as in the Danish Stumble. By making
function and structure central to the definition of dance, we can capture a range of activities that
by many would be considered non-dance or borderline cases.
With this in mind, Carroll’s definition still puts dance in the same category as other
choreographic practices, and we must therefore do more work before we can get to a more
specific definition of vernacular dances. Specifically, we need to look closer at vernacular dance
as meaning-bearing cultural practices; as complete forms of life.
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Vernacular Dances as Forms of Life
We have seen that dancing is a culturally immersed practice. This is especially so for vernacular
dances, whether the Danish Stumble or the New Zealand Haka. Next, I will continue to hone in
on the cultural embeddedness of vernacular dance to see why we really need to characterize
vernacular dancing as meaning-bearing cultural practices that we live through in the moment of
dancing (The Form of Life Thesis).
On December 30th 2020 CNN ran the following headline, “These robots can boogie down
better than most humans.” (Moos, 2020). The article describes a viral video by robotics company
Boston Dynamics showing off their robots “dancing” to Do You Love Me by the Contours
(1962)6. On December 31st 2020, tech magazine Gizmodo ran a similar headline; “Meet the PintSized Robots That Spontaneously Dance” (Schultz, 2020). A quick browse through news
websites and the academic literature shows a wealth of articles claiming that robots can dance
(Aucouturier et al., 2008; Michalowski et al., 2007; Oliveira et al., 2015; Sullivan & Bers, 2018;
Xia et al., 2012). In fact, some researchers have taken this claim so far, that they are claiming
that humanoid robots can now be used to archive indigenous dances from cultures that are at risk
of extinction (Sandoval et al., 2016). To illustrate this point, Sandoval and colleagues
programmed robots to performed the New Zealand indigenous dance Haka (Sandoval et al.,
2016). Sandoval and colleagues suggest that their robots can be used to archive traditions of
human movement such as dance so that alien anthropologists in the far future will be able to
understand human culture and interactions without any humans being around.
We find a similar tendency in the world of human pet interactions. The internet is replete
with gag books such as Dancing with Cats (Silver & Busch, 2014). There is even a video of
chimpanzees seemingly doing the Conga Line.7 Additionally, biology has long been full of
claims that bees dance to communicate, spiders dance to impress their mates, and Cockatoos
dance because they can nod their heads to the Backstreet Boys.8

6
7

Boston Dynamics: Do you Love Me? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fn3KWM1kuAw
Chimpanzees Dancing the Conga Line https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pwHD0vKLCo

8

Snowball the Dancing Cockatoohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7IZmRnAo6s
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Both in the case of dancing robots and dancing animals, there is an assumption that
dancing is simply movements, perhaps with some accompanying music. If we get the
movements right, that is the end of the story. For example, one team of roboticists claim to have
created dancing robots, because their robot can mimic human movements and generate new
movement sequences by putting the mimicked movements together in a new order (Manfre et al.,
2017) But, as we have already seen the story is not that simple. The general assumption in
robotics that dancing robots are those that can perform preprogrammed movements while music
is present is deeply misguided. Yet, contrasting human dance with the robot and the animal case
teaches us something important about dance. Namely, we learn that dances are embodied
meaning and knowledge systems and that when dancing, we partake in those systems. In fact, as
we shall see, we can make a claim even stronger and say that; when we dance, we live through
the dance (The Form of Life Thesis).
Mingon and Sutton (2021) have directly responded to the robot Hakka case. Through
cognitive science and anthropological research, they demonstrate that simply mimicking the
movements is not equivalent to dancing the haka. Haka has a rich cultural history that is often
misunderstood by westerners (as we saw Carroll doing). For example, when European sailors
arrived in New Zealand, they could not understand how a threatening war dance could also be
used to welcome newcomers:
Was it a battle song that they performed for us? The solemn, profound character of their
music might lead us to think so; yet some of the movements seemed to be appropriate to
a rendering of a lovers’ contest. Be that as it may, whatever their intention, whether it be
victory or love that they celebrate in this manner, the fact remains that they have a music
of overwhelming force. (d'Urville, 1950, 250)
While most people think of Haka as the war dance that is performed before Rugby Games in
Australia and New Zealand, the dance serves a wide range of social and epistemological
functions. Haka is danced as a way to grieve, honor, celebrate, or even process information. In
fact, Haka can be used in a number of situations that, to a western audience, seem counterintuitive because the dance is often thought of as aggressive. Yet, as Mingon and Sutton point
out, media and culture are often concerned with how rituals appear and not how it feels to
perform the ritual (Mingon & Sutton, 2021).
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The claim about feeling is important. Dances feel a certain way, because they have an
epistemic effect on the dancer. The Haka is used to embody a set of cultural traditions and a way
of thinking. The dance is literally used as a tool to think through various situations. In short, most
dances are deeply tied to culture. Dances develop through human culture and often function as
systems that the dancer embodies to think, feel, and experience in the mode of the dance; simply
put, in the moment of dancing, we live through the dance.
When interviewing Haka practitioners, it becomes clear that the Haka is a way for
practitioners to both embody the past and act upon the present. This is not to say that the past is
stored propositionally the same way that history books or folk stories are preserved. Rather, the
affect, habits, attitudes, and ways of thinking are preserved and relived through dances. Again,
we see that vernacular dances are often all-encompassing, they are a complete framework
through which we act in the world.
We see this phenomenon of a culture living through dance very vividly in breaking
culture. The values, attitudes, and feelings of the Bronx in the 1970s are actively relived through
breaking; one does not “breakdance,” one becomes a B-Boy (Schloss, 2009). The antiauthoritarian, hyper individualist and cutthroat survival culture of the South Bronx is reembodied every time a B-Boy or B-Girl challenges someone to “battle” on the dance floor:
Many b-boys feel that these emotions—and the environment that produced them—were
literally encoded into the songs by the original social context in which they were
recorded. As Richard “Breakeasy” Santiago, a Brooklyn-based b-boy in his early 40s
who serves as a mentor to many younger dancers, explains: If you were to go back in
time and...listen to that record being played while the conditions and the environment are
around at that moment in time, you [would] understand why is it that we move[d] the
way we did…
When the song is blasted through huge speakers—and properly danced to—that time and
place are virtually reconstituted. The songs paint a three-dimensional picture of an
environment that b-boys can then enter through the dance. By engaging with the music,
the dancer can experience the emotions of the original musicians—and the original bboys. (Schloss, 2009, 23-24)
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We see here that dances function not only as a collective way to affectively experience the past
(a form of collective memory) but dances scaffold and envelope dancers in a shared environment
of meaning. To dance is to act through a shared hermeneutical context (more on this later). In
breaking, sticking out your tongue has a very specific meaning (to signal spite). This same
gesture has a completely different meaning in the Haka. In fact, in the Haka, the use of the
tongue is contextually flexible, and its meaning is interpreted in relation to the environment,
context, and the other movements of the group and the individual dancer. Therefore, when we
dance, we do not only learn a dance system consisting of steps and transitions; dancing means
being privy to and acting in accordance with deep-rooted cultural traditions. These traditions
come with habits, movements, affect, and ways of thinking. As demonstrated by Shay Wells
when studying native American dance, dances are epistemological systems (Welch, 2019). When
we dance, we not only reexperience the affect, and habits of a culture, and it's past, we use that
dance to enact the present and move us into the future. Dances are, worlds we step into and use
to move forward, facilitated by the past; vernacular dances are forms of life (The Form of Life
Thesis).
Mingon and Sutton, are fully justified in arguing that robots do not dance, and the
Sandoval robots are not performing the Haka (Mingon & Sutton, 2021, 21). When we dance the
Haka, we are in an active relationship of being hyper-sensitively attuned to one another under the
shared meaningful context of the dance; I perform the movements I do because of what you are
doing and because of what is happening in the environment, and in the music. The robots, on the
other hand, have been preprogrammed to execute a series of movements. The robot does not
move through a form of life. Even more sophisticated robots that might be slightly more reactive
are not dancing because they do not have the affective, cultural, or phenomenological experience
that comes with dancing. As Mingon and Sutton mention (ibid, 6), dancing robots are dealing
with a frame problem that is vaster and more fast-paced than the already insurmountable
standard frame problem. Simply put, Robots do not understand context, are not epistemically
changed by context, and do not feel anything (unless, of course, someone solves the hard
problem of consciousness).
The trickier case is non-human animals. Do bees actually dance? Are Conga-line
chimpanzees dancing? Can a bird dance to the Backstreet boys? Like many things in life, the
33

answer is somewhat complicated. Non-human animals often seem to proto dance. For example,
more intelligent mammals such as cats, dogs, and pigs, can often move in playful, somewhat
rhythmic patterns with their humans (Merritt, 2021). In such cases, there is a buildup repertoire
of habit, skill, and meaning between the human and the non-human animal. There is in virtue of
a relationship a (short) tradition of interaction and meaning.
Still, no non-human animal species on earth intentionally uses rhythmic organized
activities to scaffold affect, knowledge, cultural identity, or any of the other numerous functions
that make dancing living cultural activities. Furthermore, one of the hallmarks of vernacular
dances is to use and combine the inheritance of the dance to create a new context. Put differently,
when dancing, we use the steps, gestures, meanings, and the context, as generative building
blocks to create new contexts. Dances are not just recapitulations of the past; they are also used
to flexibly create new traditions, steps, meaning, and more. As in language, dance movements
can operate as a system that enables practitioners to create new meaning. This is often done in
moments of improvisation but can also happen as a dance is being performed in a new context or
through deliberate choreographic choices (note, however, that I am not claiming that dance is a
language. Dance is language-like). For example, the meaning of an iconic step from the
choreography Mexican Breakfast (Bob Fosse, 1969) became the “single ladies dance” when
performed by Beyonce in the music video accompanying the number one hit Single Ladies
(2009). The step, which is now the “Single Ladies Dance,” has taken on a new meaning
associated with Beyonce, dating norms, and women’s empowerment. Furthermore, when
improvising, any dancer with competency in western culture can perform the step to invoke the
cultural reference embedded into the step. Neither non-human animals nor robots have the ability
to intentionally generate new contexts through the use of a generative dance system. In the case
of robots, even responsive robots, movements are at best reactionary. The same is the case of
non-human animals. Humans engaging in dance-like activity with their non-human counterparts
may be considered dancing - on the side of the human. Nevertheless, on the non-human animal
side of things, they can at best be said to proto dance.
To underscore the central point here; It is not that one must have propositional linguistic
capabilities to understand that one is dancing. Dances are not living cultures through language.
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For example, in both breaking and in capoeira9, songs and stories that accompany the dance are
often historically inaccurate, scattered, out of order, and generally misleading. As Christ
Downing writes about Capoeira:
songs in capoeira performance are not, from a phenomenological perspective, historical
storage. Sung historical references do not primarily preserve information or recount a
narrative. In fact, they are usually a meagre source of information and too poorly
organized to serve as history. The sparse shifts in projection are too disorienting, the
detail provided too sparse, and the jumble of the historical sequence during a game too
confusing. The most salient experiential dimension of this form of remembering is the
affective weight, the violent gravity that these events evoke. Historical references, like
coaching, are an evocative form of applied poetry. A capoeirista does not sing in the roda
primarily to remember; he or she remembers through song to feel the deeper truth of the
game. (Downey, 2005, 85)
Vernacular dances then let the dancer relive the affective, non-propositional attitudes, skills,
habits, and modes of perceiving of a cultural tradition. While my house cat often will roll around
on its back when I break in the living room, there is no cultural re-embodying taking place in my
cat. Humans, on the other hand, use their dancing to not only be connected to a culture and its
past but also to move that culture forward; again, vernacular dancing is a form of life. Dances
are, in many respects, systems of cultural action. For example, at the death of Los Angles rapper
Nipsey Hustle in March 2019 the local Compton community came together to grieve and move
on through dance. In doing so, not only did the local community process their loss, but the
dances performed around the death also evolved through new added historical and affective
significance (Dance Studies Association, keynote panel, 2019). Similarly, Mingon and Sutton
point out that the New Zealand Haka was performed in solidarity after the Christ Church
massacre in 2019 (Mingon & Sutton, 2021).
What also becomes clear from these examples, and numerous other examples is that
dances are also a way of remembering. This is not a form of declarative memory but a form of

9

A Brazilian dance that is both dance and martial art.
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cultural memory that can be passed down through generations. Dancers not only remember the
collective affective memories of their tradition when they dance but also remember in a felt
embodied fashion their own experiences with their culture. Across case studies of breaking
(Schloss, 2009), club dancing (Salkind, 2018), native American dance (Welch, 2019), capoeira
(Downey, 2005), Haka (Waitoki et al., 2018), and many others, we get the same conclusion.
Dancing, in part, functions as a form of non-propositional collective recollection.
There could be a concern that the view of dances as embodying cultural traditions only
applies to specific communities and experts. However, we can accommodate such a worry if we
revisit my two favorite examples, club dancing, and the standard U.S wedding. In both cases,
laypeople of various skill level interact to varying degrees of success. In each scenario, we see
anything from a stumble to elaborate displays of virtuosity. Both in club dance as on wedding
dance floors, the participants are engaging in types of dancing that are intimately tied to social
rituals, norms, and their respective contexts. In these contexts, social practices around marriage,
procreation, the family unit are embodied through the dancing, the (often cringeworthy) fatherdaughter dance at many American weddings being the perfect example. In the father-daughter
dance, patriarchal values are embodied through a dance ritual in which the father has to “give
away” his daughter and gets to enjoy a last moment of intimacy before the daughter is no longer
“his.” The father-daughter dance looks the way it does because of the value system that is being
reembodied through the dance.
Overall, we can say then that dances are inseparable from cultures. Even art dancing (the
kind of dance that thinks of itself as art and is produced by people in the art world) exists as
responses to previous dances and previous art dances and actively engages with the current and
past art cultural environments. The many experimental dances made under the banner of postmodern or contemporary dance are, despite their boundary-pushing nature, still in contact with
the cultural traditions to which they respond. Furthermore, such experimental dance traditions do
embody the habits, affect, skills, and so forth of the art movement to which they belong.
Again, the overarching claim is that vernacular dancing are meaning bearing cultural
practices that we embody; in the moment of dance, we live through the world of the dance (The
Form of Life Thesis).
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Everyday Aesthetics and Forms of Life
Next, I want to further expand on the form of life thesis by circling back to everyday aesthetics
and John Dewey’s notion of having an experience.10 Looking at Dewey’s notion of experience
will allow us to understand how the dancer steps into and lives through the form of life when
they partake in vernacular dance.
The term “aesthetic experience” has a long, complicated history within the field of
aesthetics (Nanay, 2014). For Dewey, however, aesthetic experiences are a form of heightened
phenomenological experiences (1934/2005). These experiences, whether brought about by
artworks in art settings or quotidian objects and activities (everyday art), have an enveloping
structure. Having an experience is to have all of one's senses bring forth a complete and coherent
phenomenology. An experience as such has a middle, beginning, and end (like a narrative) and
brings its subjects into a state of attunement and harmony. Deweyan experiences envelop their
subjects and bring forth an interactive harmony between the situation and the agent. For
example, when we see local music legend Andy Britton play with Kavatica at the Hi-Tone, we
do not just listen to the music. Rather, the soundscape, the venue, the appearance of the band
creates a totality that presents a unique aesthetic world. For an hour, we are enveloped by the
aesthetic world produced by the band-venue experience.
Artworks, or everyday art such as vernacular dancing, creates experiences through
aesthetic sources; visual presentation, sound coherence, tactile experience, all the various ways
sensory experience can come together to present a heightened totality. In short everyday arts
such as vernacular dance aim to produce experience through aesthetic means.
The classic example of an everyday art aesthetic experience is a nice meal. The
presentation of the food, the interior, the feeling of the chairs and tables, the taste of the food, the
sound, and the ambiance, create a world that the dining person can live through. When at a
restaurant or at a nice home-cooked meal, agents live through the enveloping world of that meal.

In Dewey scholarship on Art as Experience, it is often a scholarly convention to underscore “An experience.” This
convention is to distinguish between ordinary everyday non-aesthetic phenomenology and heightened immersive
aesthetic experiences. I adopt this convention in this sub-section to help the reader.
10
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Such an experience has a beginning, middle, and end; sitting down and getting ready to eat the
meal and leaving the restaurant.
As the guests go through the meal, the complete context of the meal aesthetic experience
brings the guest into a happy, joyful state of heightened phenomenology; they taste more, hear
more, laugh together, tell stories, pay attention to the texture of the food, and so forth. The
context of the experience has organized the participants into interacting in a specific pattern.
When having an experience, the experience organizes the participants into certain patterns of
behavior and interaction. Aesthetic experience is importantly conduct regulating (a point that
becomes important when we talk about the massive hermeneutical background in chapter 4).
In this way art and everyday art, uses aesthetic contexts to teach participants about
culture, history, politics, philosophy, and more. Aesthetic experience for Dewey has an
enculturating function, in which the experience both teaches about culture and lets participants
live through the culture (Dewey, 1934/2005, chapter 10).
With this little summary of Dewey in mind, we can now see how vernacular dances are
everyday art that dancers live through (The Form of Life Thesis). Whether we are talking about
Dominican merengue, New Zealand haka, American breaking, club dancing, these dances all
produce enveloping experiences. The social-cultural systems that we call vernacular dances use
aesthetic elements to produce complete worlds the participants partake in and live through. When
a bboy/bgirl steps into the middle of the dance circle, points at their opponent, and the crowd is
chanting, “battle, battle, battle,” they have an experience. Everything from the norms in play, to
the music, to the air density and temperature of the room creates a complete coherent and
enveloping aesthetic experience. At that moment, the breaker is not an accountant, a parent, a
homeowner. At that moment, they are a breaker living the breaking life.
Similarly, when dancing merengue with neighbors and friends at a local bodega in
queens, the dancers are undergoing a complete experience with beginning, middle, and end,
which perpetuate a certain kind of multicultural New York City lifestyle. Such an experience
teaches the dancer about their culture by letting them live through the culture. Typically
vernacular dance experiences begin from the moment the dancer sets foot in the venue, dance
space, etc., and stops when dancers leave the dance context (go home, go to eat, DJ stops the
music).
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Vernacular dancing as an aesthetic experience often creates a form of mental and
contextual break from once daily tasks, chores, and responsibilities. These dances also present
opportunities for dancers to forefront other parts of their identity or temporarily be someone else
entirely. Of course, not every instance of vernacular dancing is as powerful and successful as the
ideal aesthetic experience; sometimes, dancers are behind on their taxes or have things on their
minds. This, however, does not change the fact that vernacular dances are complete systems that
the dancers live through in the moment of dance (The Form of Life Thesis).
I further want to stress that for many agents, vernacular dances are also forms of life
when they are not actively dancing. Many people organize their lives around dance subcultures.
However, in this dissertation, I will only focus on what happens in the moment of the dance.

Dance Styles, Organizing Principles, and Meaning
We have seen that vernacular dances are cultural practices that the dancer lives through in the
moment of dance (The Form of Life Thesis). Dancers are re-enacting, re-telling, and reinvigorating specific histories, cultures, norms, traditions, and beliefs when they perform steps
within a codified dance form (Chang, 2007; Goldman, 2010; Schloss, 2009; Welch, 2019). This
conclusion is important because we further learn that dance movement is always meaningful.
Besides being about just the forms created, dance is always the manifestation of a set of
organizing principles, and therefore always carries with it the meaning of those underlying
principles. Next, I will go into more detail on how dance movements within improvisational
vernacular dance create meaning. I will pay special attention to organizing principles, the overall
narrative structure of dance meaning, and the temporal structure of dance meaning.
We begin with organizing principles. Organizing principles refer to the different
principles that make a dance style appear as a unique practice. Dance styles have different
norms, traditions, gestures, rules, and so forth that the dancer must adhere to as they are
performing the dance; a system of steps is, of course, usually the most important organizing
principle. One is doing house dance when adhering to the steps that are in the canon of house
dance steps. We are doing two-step when we are doing the steps in the two-step canon (whether
or not that canon is an oral tradition or a codified tradition). In short, when we partake in a
specific style of dance, we are adhering to the organizing principles of that style (including,
steps, norms, rules, and more).
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Importantly, when we live through a dance, the meaning of our practice becomes
structured in part by the organizing principles we are adhering to. In this way, all dance
movement is in some capacity meaningful. Hence, we can identify several layers of meaning
displayed by the dancing body: formal, gestural, representational, affective. However, regardless
of the meaning displayed in each movement sequence, the dance as a whole always also carries
with it the underlying meaning of the structure that is being used to bring forth the dance.
Any movement sequence in dance then is multi-meaningful. A movement or movement
series not only points back to the principles used to generate it, the movement can also represent,
gesture, and transfer affect all at the same time (see Figure 1). Dance, meaning then, is always

Figure 1 - A snapshot of a dance movement. The movement contains multiple layers of meaning
in a dynamic gestalt. Overall, the entire gestalt is the expression of the organizing principle to
which the dance adheres. The individual movement not only expresses these principles but also
carries meaning through gesture, affect, emotion, virtual powers, and representation.
multilayered. Consequently, when we define dance, we must include in our definition that dance
is an inherently meaning carrying activity and that this meaning is tied to organizing principles.
Importantly, the fact that dance is inherently expressive and meaning carrying does not
necessitate that vernacular dance is performative; that is, it does not require an audience. In fact,
the meaning expressed in the dance act can and often is fully reflexive; that is, we often dance
simply by ourselves for ourselves. In such cases the dancer is both the generator and consumer of
the meaning through the expressive act; one of the many reasons why dance is often described as
an experience that is meaningful to the dancer themselves. It could be argued that this makes the
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dancer their own audience, but such an objection seem to stretch the meaning of the word
audience. Dance does not need to be done for the sake of other people. Often dance can be a
solitary activity.
What emerges is a view of dance as a gestalt; here meant as something that emerges as a
product that is not reducible to the sum of its parts (not meant in the technical sense used in
gestalt psychology). What we see in Figure 1 is a depiction of the overlaying meaning that
emerges in dance movement. Each part of the body can be read separately as displaying affect,
gesture, representations, and more. Each part of the body also adds up to a totality in which the
meaning of that totality cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. If we take the pose from Figure
1 as our example (a classic pose from contemporary American hip-hop dance), then we can
analyze parts of the pose as holding separate meanings and look at the pose overall. For example,
the left hand and arm in itself is a gesture that represents a sign, especially through the
positioning of the hand and the fingers (in this case, the slicing of the throat, which indicates that
the dancer is about to outdo their opponent). The ninety-degree angle of the left arm also adds to
the overall meaning of the pose by creating a line that breaks the upward-leaning curve of the
rest of the figure. The bend in the leg, the slight lean of the hip and torso, and the left arm close
to the body create a right-leaning arch that is broken up by the vertical line of the right arm (a
pose that means to stand one's ground in anti-authoritarian defiance while still being
idiosyncratically oneself).
Narrative, Retention, and Protention
Next, I will go into more detail regarding the unfolding dance gestalt by analyzing two
structural components of dance movements and meaning. First, I will show how the overall
meaning of a dance sequence has a structure similar to a narrative. Second, I will demonstrate
how the temporal structure of dance movements themselves at each moment has a meaning
structure similar to Husserl’s theory of internal time consciousness; the present moment includes
retention and protention.
Once a series of movements are connected, further layers of meaning are added. That is,
once we are looking at movement and not a pose, a dynamic gestalt emerges. In such a gestalt,
the meaning of each moment in time is holistically engendered by all the other movements that
came before it in the series. Accordingly, dance movements generate a gestalt with a structure
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similar to a narrative (beginning, middle, end). While I do not want to claim that dance
movements always narrate, the movement gestalt does have many of the same characteristics as
a narrative. Narratives are holistic entities; when we read a story, the current point in the story
only makes sense because of what came before it, and once we have the complete narrative in
front of us, a new meaning emerges from the totality of the product (Schechtman, 2014, 100).
Metaphorically speaking, when we are looking at dance, the journey through the movement has a
different meaning at each stage from beginning to completion. As we shall see later, the
overflow of static and dynamic meaning that is present in dance makes it pragmatically near
impossible that a mind which is solely (or mostly) representational could understand or react to
dance movements. At each moment, the current pose holds its own multifaceted meaning while
also adding to the dynamically growing gestalt (see Figure 2). In consequence, when we
appreciate dance or dancing with others, we are involved in a dual-task; we must read each
movement in all its richness and read the totality of the gestalt.
To clarify, dance movements themselves have an intrinsic narrative-like gestalt structure
of meaning. In addition, when we appreciate dance as an audience member, we read and react to
this unfolding gestalt. Finally, when we dance with others during improvisational vernacular
dance, all dancers co-create and react to each other’s unfolding gestalts (a lot more on this in
chapter 4).
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Figure 2 - A four-second sliver of dance improvisation performed by Frankie J. at the 2017 HipHop Obsessions House Dance Semifinal (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mmvfm2GdtsM).
Each movement in this series is understood both individually and as a growing gestalt. The
understanding we have of the series at the end is informed by the trajectory of the entire series.

We can further analyze dance movements in terms of their temporal structure. The
temporal structure of dance movements functions very similarly to Husserl’s account of timeconsciousness (Husserl, 1991). While it is outside the scope of this project to go into detail
regarding Husserl’s account of time consciousness, the account is roughly speaking this; in each
present moment of phenomenal experience, we experience not only the present but also the most
recent past and what we anticipate will happen next. Each moment of experience (the primal
impression) contains the recent past (retention) and anticipation of what will immediately happen
next (protention) (Husserl 1928/1964). The easiest way to understand this structure of experience
is to think of our experience of a melody. When a tune comes on, we will not experience it as a
melody if we did not retain the previous nodes. In addition, we would also not experience a tune
as a melody unless each node came with built-in anticipation; this is why we can clap and sing
along. In short, our experience of the world typically contains the immediate past and
anticipation of the immediate future.
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Both dance movements in themselves and the way we perceive them as audiences contain
the Husserlian tri-partite temporal structure. Each moment in a dance movement sequence gains
its particular effect and meaning in light of what came immediately before it and where the
sequence is about to go next. Similarly, when we perceive dance, we understand each movement
in terms of retention and protention (see Figure 3). From the perspective of the audience, even
while dance movements are constantly vanishing, that is, they disappear as soon as they are
created (Siegel, 1972), we still keep what has recently passed in our short-term memory, in the
specious present (James, 1890/1950). For the observer, like the melody, the present moment in
dance contains a trail of what came immediately before it and anticipation of what is to come
next.

Figure 3 - Our experience of dance movements, inspired by Husserl’s account of time
consciousness. From the audience point of view, we experience each dance movement as being
meaningful because of what came immediately before it and what we anticipate to happen next.
Both the movements in themselves and how we experience them adheres to the retention
protention structure.
It is important to understand the role of protention. From the point of view of the
audience, many dance movements gain their particular effect in part by “playing with” the
protentional structure of the viewer’s perception. For example, by moving one’s arms forward in
a reach but suddenly pulling one’s chest backward the dancer can create an effect of being
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dragged away by an unseen force. This effect works in part because the structure of the arms
forward movement contains the protentional expectation that the movement is going to continue
forward. By pulling the chest backward, the dancer breaks the expectation, thereby generating a
dynamic virtual effect of force. Dance movements as a class of movements often artistically
exploit the protentional structure of perception by both following expectation and breaking
expectation.
While dance always contains the structure of the narrative-like holistic gestalt, dance
movements do not have to narrate. This is not to say that dance can never narrate. Sometimes
dance movements do, in fact, generate a narrative which in turn is layered on top of the other
aspects of meaning that we have already identified. In such cases, the dancer deliberately utilizes
their body to generate gestures, representations, affect, and so on, which in succession indicates a
narrative. Such narratives are at times very simplistic; for example, in breakdancing, it is typical
for dancers to indicate insult narratives. Other times, individual segments of the dance can tie
together into a larger narrative with a complex story arch as in some forms of ballet.
We have seen that vernacular dances are a form of life that the dancer lives through in the
moment of performance. In the dance, the mover adheres to a series of organizing principles
dictated by the specific dance style they are enacting. Adhering to organizing principles
contributes to bringing forth the enveloping aesthetic experience that makes the dance a system
the dancer can live through. When enacting a dance style, a dynamically unfolding gestalt
emerges.
We have looked at two features of such a gestalt; its unfolding overall meaning mirrors the
structure of a basic narrative, and each movement sequence gains its individual meaning due to
its temporal structure of retention, primal impression, and protention. Vernacular dances as
forms of life are inherently tied to the way movements use temporality to generate meaning.
From the perspective of the onlooker, we have seen that we also understand the overall meaning
of dance sequence in a narrative structure and that each unfolding movement is also understood
in terms of retention and protention.
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Exemplar Pattern Theory of Dance and Everyday Aesthetics
Defining anything using necessary and sufficient conditions is difficult. The problem is, in part,
that definitions build on necessary and sufficient conditions regarding human social-cultural
activity are immensely brittle; all it takes is one counterexample, and the definition fails. Overall,
it is often a non-productive strategy to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for things
outside of the abstract such as math or pure theory. Given everything I have said about
vernacular improvisational dance as forms of life, I want to wrap up this discussion by applying
the idea of an open concept, an exemplar, and a pattern to the form of life thesis.
I am not interested in what makes dance art. Neither am I interested in how we can get
other people to think of dance as art. I am interested in vernacular dances, ranging from dancing
in the mirror while singing to a blow-dryer to full-blown organized sub-cultures such as
breaking, salsa, hustle, or krumping. These dances do not need to be art to fulfill their social and
personal function, and practitioners often do not care if people outside their sub-culture think of
it as art or not art. So, when defining what dance is as a practice, we are looking at cultural
traditions and, importantly, traditions that are in communication with each other.
First, we must understand that since vernacular dance is an evolving human practice, we
can describe it using what philosophers of art have called “an open concept” (Weitz, 1956).
Concepts are considered open when we can think of real or imagined cases that force the
evaluator to exercise critical reflection in determining if the case study belongs within the
concept. Through such judgment, the boundaries of the concept are slowly augmented, and the
concept itself becomes more nuanced over time. Importantly open concepts are malleable to
change given changes in practices on the ground. Accordingly, open concepts are sensitive to
empirical reality and can therefore not be a purely armchair exercise. For example, art itself is a
notoriously open concept. The aim of many art traditions and artists is to subvert and challenge
the previous art tradition, which means that art is always in conversation with itself.
“Vernacular dance” is similarly an open concept because dance traditions and practices
are constantly evolving, responding to themselves, and in dialogue with larger social, cultural,
and political trends. For example, various styles of ballet developed as responses to previous
choreographic practices (Pakes, 2020). Voguing and bone-breaking developed out of queer
ballroom and disco dance practices in the nineteen seventies and eighties (DeFrantz, 2016).
46

Many hip-hop dances (such as top-rock or new jack swing) developed from mambo dancing in
the South Bronx in the nineteen sixties (Chalfont, 2006). Breakdancing even had a short-lived
punk-rock derivative known as circus style in the early two-thousands as a response to footwork
puritanism. What I wish to highlight is that to understand what dance is as cultural practice, is
also to understand the way dances are living traditions that develop from each other.
Additionally, dance practices are always in contact with social and material conditions in the
larger societies in which they take place.
“Vernacular dance” being an open concept means that we must understand dance across
at least two different time scales. First, we must understand what makes dancing dance in the act
(short timescale). Second, we must understand dance intergenerationally (long timescale). So, we
must understand what makes something dance as it is unfolding in the act, but also how the
people who manifest these acts refine, develop, innovate, discuss, teach, and live their practice.
To help us trace our open concepts of vernacular dance, we can use an exemplar
knowledge definition (Seeley, 2020, 103). Such a definition partitions something into a category
by investigating how closely related the thing in question is to a group of exemplary proto-types.
For example, we can define something as a Snuggie™ by seeing how closely it resembles the
original product, which was a woolen blanket with sleeves so that one can operate a remote
control while still being covered by a blanket (See Figure 4). To understand whether the object in
question is, in fact, a Snuggie, one must know something about its etiology (its causal history):
was this object made to be more like a blanket or a hoodie? Is it commercially produced to sell to
screen using consumers in the western market? Does it contain the same sense of purposefully
kitsch and ironic aesthetic as the original Snuggie™? In fact, many products that self-label as a
“Snuggie” are now closer to a small tent that loosely resembles a sweater but are made from
blanket fabric. To understand that these tent-like objects are still, in fact, “Snuggies” is to
understand the causal history of the category. Over time, different Snuggie producers
experimented with the formula and responded to the current state of the market and the various
consumer discourses that developed on the internet regarding the “Snuggie™.” A specific
Snuggie aesthetic developed over time, accentuating various features of the product, highlighting
the humorous aspect of the Snuggie™. To know whether an object is a Snuggie is, therefore, to
track its causal history towards an original set of exemplars.
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This, however, also means that with enough time, objects become thickly or thinly
defined as one thing or another. For example, bar stools are thinly chairs, or certain Snuggie-like
products, such as the Burrito Blanket™, are thinly a Snuggie (see, Figure 4). So, our definitions
of categories and objects exist within Venn diagrams of overlapping categories. The Burrito
Blanket™ is thinly a Snuggie™ and perhaps more thickly a costume.
The important point is that to understand how something belongs to a category is also to
understand how it relates to well-known outliers (Seeley, 2020, 114). In art dance, for example,
cases of post-modern dance, art happenings, some works of butoh, installations, and others,
respond to the art dance tradition by existing at the periphery of our conventional understanding
of what is dance. Similarly, in vernacular dance, new social media practices such as TikTok
trends and TikTok challenges exist at the periphery of our proto-typical understanding of
vernacular dance by being a hybrid between short film making, music production, movement,
and delayed social media platform mediated interaction. By creating a spectrum woven together
by a causal history, we can situate a cultural practice by understanding where it comes from and
where it is going. This is a family resemblance approach (Wittgenstein, 1968), that relates
families through their response, development, and causal relation to one another.
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Figure 4 - The etiology of the Snuggie. To know if a given product belongs in the Snuggie
category is to understand what tradition and exemplars that product is responding to.
Furthermore, we can understand if the product is thinly or thickly within the category by seeing
how the product relates to causally related outliers.
Drawing on everything we have explored so far, we can say that vernacular dance is a
cultural practice that involves moving the body in accordance with implicit and explicit
organizing principles. Dancing is a culturally tethered practice in which human movement
becomes multi-layered with meaning. This meaning comes from several sources; the organizing
principles, the individual gestures, symbols, affect, emotion, and intentions, but also the narrative
and temporal structure of dance movements. Furthermore, what is expressed can be real or
virtual. Each individual movement carries meaning, and so does the emerging gestalt “the
dance.” Movements can be performed with overflowing expressiveness or in other less frequent
cases with minimal expressiveness. Vernacular dancing is in constant cultural, historical, and
affective conversation with itself and the world around it. Vernacular dancing carries with it the
past to create something new. Vernacular dancing is prototypically tied to music, but given the
etiology of some dance forms needs not necessarily be performed with music. Dance can either
express content or simply be about itself.
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One of the core elements in most dance traditions is the transformation of ordinary
movement into rhythmic movement (Bresnahan, 2019a). But, again, we can think of outlier cases
that might be causally connected to our core concept of dance but tries to move un-rhythmically.
Similarly, tight coupling to the music is prototypical of vernacular dance but need not always be
the case.
All of this adds up to the idea that vernacular dances are forms of life that we live through
in the act of dancing. At this point, we have a group of core concepts, outer core concepts, and
periphery concepts that, across various combinations that make up the family of activities we
prototypically label vernacular dance. Thus, in our defining of vernacular dance it is important to
understand the philosophical notion of a pattern (Dennett, 1991; Gallagher, 2013).
In simple terms, a pattern is a set of components, the totality of which are jointly
sufficient to constitute a certain phenomenon. For example, in debates regarding the self, it has
been said that the self is not one thing. Rather, aspects such as the minimal self, narrative self,
affective self, performative self, and others, are jointly sufficient to generate the dense
phenomenon of self, or self-pattern (Gallagher 2013). In terms of dance, the various components
we have examined so far jointly make up various vernacular dance forms. Expressiveness,
organizing principles, embedded cultural knowledge, dance systems, adherence to music, and so
forth, each become jointly sufficient to label something a dance form.
Pattern theory is typically used to explain the differences between causation and
constitution. Each of the components of a pattern relates to each other in ways that are unique to
that specific configuration. From that configuration emerges a gestalt (Craver 2006). The most
common example comes from neuroscience; in the brain, various centers of organization activate
in oscillating waves that dynamically impact each other. From these oscillations emerges a new
higher level of organization (Kelso, 1995; 2016). The higher level of organization is then, in
turn, capable of interacting with other components at that same level of causation, creating
further patterns. Patterns at various levels scale up or down depending on the level of explanation
we are surveying.
When we see some humans weirdly moving about and we ask ourselves are they dancing,
the answer requires understanding the activity at hand as a pattern. Vernacular dancing comes as
dance forms or dance styles, and each of these can be understood as a unique pattern of
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components that give rise to the emergent dance. Each of the components constitutes the specific
dance form that we can then trace in our etiology in relation to the exemplar cases. In other
words, once we have analyzed the pattern of activity, we can then place that activity as being
thickly or thinly a specific vernacular dance form when compared to our exemplars. Given
everything said in chapter one so far, the prototypical exemplar of vernacular dance at its core:
•

Has a culturally developed dance system.

•

Has culturally determined functions.

•

Adheres to implicit or explicit organizing principles.

•

Expresses meaning either virtually or through self-expression.

•

Has a narrative structure of overall meaning in each instantiation.

•

Has a meaningful temporal structure of retention and protention for each movement.

•

Is more expressive than what is necessary for daily instrumental movements.

•

Is performed with music.

•

Contains rhythmic human movement.

With these core features belonging to our prototypical dance concept, we can now look at
individual cases, analyze the patterns of their components, and thereby see how thinly or thickly
they match our exemplars.
To come full circle, let us briefly return to the notion of everyday aesthetics. The overall
takeaway from our first eight sub-sections of chapter one is that vernacular improvisational
dances are prototypically meaning-bearing cultural practices that we live through. Vernacular
dances create aesthetic experiences that fully envelope the dancers and have an enculturating
function. These practices have a set of prototypical features that can be thickly or thinly present
and use these features to create such aesthetic experience. Vernacular dances are aesthetic
practices of the everyday that are concerned with producing meaningful experiences that
transform their practitioners; a person is not just breakdancing; a person becomes a bboy or a
bgirl. Dewey argues that art is a universal practice that establishes community by teaching
people about their civilization and culture through “experience” (Dewey, 2005, Chapter 14).
While one might have reservations about this broad definition of “art,” vernacular dances do
fulfill this enculturation function through aesthetic experiences. As “everyday art” (Saito, 2007;
2017) or, better yet, an everyday practice, vernacular dances enculturate their participants into
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communities and sub-communities through aesthetic experiences without necessarily being fine
art.

Which Kind of Dance improvisation?
I have provided a general definition of vernacular dance as forms of life. But, this dissertation
focuses on vernacular improvised dance. Hence, for the reader unfamiliar with improvised dance
(freestyle in industry terms), the improvisation part might still seem opaque. In fact, there are
many ways in which dance can be improvised (Bresnahan, 2015).
For example, sometimes there is wiggle room within choreographed dance for a dancer to
do something of their own choosing within a specific spot in the choreography (for the next six
eight-counts, you may do as you please). Other times there is flexibility within a choreography to
perform steps with one’s own personal flair (I choose to do the pas de bourrée in a more bouncy
fashion). In this dissertation, I speak of neither of these types. Neither am I thinking of fast
composition; when someone makes a choreography on the spot.
Here I am speaking of those dances in which there is no choreography, and the dance
session produces no choreography. Instead, the practice is open-ended. Dancers come into the
situation and interact with each other or dance by themselves, not forced to do one thing or
another. Their actions are free within the parameters of the dance system and organizing
principles of that type of dance. This is unlike, say “The Electric Slide” or “The Cupid Shuffle,”
in which dancers are being given instructions on what to do. This type of improvisation is also
dissimilar to stand-up comedy improvisation in which actors are being given prompts from the
audience. Rather, the type of vernacular dance improvisation I have in mind is interactive and
open-ended, primarily between the people doing the dancing.
For example, Ed walks into the club. Recent hit “Astronaut in the Ocean” comes on. Ed
makes eye contact with Becca, they start dancing without a plan responding to each other’s
movements. After three songs, Ed is tired and needs a beer. The interaction stops. Another
example, I go to the jam with my breaking group 5 Crew Dynasty. We see competing breaking
crew Dynamic Rockers across the room. Stephen points at the opponents. Everyone rushes to
form a circle. Dance battling for thirty minutes, we take turns dancing in the middle of the circle,
trash-talking, and responding to each other’s movements. In the dance battle, we can freely
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choose which codified “breaking moves” we use against each other. The DJ announces the event
is about to officially begin, the dance battle interaction ends. A final example, we are sitting in
Union Square relaxing with our friends doing some people-watching. Little do we know it is
international samba week. A Brazilian samba band emerges from the subway station. People
begin to form around the band. Those who know how to samba (and probably knew the band
was coming) dance with each other closest to the band. Those who do not know samba are at the
periphery of the crowd. All members of the crowd are responding to each other but without a
plan. They are seeing where the interaction will take them. The dancers closest to the band are
using codified samba steps and organizing principles to respond to each other’s movements.
Again, without a plan. The band plays for two hours and then disappears back into the subway
station. The interaction ends.
The common thread in these examples is that the improvised vernacular dances I am
covering here are not spontaneous free for all. They are, as we have already discussed, governed
by dance systems, organizing principles, norms, history, and more, which create an aesthetic
experience (The Form of Life Thesis). Nevertheless, within the parameters of the dance agents
interact without a pre-set plan or instruction, these vernacular dances are open-ended practices.
Summary and on to Dance Cognition
I have argued that vernacular dances are meaning-bearing cultural practices; they are forms of
life we step into and move through as we dance (The Form of Life Thesis). Vernacular dance is
a practice that has some of the same features as fine arts dance but is more universal and takes
place at a much wider selection of spaces and occasions. Vernacular dance need not be prechoreographed; it is often improvised, although sometimes it can be choreographed. Vernacular
dance is a practice and, therefore, typically does not have “works” the same way art has
artworks. This is important because vernacular dance does not need an audience. While
vernacular dancing can have audiences, most frequently, they do not because most people
present are participating. Rather than being limited to appreciation, vernacular dance often serves
a range of functions that can be communal, therapeutic, political, pleasurable, consoling,
ceremonial, and the list goes on. Within such meaning-bearing cultural practices, improvisers
can interact in a non-planned fashion by freely interacting and putting sequences together that fit
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within the constraints of the cultural practice they are participating in (for example, New Jack
Swing, Pop, and Lock, Waltz, Pogo, etc.).
A prototypical vernacular dance is performed to music, has an explicit or implicit system
of steps, often involves more expressiveness than what is necessary for doing the same
movement in a daily task, and serves one or many cultural functions. Many of the movements
often display virtual powers but need not do so. Furthermore, the meaning in dance movements
have a retention protention structure in the form of a developing gestalt.
Next, I will provide an overview of the standard framework in philosophy of mind and
cognitive science, namely representationalism, and use vernacular dance to demonstrate why this
story will not work (The Inadequate Framework Thesis). We will quickly see how vernacular
dances as forms of life pose a serious problem for computational and representational
philosophy.
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2. Representationalist Philosophy and Why it Cannot Account for
Vernacular Improvisational Dance
In this chapter, I will go through the mainstream canonical framework of cognition found in the
analytic philosophy of mind. I will first explain what it means for the mind to be computational
and do computations. Computational cognitive systems are those that generate and manipulate
representations to produce outputs. Hence, I will also spend significant time elucidating the
different standard accounts of mental representations. Once the standard framework is in place, I
will pay special attention to the newest theory within representational philosophy of mind,
namely predictive processing. I first concentrate my criticisms on predictive processing, then I
criticize the larger, more general framework of mental representation.
The overall goal of this chapter is to argue for The Inadequate Framework Thesis, the
idea that representational philosophy of mind and cognitive science cannot adequately account
for improvised vernacular dance. The inadequate framework thesis contains six sub-arguments;
four arguments pertaining to predictive processing and two arguments pertaining to
representations generally. The six arguments are:
•

The Phenomenological Problem.

•

The Affect Problem.

•

The Expressive Movement Problem.

•

The Scaling Up Problem.

•

The Content Problem.

•

The Computational Burden Problem.

I begin my critique by pointing out general problems faced by predictive processing.
Then I expand the critique to looking at problems that emerge as we try to explain dance
cognition through predictive processing. I call the first line of critique the Phenomenological
Problem for predictive processing and, in short, argue that our phenomenological experience of
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the world does not support a predictive processing account. This is especially the case if we take
visual, auditory, and other illusions into account.
Next, The Affect Problem argues that predictive processing cannot adequately take
human affect and emotion into account since affect often cannot be reduced to a matter of error
minimization. In a similar vein, The Expressive Movement Problem argues that expressive and
open-ended movements cannot be reduced to a problem of error minimization because there is
no error criterion. Finally, The Scaling Up Problem demonstrates that predictive processing
cannot readily explain how it scales up to higher-level human desires, such as the desire for
adventure. Similarly, improvisational dance is a process of ongoing ambiguity; thus, on the
predictive processing model, human beings ought not to enjoy, let alone spend time dancing. At
the same time, predictive processing cannot explain how it scales up to the universal human
experience of boredom, given that complete information and predictability ought to be the
optimal human state, we should not experience boredom.
After we have looked at problems specific to predictive processing, I will argue more
generally against mental representations using improvisational vernacular dance. This section of
the chapter attacks the broader category of representational theories of cognition in general.
Specifically, I argue that computational and representational systems run into a type of frame
problem pertaining to the assignment of content to representations regarding open-ended
expressive improvised movements such as dance movements (The Content Problem). This
special version of the frame problem leads to an infinite or near-infinite regress where the
consequence is a computational task too immense for any computational system to complete in
time (The Computational Burden Problem). With this roadmap in place, let us begin by going
over the standard computational and representational theories of mind.

Representations and Why We Must Talk About Them Yet Again
In my first year of graduate school, I attended a talk at an interdisciplinary conference on
cognition. An enactivist philosopher was speaking on the embodied aspects of ontogeny – the
details matter not. Mid talk, a senior scientist from a psychology program raised their hand to ask
if it was true that “Enactivists do not believe in representations?” The philosopher, with a tired
look on their face, pulled up a chair, sat down, and asked the scientist, “what exactly is a
representation? Can you define it?” After some back and forth, the scientist nearly yelled, “Do
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you not believe in neurons firing?” The tired enactivist responded, “well, of course, I believe in
those,” and continued their presentation.
I begin with this anecdote because it is indicative of a problem that has plagued cognitive
science, philosophy, and interdisciplinary work for a while now. This problem re-emerges as
interdisciplinary work featuring the mind sciences becomes increasingly more common. The
problem is this; the way we talk about the mind is by no means standardized, and no word
exemplifies this problem better than “representation.” Within the history of philosophy,
“representation” is a complex, fleshed out, and rather specific concept. Further, ongoing debates
over what representations “are” in an ontological sense, whether or not they even exist, and what
role they might play in cognition have led to the apt nickname “The Representation Wars”
(Clark, 2015). The philosophical notion of a representation often includes commitments such as
representations being discrete items, being language-like, having content, being either veridical
or unveridical, internal to the mind, and the list goes on.
The other cognitive sciences (the sciences dealing with cognition that are not
philosophy), on the other hand, use the notion of “representation” much more loosely. The
notion of representation is typically assumed but under-explained. As we will see, many authors
within cognitive science appeal to representations in a loose fashion, often simply meaning
patterns of neuronal activation. Other times, representation is invoked at a systems-level of
explanation to illustrate what a cognitive system is doing without any ontological commitments
(Franklin et al., 2013). For example, in the literature on joint action, having a shared task
representation is often invoked to explain that participants are somehow aware of what must be
done for members of the group (Vesper, et al. 2017). Nevertheless, this notion does not always
mean that the author is committed to the ontology of a “representation” in the philosophical
sense. As Rowlands aptly points out, the history of arguing about representations has been
characterized by opponents and allies talking past one another (Rowlands, 2017). The situation is
further complicated by the field of computer science and AI (which philosophers often attempt to
draw from), having their own broad use of representation partitioned into various types of data
structures. For example, it is typical for models of general artificial intelligence to use several
different data structures (Copycat architecture, nodes and links, subsumption architecture, just to

57

mention a few), that all can be said to be in some capacity representations or representational
(Franklin et al. 2016).
In consequence, when talking about the mind across disciplines, there is an urgent need
for housekeeping and clarity. Much research that has been previously claimed to be in either the
classic cognitivist camp or the more dynamic, embodied, enactive camp might be utilized by
both sides once their notion of “representation” has been elucidated. For much empirical research
putting the results in representational or non-representational terms is often a matter of heuristics.
Still, it is crucial to always keep in mind what notion of representation is being invoked when
reading across kinds of literature. Ontological commitments do make an important difference to
theories and their plausibility.
This project is attempting to explain the cognitive nature of improvised dance in a way
that is non-representational. That is, I will argue against a specific range of approaches typically
within philosophy and cognitive science. These approaches employ a notion of representation
and an account of centralized control that typically include features such as content,
propositional content, intentionality, discreteness, veridicality, disembodiment, internality, and
cognitive ubiquity. Throughout this project, in the name of clarity, I will attempt to always
specify which notion of representation is being invoked and why.

Fodor The Archetypical Cognitivist – Modularity and the Language of
Thought
I will begin with some of the canonical works by Jerry Fodor because these texts, in many
respects, contain most of the commitments generally held by the philosophy of mind and
cognitive science in the cognitivist tradition. Put differently; if there was ever an archetypical
cognitivist philosophy, it would be Fodorian philosophy. As Such, we can use Fodor’s
Modularity of Mind and Language of Thought as general templates to contrast and compare
theories within the realm of cognitivism. The modularity thesis and language of thought thesis
still serve today as the explicit or implicit foundation in much representationalist philosophy.
In short, the language of thought thesis provides the following assertions about the mind
(Fodor, 1975):
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•

The mind is through and through a computational mechanism that performs
deductive and inductive inferences.

•

Performing inferences presupposes representational symbols and grammar for
how to manipulate those symbols (Fodor, 1975, 55).

•

Cognition is an input-output process in which information is translated into the
language of thought and actions are the result of computational inferences.

•

The language of thought is innate (and learning a natural language like French or
English is impossible without the innate built-in language of thought).

•

Sensory systems transform perceptual information into the language of thought
before central processing occurs.

In short, the modularity of mind thesis provides the following assertions about the mind:
•

Many processes in the mind are carried out by individual modules that are only
responsible for that specific task.

•

Mental modules preprocess information into representations in the language of
thought before sending the representations to central processing.

•

Mental modules are located within specific physical locations in the brain.

•

Mental modules are impenetrable to information and processes from other
modules.

•

Modules work asynchronously and autonomously (they continue to do their thing
regardless of what is happening in the rest of the mind and brain).

In Modularity of Mind (Fodor, 1984), Fodor argues that the mind consists of
independently functioning modules of three types; transducers, input systems, and central control
modules (ibid, 41). On this view, the modularity of mind is characterized by four main traits:
innately specified domain-specific modules that are hardwired (not assembled from smaller
structures) and autonomous (ibid, 37). For example, for Fodor there might be a module dedicated
only to processing facial expressions or a module that only processes word recognition. When
summarizing his account Fodor muses:
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We can abbreviate all this by the claim that the input systems constitute a family of
modules: domain-specific computational systems characterized by informational
encapsulation, high-speed, restricted access, neural specificity, and the rest. (ibid, 101)
Modules then are special-purpose processors that operate autonomously from the rest of the
mind, processing specific classes of information and make that information available to central
processing in representational form. Not only are modules informationally encapsulated (they are
not affected by other cognitive processes), they are quite literally hardwired into the brain (ibid,
98-99). That is, on the modularity view, the modules live in concrete physical areas of the brain.
On this view, damage to certain brain areas entails a reduced or complete absence of functioning
of that specific cognitive function.
In this tripartite system, transducers send information from the senses to input systems.
Input systems consolidate and interpret this information into representations that are readable by
central processing. This, is in other words, much like how a computer functions; computers must
translate various kinds of information into the same format before being able to centrally
processes data. For Fodor, central processing makes inferences over the representations provided
by input systems, and when needed, central processing makes executive decisions such as
moving the body.
Importantly cognitive modules are fast. As Fodor argues, they trade intelligence and
flexibility for speed (ibid, 70). Cognitive modules (such as visual perception, or word
recognition, Fodor’s two main examples) are fast because they only react to very specific subsets
of stimuli information. Each cognitive module operates autonomously and only cares about
innately specified types of information that it can process into legible representations. The
overarching argument is that many perceptual and cognitive processes, such as seeing the
Muller-Lyre illusion or recognizing words in a language, happens rapidly and mandatorily. That
is, we cannot help but to see the Muller-Lyre Illusion, and we cannot help experiencing a word
as meaningful regardless of background knowledge and context (ibid, 65-70). It is worth noting
that the literature on cognitive penetrability has put a serious dent in this type of modularity
thinking (more on this later).
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Figure 5 - The Muller-Lyre Illusion. Even when we are told time and time again that the figures
are the same length, we still perceive one being longer than the other.
Although many of the mind’s functions are modular, modules are still supposed to
interact sparsely. So, most cross-talk between modules happens indirectly through central
processing. The autonomous nature of cognitive modules happens in part because of their
informational encapsulation. Not only do modules only process a very slim prespecified sliver of
sensory input, but modules are also, (according to Fodor), immune to input from beliefs and
information from other modules. Put differently, modules supposedly are cognitively
impenetrable (ibid, 77). Even if a person knows that their mom would never hit them, if she
jokingly moves her hand in a slapping motion, the person still flinches. This reflex is the product
of cognitive modules simply doing their job regardless of context.
Furthermore, Fodor argues that the reason why humans are often dreadful at multitasking is that different cognitive tasks utilize the same cognitive modules. In consequence, if
two or more multitasking tasks make use of the same set of modules, the person’s processing
time will slow down because the processes must share the same resources, namely the same set
of modules.
While being mechanical (or dumb as Fodor calls them), cognitive modules can still
display some flexibility through the use of association. Thus, when research participants
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recognize the word “bug” faster when looking at a picture of a microphone or an insect, this is
due to associations made within the cognitive module for language recognition (ibid, 81-85).
Rather than being open to inputs and augmentation from other modules and processes in the
mind, cognitive modules remain encapsulated. Inspired by connectionism, cognitive modules can
string association links between their internally stored concepts. While the language recognition
module is not affected by what “facts” an agent might know about spies, bugs, microphones, and
other such concepts, these concepts can still be internally linked within the module. This allows
for faster word recognition and processing.
Furthermore, Fodor argues that when agents look around the world, they perceive objects
in terms of their most simple descriptors. For example, if we look out the window and see a
woman walking a dog, we do not see Homosapien-mammal-female performing locomotion with
mammal-canine-poodle. Rather, we observe a woman walking a dog. The fact that we most of
the time experience things in a semantically “shallow” way is evidence that modules output
semantically simple representations that must be processed by central processing after module
production (ibid, 91-96).
Note that while Fodor insists that he is not talking about phenomenal consciousness, he
often slips in and out of describing what is happening at the sub-personal and personal level of
explanation. It is when reading Fodor not always clear which level of explanation is being
invoked. So when talking about “seeing” a women walking a dog, it is not evident whether Fodor
is talking purely about sub-personal processing or also our phenomenological experience.
Painting with very broad strokes, for Fodor, cognition is a three-tiered process in which
sensory stimulation is processed by inducers and sent to input systems. Input systems further
process information into representations and often make inferences over those representations.
Finally, representations are sent to the central processing unit, where multiple representations are
processed through a long series of syntactical computational inferences.
Owing much to Chomsky’s notion of internal hardwired grammar, Fodor argues that
cognition is ultimately a matter of the brain performing syntactical computations in a language of
thought. Just like programmers can write in languages such as Python, C++, R, and so on, the
mind has a prespecified basic grammatical structure that it uses to process representations. These
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representations, therefore, must of course, be in the right format so that the mind can read the
representations – that is, representations must be in a language of thought.
Importantly the language of thought enables the acquisition of natural languages but is
not replaced by natural language. In consequence, most sub-personal processes happen as
inferences within the language of thought (Fodor, 1975, 75). Fodor argues that perception is
ultimately a matter of problem-solving and that problem-solving must take place within a
grammatically structured language. Accordingly, all sub-personal cognition ultimately takes
place in the form of logical inferences through a syntax. For Fodor, the argument for the
language of thought relies on the idea that humans could not learn a natural language without
being born with an innate language of thought. Put in computer metaphors: we cannot install
software onto a computer unless that computer already has an operating system installed.
Additionally, to continue the computer metaphor, it is not the individual software that
communicates with the computer hardware but rather the operating system. Thus, the language
of thought is constituted by brain processes, and natural language is expressed by the language of
thought. Fodor writes:
Where we have gotten to is this: if learning a language is literally a matter of making and
confirming hypotheses about the truth conditions associated with its predicates, then
learning a language presupposes the ability to use expressions coextensive with each of
the elementary predicates of the language being learned. But, as we have seen, the truth
conditions associated with any predicate can be expressed in terms of the truth conditions
associated with the elementary predicates of L. The upshot would appear to be that one
can learn L only if one already knows some language rich enough to express the
extension of any predicate of L. To put it tendentiously, one can learn what the semantic
properties of a term are only if one already knows a language which contains a term
having the same semantic properties. (ibid, 88)

We learn several things from this lengthy quote. First, Fodor argues that language acquisition is a
chicken and egg problem. Supposedly the only way one can learn a language is through a
language. So, unless we have a language baked in, human agents cannot acquire more language.
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Figure 6 - An overview of the classic cognitivist model endorsed by Fodor and others.
We also learn that Fodor is committed to a strong nativism about language and that he equates
language learning with hypothesis making. In fact, for Fodor, all concept learning, perception,
and action decision making is a matter of hypothesis making (a trend that continues in recent
research on predictive processing). If the core function of the mind is to make hypotheses, then
hypothesis making needs a language to make hypotheses in. Therefore, the Fodorian archetype
of the mind is a computer system implemented through the brain that manipulates discrete
contentful mental representations.
Finally, we see that Fodorian philosophy presents a great example of the dichotomy of control;
either an agent is in control or not in control of their actions. Here being in control of one’s
actions means that executive control has processed representations and, through logical inference
has produced a conclusion. Being in control means that the representational conclusion is
translated into a motor command that is then sent to execution. Not being in control means to
have one’s body move without central executive control, translating representations into a
conclusion and then a motor command. In this model, being in control of one’s action is a
dichotomy based purely on representational rational inference. However, what exactly is a
representation?
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What are Mental Representations?
We have seen how mental representations are posited as the medium with which the mind thinks,
or as Haugeland puts it, ‘‘Reasoning (on the computational model) is the manipulation of
meaningful symbols according to rational rules (in an integrated system)’’ (Haugeland 1985, 39).
On the classic computational model, all cognition consists of the manipulation of mental
representations. Still, what exactly are mental representations? This question is important
because mental representation is evoked throughout philosophy and cognitive science, but most
often, theorists are talking past each other. As Rowlands bleakly summarizes the state of the
debate, “a series of more or less loosely connected debates scarred by ambiguities,
misunderstandings, equivocations, and proponents talking past opponents” (Rowlands, 2017,
4226). For example, one influential model of mental representation from cognitive science is
perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999). On this and many other accounts, representations
ultimately boil down to repeated patterns of neuron activation. This is in rather stark contrast to
Searle (Searle, 1983), or Millikan (Millikan, 1991), who both argue (in the language of thought
vein) that representations have content and that this content is propositional. Hence, we see
Rowlands’ assessment in full fruition; one camp speaks of representation as a heuristic for
neuronal activity, while another as a very specific kind of mental item. Be it as it may, it is not
simply philosophy and cognitive science that differ in their use of the term representation.
Within philosophy itself, there is no fully agreed-upon notion of representation. In fact, in his
book dedicated to cleaning up the concept of representation, Ramsey laments that there are so
many different versions of “representation” within philosophy and cognitive science that it
would be nearly impossible to elucidate them all (Ramsey 2007, chapter 1). Following Ramsey, I
will not attempt to define the concept of representation since there is no such thing. Rather, I will
look at the features of mental representation that are included in most theories. Hence, the
concept of representation does contain a list of properties that show up most frequently:

1. Representations are internal to the brain.
2. Representations are produced by the environment.
3. Representations come in discrete vehicles.
4. Representations have content (which is carried by the vehicle).
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5. Content has truth conditions.
6. Representations require processing (typically through inferences).
7. Representations can be decoupled from the environment.
8. Representations can be explained in relation to the function of the system.
From this list, philosophers have especially focused on items four, five, and seven, namely,
content, decouplable-ability, and veridicality. The idea is that to account for hallucinations,
imagination, and abstract thinking, the mind needs to make inferences over items that are
decoupled from the environment (Fish, 2009). On this theory, we would not be able to explain
hallucination unless there is some product in the mind that does not correspond with the
environment. Further, the fact that we are frequently mistaken about what we perceive means
that representations can be true or false (Dretske, 1995, 4). Hence, representations can be said to
“have” truth conditions. In her overview of representations, Orlandi reminds us that: “A state
represents something only if it has content, and only if it is able to misrepresent. A state of a
system that does not have these two features is not a representational state” (Orlandi, 2013, 3).
Content and veridicality are then closely connected concepts: “In many important cases, a mental
state has a content that represents the world as being a certain way. We can ask whether the
world is indeed that way. These states are semantically evaluable with respect to such properties
as truth, accuracy, and fulfillment” (Rescola, 2016, 16-17). A representation stands in for
something in the environment in virtue of its content, and that content can accurately or
inaccurately describe the environment. Travis reminds us that: “Representational content has
correctness conditions of a special sort – those entailed by taking things as being thus and so –
where, for all that, things need not be that way” (Charles Travis, 2004, 58). Consequently,
implicit within the use of representation is the notion that cognitive systems are somewhat
removed from the environment. Rather than being in direct contact with the world, cognitive
systems mostly navigate the world indirectly through their manipulation of representations. An
agent acts on their representations of the world, not the world itself. Therefore, representations
must be intensional (with an s); they are meaningful in virtue of pointing to things in the world.
To understand the concept of representation, we must understand its intensional
character. Mental representations are “meaningful” in the sense that they describe the world as
being “thus and so.” For example, on a thermometer, the temperature of the room is indicated by
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a number (for example, 20 Celsius). We can then say that the number “20” on the dial represents
the world as being a certain way, namely room temperature. Thus, the content of the
representation is “room temperature” and/or twenty Celsius. To make this example clearer, we
can contrast it with what is not a representation. For example, an old-fashioned steam engine can
propel a vehicle forward. This happens as the temperature of the water is increased so that it
expands into steam form and pushes a cylinder. The steam being hot and expanding pushes the
cylinder causing motion. In this case, the hot water does not represent to the cylinder the state of
the world; it simply pushes the cylinder forward. While the relationship between the cylinder and
hot water is a consistent and lawful relation that could be said to contain information in virtue of
its lawfulness, we do not say that the system is representing anything. The water is not telling the
cylinder to move upwards; the water and the cylinder simply interact (This is an important point
that we will return to when we go over dynamical systems thinking). Importantly, a state is
representational and has content if it can tell a consumer of the representation what the world is
like (Millikan, 1991). As Dretske points out about perceptual systems: “The representations they
produce by way of carrying out their informational functions have a content, something they say
or mean, that does not depend on the existence of our purpose and intentions” (Dretske, 1995, 8).
Representations “say” or “mean” things about the world, for example, in the case of our
thermometer “that the room is twenty Celsius” or “room temperature.”
Importantly we can say that representations get their intension from their intentionality.
That is, representations are always “about something, and the thing they are about is their content
(Ramsey, 2007, 17). Nonetheless, as Dretske points out, not all representations are the same, in
part because their contents differ. Some representations are visual, auditory, tactile, while others
are propositional, for example, beliefs (ibid, 9-10). Hence, unlike in Fodor’s language of thought,
in which all sensory input is converted into the same representational format, some
representationalists must face the challenge of explaining how differently formatted
representations interact. However, regardless of format, all representations share the property of
intentionality; they contain content that is about something.
Amongst the different types of representations that are posited, one large class becomes
particularly important for explaining agential action, namely propositional attitudes.
Propositional attitudes are thoughts (conscious or sub-personal) that relate an attitude of the
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agent to some meaning that can be expressed in a proposition (Russell, 1919). For example, an
agent can love, hate, want, evaluate, dismiss, investigate, fear, and respect. However, each of
these verbs requires that something is being hated, loved, missed, feared, etc.; these concepts
must be attached to content. In this case, that content can be expressed in the form of a
proposition such as, for example, “the old Viking graveyard.” An agent can love, hate, fear,
investigate the old Viking graveyard; “I fear that old Viking graveyard.” Propositional attitudes
then are representations of the form “Agent-X has Attitude-Y towards Proposition-P.” X is
typically the agent themselves, Y is some psychological attitude and P is some fact, entity, or
imagining that can be described through a proposition (Searle, 1983).
As a class of representations, propositional attitudes are considered important because
they help explain behavior (Ramsey, 17). Therefore, on many accounts of action and general
accounts of the mind, propositional attitudes directly cause action. For example, Darth Vader
knows that Luke Skywalker is his son, Darth Vader wants to rule the galaxy, Darth Vader
believes that Luke can’t handle the truth and will be gullible if he gets to know the truth.
Therefore Darth Vader cuts Luke’s hand and reveals the truth. The idea is that having a set of
representations in the form of propositional attitudes makes the agent behave a certain way and
that we as the onlooker can make sense of the behavior by making sense of the causal inferential
flow of propositional attitudes. Ramsey uses the example of theory-theory from social cognition:
A popular example of such a law goes as follows: If someone wants X and holds the
belief that the best way to get X is by doing Y, then barring other conflicting wants, that
person will do Y. When we explain or predict behavior, the theory-theory claims we
(tacitly) replace variables X and Y with whatever propositions we think an individual
actually desires and believes (ibid, 17).
From the quote we learn, that propositional attitudes can be taken as part of the representation
commerce of the mind to move the agent into action (or at least, so the story goes). Again we see
the idea that inferences are what make someone in control of their actions. Nevertheless, in the
literature on propositional attitudes, it is not clear whether the proposition component of the
attitude is meant to be a literal proposition (in natural language or the language of thought), or
whether meaning as a proposition is meant as a heuristic. There is a big difference between
arguing that representations are literally shaped in the syntax of a language and arguing that
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subjects stand in a psychological relationship to some entity, and we just so happen to describe
that entity in a language when we write philosophy text.
More generally, the claim that representations have content has been asserted in a wide
variety of ways, some more literal than others. For a review of these debates, see Hutto & Myin
(2013; 2017). What concerns us is that while it is agreed that representations generally have
content because they have intentionality (they are about things in the world), the form that
content takes is still very much up for debate – even amongst thinkers who are proponents of
mental representations (Rowlands, 2017).
Finally, it is worth noting that representations are typically involved in functional
explanations of cognition. That is, representations are invoked when trying to explain what an
organism is functionally trying to do or obtain. Again, Orlandi is helpful: “a visual state
represents only if the state figures (or is available to figure) in an explanation of what a subject,
or more generally, a cognitive system does” (Orlandi, 2013, 3). While Orlandi is speaking about
visual representations, the point is well taken. For example, we would not attempt to explain the
mechanisms of a clock in terms of a representation, even though we technically could (Chemero,
2009, 68-73). Representations are most often invoked to explain what conscious or at least
cognitive systems are doing and especially to explain what functions they are performing. For
example, in the literature on group action, there is a lot of talk of representing the task of one’s
team members (Sebanz et al., 2003). Such an explanation is about what is being done and,
importantly, why it is being done. Put differently, representational systems are teleological
(Millikan, 1984); they perform the function of informing the agent about the world and guiding
the agent’s behavior even when they fail at that function. As Dretske points out, the heart, liver,
and lungs all can be said to have specific functions in the body, even when they fail to fulfill
those functions. Similarly, the function of representations is to inform the agent about the world
(Dretske, 1995, 4): “The senses yield representations of the world, not just because they (when
working right) deliver information about the world, but because that is their job” (ibid, 5).
Implicit within the notion of mental representation is a commitment to a naturalized teleology, in
which representations are meant to indicate the world as being a certain way.
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Structural Representation
While the standard account of representation has taken representations to be arbitrary symbols
that are assigned content and manipulated through the language of thought, there is another
contender in the field of representation, namely structural representation. Unlike, what Ramsey
(2007) calls IO representation, structural representations gain their content by being isomorphic
to their target. IO representations are like symbols, letters, or street signs; content is arbitrarily
assigned to them through some (often normative) content selection process. Structural
representations, on the other hand, are like maps or model airplanes; there is an isomorphism
between them and their target. In the same way, we can manipulate a model airplane in a small
air tunnel to figure out what would happen to a real airplane; structural representations become
parts of internal models of the world that the system can reliably exploit due to the isomorphism
(Ramsey, 68). As long as there is a reliable isomorphism between the structure in the world and
the internal model and its components, the system can make computational inferences using that
model.
The important difference between structural and regular representations is that content is
assigned depending on the task the system is trying to accomplish; structural representations get
their content from the organism being embedded into the environment. While, in some sense,
any model could be isomorphic with a number of objects in the world, structural representations
gain their content from being isomorphic with whatever object the organism is currently engaged
with (Cummins, 1996). The same structural representation can stand in for many different
objects. So, content specification comes from what the organism is currently doing (Ramsey,
2007, 96).
Let’s say we are drawing a map to indicate the flow, congestion, and short-cuts of city
traffic. We can (think of google maps as an example) color the congested roads in red, the heavy
traffic in yellow, and the clear roads in green. We would still say (according to defenders of
structural representations ) that there is an isomorphism between the colors of the roads and the
actual conditions of the road. So, even if structural representations do not literally look like
miniature models of what they represent, they can still stand in as a model of their target. We
have to remember that representations are posited to explain the functional sub-personal level of
the mind, not phenomenological experience. Therefore, structural representations do not need to
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be a model in the miniature airplane sense. Rather, structural representation just needs to have a
reliable causal isomorphism between themselves and the content they target. For example,
computer programs can model a weather system through lines of code without having to have a
display of the weather like the ones seen on the news. It is simply enough that sensors can create
reliable input into a mathematical, inferential program that then computes outputs. Thus,
structural representation really boils down to a correlative relationship between objects in the
world and objects (representations) in the mind: whenever A goes up, the representation of A
reliable changes, whenever A goes down, the representation of A changes reliably.
While the difference between regular symbolic representations and structural
representations is rather slim and often confusing, the core difference is that structural
representations allow the system to engage in surrogate reasoning (Swoyer, 1991). This is the
kind of reasoning a system can perform when it has a model that it can manipulate, experiment,
or reason through. Surrogate reason, in this way, is more open-ended than classical computation,
in which each module must stick to a set of axioms to perform deductive operations. Ramsey
explains the difference between regular representations (IO) and structural representations (Srepresentations) in the following fashion:
In the case of the former, the job is linked to an internal sub-module or processor
performing computations relevant to the overall capacity being explained. Such an inner
sub-system typically receives representations as inputs and generates representations as
outputs, so that is how representation comes into the explanatory picture. In the case of Srepresentation, the story is quite different. There the job of representing is linked to the
implementation of a model or simulation, which requires components that stand for the
relevant aspects of the target domain. (Ramsey, 2007, 104)
On the structural representation account, the mind builds elaborate models that stand in for the
environment and then runs simulations on those models to decide on a course of action. As we
shall see soon, this makes rapid, flexible, and artistic behaviors such as dance immensely
computationally expensive and nearly impossible.
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Action-Oriented Representations
Having the classic notions of representation under our belt, we have one more type of
representation to go before we can look at predictive processing. As embodied approaches to
cognition slowly gained a foothold, representational thinkers began acknowledging the
intermeshed nature of perception with action. Furthermore, many thinkers realized that there is a
need to bridge the representational and computational approaches to the mind with evolutionary
theory (Dretske, 1995; Millikan, 1991).
Millikan introduces the notion of Pushmi-pullyu representation (Millikan, 1995). Being a
close relative to affordances, Pushmi-pullyu representations are action-oriented representations
that push the organism into action. Rather than having traditional semantic content that needs to
be manipulated through computational inferences, Pushmi-pullyu representation carries nonpropositional content in the form of action instructions. That is, Pushmi-pullyu representations
instruct the organism in what to do in a direct fashion.
In order to explain the evolutionary history of the mind and the representational
framework, Millikan posits that Pushmi-pullyu representations do not need a practical syllogism
(see the section on action theory). Rather, basic organisms can react to information in the world
without computational inference by direct instruction from Pushmi-pullyu representations. The
classic example is bee dancing. By wiggling and swaying, bees can indicate to one another
where sources of food, danger, and other entities are located spatially. However, the bee on the
receiving end of the signal does not need to have a cognitive model of the environment, a
cognitive map, or make any inference regarding the information. Rather, there is a direct
correspondence between the bee’s wiggly dance and features of the environment. The bee dance
relays this information simply by pulling the bee into action.
Millikan argues that the contents of Pushmi-pullyu representations are blueprints for how
the organism should act that the organism can immediately exploit (ibid, 189). Millikan further
argues that ingrained into the notion of being directly exploitable is also content regarding what
must be true about the world:
Consider first a very primitive representation: the food call of a hen to its brood. A proper
function of this call is to cause the chicks to come to the place where the food is and so to
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nourish them. Assume, what is reasonable, that this is the only proper effect that the call
has on chicks, the only effect the call has been selected for. Then the call is directive,
saying something like "come here now and eat!". But it is also a condition for proper
performance of the call that there be food there when the hen calls. So the call is also
descriptive, saying something like “here's food now.” (ibid, 190)
The function of the Pushmi-pullyu representation then determines its content. So, by having been
naturally selected for through evolution, some representations have a function, and their function
thereby determines their content. In this fashion, a bee waggling can direct another bee to
flowers because the waggle has evolved as a function to do that specific task.
Millikan stresses that Pushmi-pullyu representations are basic because they do not have
to go through the organism's central processing system. Neither beliefs, desires, nor the like are
included. Rather, the representation is directly picked up by the system and triggers it into action.
While Pushmi-pullyu representations are fairly simplistic in animals, humans can supposedly
veto their pull, choose between sets of Pushmi-pullyu representations, and so forth. Still, the
notion remains the same, the content of the representation also directly pulls the organism into
action without the need to centrally decide on and plan out that action.

Predictive Processing
Predictive processing is the most recent theory within representational cognition. Unlike regular
computational theories of mind, predictive processing argues for an embodied and
environmentally embedded approach in which all of cognition is unified by the principle of error
minimization (Hohwy, 2013; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019). On this model, the brain (and by
extension the mind since, on this theory, the mental is skull-bound) is essentially a maker, tester,
and updater, of hypotheses. In other words, cognition is the process of the brain acting as a
scientist. Note that some have tried to explicitly claim that the predictive brain is not a scientist
(Bruineberg et al., 2018). Through the constant updating of Bayesian probability values, the
brain is in the ongoing business of attempting to predict what will happen next. Such prediction
happens through probabilistic hypotheses regarding what sensory input the brain believes it
ought to receive given its current situation. Consequently, the frequent mismatch between the
expected signal and the actual signal received leads to updating of the system's probability values
(Wiese & Metzinger, 2017).
73

The two core concepts that drive cognition in predictive processing are Bayesian
hierarchical generative models and predictive coding (Williams, 2018, 150). Generative mental
models are made from “priors,” which indicate what state we should expect the world to be in.
Previous sensory experience creates through Bayesian statistical inference a model of what the
mind ought to experience given a specific situation. All sensory inputs are automatically
compared against the model of what is expected to be experienced. Only when perceptual input
deviates from the generative model are inputs fed back into the model (Hohwy, 2013, 49).
Typically, only when something is uncertain or unexpected is there a need for the system to act.
Hence, the brain is an uncertainty minimizer that works by minimizing the error between what is
perceived and what should be happening according to the mental model.
Unlike other more conventional representational theories, some versions of predictive
processing are centered around embodied action, or what is known as active inference. When a
cognitive system experiences a mismatch between expectation and the signal, that system can
physically act on the environment (Clark, 2016). Through physical action, the system can
attempt to minimize the discrepancy between the error signal and the predictions of the mental
model. Accordingly, error minimization is largely a matter of acting on the environment to
change the signal to a form that pleases the mental model. Generally speaking, movement is a
cognitive system attempting to minimize the error between its top-down predictions and its many
bottom-up inputs (Williams, 2018, 153). We can already see the looming problem for the
relationship between dance and predictive processing; what error signal is being minimized when
improvising?
It is important to keep in mind that active inference happens in near-constant commerce
with the environment. On classic computational theories such as Fodor, the action is the last
product of a long computational chain. The brain computes over inputs and then eventually spits
out a movement command if necessary. Predictive processing is much closer to being an
enactive theory since active inference (action) is perpetual and ongoing. The brain is constantly
updating its hypothesis and its probability weightings through an engagement from the
environment. Mental models are never done, and they need to be constantly updated.
Consequently, predictive processing is first and foremost a theory about the brain as an
isolated inference-making machine deeply dependent on structural representations (Clark, 2015;
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2016). Rather than cognition happening through syntactic Fodor style computations, mental
representations are isomorphic with their target. This, in turn, allows the system to generate a
rich inner model of the world. So predictive processing uses a mix of structural representations
and Pushmi-pullyu representations. As Friston explains:
The hierarchical structure of the real world literally comes to be ’reﬂected’ by the
hierarchical architectures trying to minimize prediction error, not just at the level of
sensory input but at all levels of the hierarchy. (Friston, 2002, 226)
The predictive processing framework utilizes the isomorphism of structural representations to
resemble the world as if the brain was internally building an inner environment that it can
manipulate and test (Hohwy, 2013, 49; Williams, 2017, 155).
Underpinning the conceptualization of the brain and the mind as an error minimizer is the
theoretical framework of the free energy principle (Friston, 2010). Predictive processing posits
that the brain’s works to minimize error is a process aimed at entropy reduction. What is also
known as the free energy principle is an organizing principle in which organisms attempt to
reduce the amount of energy spent by remaining within a subset of desired metabolic states. An
animal has an almost infinite number of states it can be in. Nonetheless, only limited subsets of
those states promote the sustaining of the organism. Hence, the free energy principle can be
understood as an organism’s physical, behavioral, cognitive patterns of organization to avoid
entropy and maintain its precarious structures. Minimizing prediction error is a way for a
cognitive system to minimize surprise and other energy costly states. Hence, cognition as error
minimization is a tool for the system to remain in desired and highly efficient metabolic states
and thereby survive (Friston, 2010). As we shall see later, this concept does not seem to fit with
dance activity since dance is very costly and volatile.
Yet in spite of the environmentally and embodied nature of the free energy principle,
predictive processing still stresses that the brain is a “lonely” organ isolated from the world. That
is, the brain must make sense of an onslaught of sensory input without being privy to its
corresponding content in the world (Gladziejewski, 2015). Having no initial content in its
representations, semantics is created within the predictive processing system by comparing input
to priors stored in the system. Furthermore, meaning is fixed through the exploitations of the
isomorphism of its structural representations with the world. Importantly, the isomorphism of the
75

structural representations is physically isomorphic. In a recent paper, Williams explains this
notion:
Predictive processing moves us away from a picture of internal representations as
judgements to one in which they function as representational tools—that is, physically
instantiated surrogates for the action-salient causal structure of the environment that
facilitate viability-preserving environmental interventions. (Williams, 2018, 164)
Put differently, structural representations in predictive processing are almost akin to
manipulative objects in a quite literal inner simulation. Being so, the structural representations in
predictive processing differ from other notions of structural representations in that these
representations are being simulated in the same way we can simulate physical objects in a video
game (if you push a boulder in a well-made video game, the boulder will tip). Rather than having
truth value like classic representations, structural representations in predictive processing come
in gradient scales of aptness (Horst, 2016, 86). In other words, each representation is successful
to some degree in simulating the external environment, and the more successful the model and its
representations are, the more useful it is for the survival of the organism (Clark, 2015, 4). The
higher degree of accuracy an internal model has towards the real world, the easier it is for the
organism to remain in the metabolically optimal position and minimize free energy. Clark,
therefore, argues in line with enactivists that cognition and perception are not for the sake of
truth but for the sake of action. Perception does not need to be fully accurate or truthful as long
as it reliably can guide the organism in action that brings it into the desired metabolic state.

Problems with Predictive Processing
Now that we have basic predictive processing under our belt, I will present several issues with
predictive processing, some general, others in relation to dance. As mentioned earlier, these four
problems are; The Phenomenological Problem, The Expressive Movement Problem, The Affect
Problem, and the Scaling Up Problem.
The Phenomenology Problem for Predictive Processing
The first major issue with predictive processing is that it cannot properly account for our
phenomenological experience of the world (The Phenomenological Problem). As Varela tells
us, our theories of the brain, the mind, and phenomenology should all be mutually constraining
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(Varela, 1996). To ignore phenomenology is to ignore the perhaps most central part of being a
human cognizer. We must understand that not all types of systems will produce the same
phenomenology. We know from decades of careful phenomenological work on patients with
various mental illnesses (schizophrenia, Anxiety, Depression, and others) that how a system
operates produces different phenomenological experiences. Changes in experience resulting from
brain lesions, split-brain surgery, and amputation (as in phantom limb patients), and many others,
demonstrate that differences in embodiment do, in fact, produce differences in experience at the
first-person level (Anderson, 2018; Dunn et al., 2017; Merleau-Ponty, 2012; Sass et al., 2017).
So, if we posit theories in which the mind is a computer, something about that truth has to show
up in our first-person experience of the world. If we posit that the mind is an incorporeal soul,
then something that reflects that fact ought to show up in our experience. Similarly, if the brain
and the body is an error minimization engine, then that fact should be reflected in our behavior
and in our phenomenological experience (at least to some meaningful degree).
At this juncture, the skeptical reader could object that the world is made of atoms and
atoms ultimately are made of energy fields such as the Higgs Boson; nothing about the reality of
atoms or energy fields seem to show up in our experience. So why should the error minimization
of predictive processing show up in our phenomenological experience?
The answer revolves around levels of explanation and causation. When we move from
one level of explanation to the level of explanation above it, our theory should demonstrate how
the lower level allows us to move to the level above. For example, we can easily see how
biochemistry leads us to cellular biology. Similarly, in economics, we can easily see how scaling
up from microeconomics supports explanations at the level of macroeconomics.
In the sciences of the mind, the sub-personal level of explanation (that is, the level of
predictive processing) is supposed to be the level of explanation right below phenomenal
consciousness. Sub-personal processing is supposed to some degree to explain why our
phenomenological experience is structured how it is structured. My claim (The
Phenomenological Problem) is that predictive processing cannot explain the structures of our
phenomenological experience despite being at the level of explanation right below. Put
differently; there is a supervenience problem between phenomenological experience and
predictive processing.
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Expanding on this claim, if we claim that some mechanism or phenomenon is allencompassing, then we ought to see the consequences of the existence of that mechanism
throughout our various layers of analysis. Gravity is an all-encompassing phenomenon and
therefore shows up at various levels of analysis ranging from quantum mechanics to explanations
on how the imagination works. Similarly, evolution is posited to be a ubiquitous phenomenon in
biological organisms, and so evolutionary theories also try to explain how we develop practices
such as visual art and music (Clegg, 2012; Dunbar, 2012; Richter & Ostovar, 2016; Wang, 2015)
Positing that everything the mind does ultimately is prediction and error minimization (Clark,
2016; Hohwy, 2013; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019; Wiese & Metzinger, 2017) is a strong claim
and consequences of such a reality should show up in our phenomenal experience of the world.
My claim here is threefold: first, what we ought to see from a brain-body system that is fully
predictive does not show up in our phenomenology. Second, human phenomenological
experience, behavior, and many of our existential dispositions contradict what we ought to see if
predictive processing is indeed true – case in point: dance. Third, because of one and two,
predictive processing has a scaling-up problem that it so far has not solved.
Part of the predictive processing coda is that the brain is completely secluded from the
world and must therefore engage in constant sophisticated guesswork resulting in nothing short
of “controlled hallucination” (Wiese and Metzinger, 2017, 17). A principle that pervasive would
have to also structure the transcendental structures of experience (again, because predictive
processing is at the level of explanation that is supposed to give rise to phenomenological
experience). Yet doing even the most basic Husserlian epoche reveals no such predictive
structure. In other words, if everything the mind does ultimately is predictive error minimization
why do we not experience the world in terms of likelihoods? In fact, when we look at objects,
even when we only see one side, we experience them as whole, dense, cohesive objects
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012). We experience objects and the world more generally as having
permanence; the world is there solidly pressing upon us. Put simply; we experience objects as
whole and certain. In contrast, we do not experience objects as “likely-an-apple” or “highlylikely-a-car.” Yet if Bayesian error minimization is the unifying principle across all levels of
cognition, then we ought to have this fact reflected in our phenomenology; we ought to see the
world in terms of likelihoods.
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Furthermore, in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty, describes how we
experience the intentional arch of consciousness as a fully embodied endeavor (Merleau-Ponty,
2012, 137). We are conscious through our bodies and the way the body is constantly in
commerce with the world. This kind of phenomenal experience seems to go directly against what
experience ought to be like if we were Baysean error minimization agents through and through.
If predictive processing is the all-pervasive mechanism as it is claimed, then we ought to have a
distanced relationship to the body itself. On such a theory, the body would simply be another
object sending information to the brain for error minimization. We would have an alienated
relationship to the body akin to that reported by many schizophrenic patients (Sass et al., 2017).
What we do experience is a holistic experience of a living body where the totality of the body
has both agency and ownership actions and experiences (Dreyfus, 2007; Fuchs, 2018; MerleauPonty, 2012)
Additionally, when learning a new skill, our perceptual experience often changes
accordingly. When I learn the difference between Tenebrism and Chiaroscuro1, I can pick out a
painting as one or the other, I directly perceive the object as being part of a class (Siegel, 2012;
2016; Stokes, 2013; 2014). Furthermore, if I am in doubt, I might waiver between perceiving the
object as being of one class or another (the same way that in an optical illusion, we can only see
one thing or the other; either the candle holder or the face). Yet, what does not happen, and what
ought to happen according to predictive processing, is that I experience the object as how likely it
is one object or another.

1

Both are painting techniques exploiting the contrast between light and dark. The techniques make the paintings
appear as if the content of the art is on a theatrical stage. One technique is more extreme in its use of contrast than
the other.
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Decades of research on attention have shown that attention comes in a variety of formats,
including but not limited to distributed object attention, focused object attention, distributed
feature attention, and focused feature attention (Nanay, 2016). However, our attentional
processes do not distribute themselves according to likelihoods. In optical illusions, our attention

Figure 7 - Here is a classic optical
illusion. The viewer either sees two faces
or a candle holder, but not both.
is distributed between seeing one object or the other object. Importantly, we do not see both
objects as being fifty-fifty in likelihood (see Figure 7).
In general optical hallucinations pose a problem for predictive processing, since
predictive processing has a strong commitment to top-down processing. For example, in the
famous Muller-Lyre illusion most people know that the lines are the same length. Yet, we cannot
help but see the lines as being of different lengths (see Figure 5). Since predictive processing is
highly committed to top-down information augmenting cognition (Clark 2016), knowing that the
lines are the same length ought to change the “controlled hallucination” into showing the sticks
as being the same length (for a similar argument see; Gallagher, Hipólito and Hutto, in press).
The same problem becomes even heavier when we look at social characterization and
stereotyping. Research has shown that two images of the same face (with exactly the same skin
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color) are perceived as one being white and the other being black when researchers photoshop
stereotypically African facial features onto one of the images (Levin & Banaji, 2006). The
problem is that on a predictive processing approach, subjects should experience faces as being
more likely to be of one type than the other. We know, for example, from decades of work on
implicit bias, that even well-meaning people who know of certain stereotypes are still susceptible
to directly experiencing those stereotypes. In consequence, the top-down claim of predictive
processing is simply too strong.
It is important to note that in my criticism, I am not saying that a theory of cognition must
conform completely to our phenomenological experience to be true. That would be an overly
taxing demand to put on any account. Yet, whatever core principle a theory proposes ought to
harmonize with our embodiment and phenomenological experience. For predictive processing,
that is not the case.
Predictive Processing and The Open Expression Problem
Predictive processing also runs into a problem when it comes to its account of movement. For
predictive processing, movement is active inference. That is, we move the body to optimize error
minimization. The core purpose of movement for predictive processing is to bring the body into
a physical configuration in which the incoming sensory signal now fits better what the model
predicts it ought to experience (Ramstead et al., 2020). For example, if someone wants to
hammer in a nail, the brain makes a prediction about what it ought to experience. Since the body
is not moving, there is a high error signal between the still body and the desired sensory signal of
what it is like to hammer in a nail. The brain then initiates sensorimotor programs that are
continually updated to bring the body into a state in which it experiences a sensory signal that
corresponds to its expectations of nail hammering experience. Most typically, however, the
active inference is a process meant to reveal hidden causes in the environment. For example, if I
am walking in the forest and hear a sudden crack, the source of the sounds needs to be identified.
Was the crack from a deer, a tree branch, a dog, maybe a tiger? The brain moves the body in the
direction of the sound to minimize the likelihood of error in what it is predicting and what caused
the sound. Put in more theoretical language, active inference is prototypically a process in which
the body is moved to reveal the hidden environmental causes of stimuli (Ramstead et al., 2020).

81

Such a story works for instrumental actions with clearly defined goals such as reaching
for water cups or hammering in a nail. The story might also work for some hidden causes, such
as snapping branches in the forest. The story does not work for open-ended expressive
movements such as improvised vernacular dance. To start us off, we can loosely ask in
expressive movements like improvisational vernacular dance, what errors are being minimized?
(The Expressive Movement Problem). What hidden causes of stimuli need to be discovered in
dancing?
The predictive agent can set an intention to do a step and then minimize the error between
not being in the state of that step and being in the state of the step. That being so, improvisational
dance is still an open-ended process. While one can minimize the error of individual codified
steps within a dance system, much vernacular dance is about creating new movements on the
spot. These movements might roughly correspond to the general organizing principles of a given
dance style but other than that, there is no error to be minimized.
It is true, as I pointed out in chapter one, that vernacular dances are highly scaffolded by
organizing principles. Yet, within each style, there is still an infinite or near-infinite number of
combinations and variations the dancer can deploy without it necessarily being considered error.
Predictive processing argues that human bodies aim to be in a state of minimized
surprisal. But in contrast, dance improvisation is exactly a process of generating surprise; to
constantly move into and be in uncertainty regarding what happens next (De Spain, 2003;
Goldman, 2010). On the predictive processing account, neither should we be able to act in such a
way, nor should we enjoy it. We must remember that the predictive processing claim is a strong
claim; error minimization pervades all acts of cognition and action. However, open-ended
creative endeavors where there is room for variability without correctness specification do not
provide any error for the productive engine to minimize.
It is true that in many dance styles that have strict dance systems, there are learned
conditions for what movements should look and feel like. That being the case, within dance,
systematized movement could be seen as error minimization. Still, in many dance styles, and
even within dance styles that do contain a dance system, there are often no criteria that determine
what a movement should look or feel like. Furthermore, in the case of improvisation, the activity
is open-ended and can therefore not be subject to error minimization. While something like the
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rehearsal process of learning individual steps might be seen as error minimization, the act of
improvisation involves generating new steps on the fly, and none of these new steps have error
conditions other than the very brought specification of the dance’s organizing principles. There
are no errors to minimize since whatever movement is produced within the boundaries of the
dances style is fair game (Midgelow, 2018; Montero, 2016; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011)
Even the case of making a mistake and correcting it within dance improvisation does not
neatly map onto predictive processing. When improvising, sometimes dancers find themselves
moving in unexpected directions; perhaps they stumble, or got the timing wrong and are now
slightly off beat. In such cases, the dancer continues to move and turn the “mistake” into a new
movement; the stumble turns into a leap, the offbeat timing turns into an extended pause, or
maybe a new pattern that hits the rhythm differently. In each of these cases, while some error
minimization is happening (we do not want to be in a state of stumbling, or be off beat), the
answer is to engage in more open-ended movement that also does not specify success conditions
over which error minimization can be computed.
The Affect Problem for Predictive Processing
Predictive processing runs into further problems when it tries to account for human emotion and
affect. On the predictive account, both emotion and affect can be reduced to error minimization.
Negative emotions occur when we unsuccessfully predict the outcomes in the world and thereby
fail to reduce the amount of free energy (Miller & Clark, 2018). We must remember that an
increase in free energy means the system is less likely to have a grip on its environment and is
therefore statistically closer to death. According to the free energy principle and the error
minimization principle, emotion and affect tell the agent if something is not being predicted
correctly and has fallen outside the control of the system (Ramstead et al. 2020).
Problematically, such an account does not square up with the human affective and
emotional spectrum (The Affect Problem). We are often sad, gloomy, angry, and so forth, even
when we know exactly what is going on without any surprise. Being sad when a family member
passes from a long-term cancer diagnosis is not due to a failure in prediction. The family knows
the diagnosis; in some cases, they might even know more or less when the person will pass. Yet,
they are still sad and have every right to be sad. The world is replete with cases in which we
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know exactly, what is going on, no surprises, and we still experience negative emotions and
affect.
It is not just negative affect and emotion that predictive processing struggles with;
predictive processing also has a hard time accounting for positive emotions and affect. For
example, there are plenty of cases in which the uncertainty and the presence of free energy is
exactly what the agent wants, and it makes the agent feel good. Bungy jumping, parachute
jumping, haunted houses, horror movies, mountain climbing, rooftop parkour2, street fighting are
all activities in which the agent is rewarded for engaging in an activity with high levels of
uncertainty. As mentioned earlier, improvisational dance itself is an activity of high uncertainty.
On the predictive processing model, thrill-seeking simply should not be a pervasive human
phenomenon. Yet, thrill-seeking is not only pervasive in most cultures; it is generally accepted in
folk psychology that most people at some point go through an “adventurous phase.” Being as it
may, bringing oneself into danger or unpredictable environments does not square up with the
predictive processing model.
Similarly, if predictive processing and the free energy principles were to be
evolutionarily sound, then organisms ought to stay in the ideal metabolic state as often as
possible. Nonetheless, this assertion simply does not square up with the evidence that dance
traces far back into our evolutionary history (Christensen et al., 2017; Hanna, 1979; Laland et al.,
2016). Pre-historic humans would have no impetus to dance whatsoever if their core process was
to minimize free energy. Even proto dance activity is metabolically too costly to fit under the
free-energy principle. Dance is simply too metabolically costly and volatile to support the free
energy principle.
Furthermore, humans generally tend to like or enjoy surprise. We give each other
presents, birthday presents, surprise parties, watch television shows like The Masked Singer or
murder mysteries, and do unexpected things for our partners to sustain our romantic
relationships. Furthermore, much of human humor is predicted upon surprise. Many forms of
humor are funny exactly because the punchline, ending, twist, are surprising (Attardo, 2010).

2

Rooftop running with high levels of uncertainty. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcKkiRl9_qE
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They are things that we could not predict or have a hard time predicting. In general, human life is
full of activities that are predicated on surprise, uncertainty, and unpredictability. For example, in
literature, theater, TV, and sometimes music, we praise creativity, originality, all various forms
of surprise.
My argument is similar to what has recently been known as the Dark Room Problem.
Why on the predictive processing model do human beings not just spend their time inside bare
dark rooms where there is close to no chance of unpredictability? On the predictive processing
model, humans ought to love boredom, yet we know that solitary confinement is one of the most
damaging forms of imprisonment possible. Predictive processing seemingly does not have an
explanation for our deep-felt desire for uncertainty and action.
It has been suggested that the Dark Room Problem is not a problem because human
agents predict that they should not be spending significant amounts of time in dark rooms
(Friston, 2013; Yon et al., 2019). However, such a reply makes any and all behaviors applicable
since all behaviors can then be explained away as the brain predicting that this is what it ought to
be doing (Sun & Firestone, 2020). As Sun and Firestone (2020) point out, such an explanation
becomes vacuous since it purports to provide the same answer to all behaviors. No behavior of
any kind is then outside the bounds of predictive processing. This, however, is self-defeating
since predictive processing claims that organism behavior should only ever be within a certain
range of states.
The Scaling Up Problem for Predictive Processing
It could be argued that predictive processing operates at a different level of explanation and that
we do not need to explain how we scale up from the basic predictive mechanism of the brain and
mind to the level of experienced human life. Again my point is that if a fundamental theory of
human cognition does not scale up and is in direct conflict with what we see at the level of
phenomenology, culture, aesthetics, and interaction, then that theory has failed. Like enactivism
that has often been accused of having a scaling-up problem (Roelofs, 2018), I believe that
predictive processing has a scaling-up problem. If one proposes a theory that is claimed to be
ubiquitous and fundamental to our being, then that theory needs to show how we can validly
move from one layer of explanation to the next (The Scaling Up Problem). Again, we can use
the example of evolutionary theory: various accounts of evolutionary theory attempt to explain
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how basic evolutionary principles can account for the existence of music and dance (Christensen
et al., 2017). In other words, these theories try to scale up. Predictive processing struggles with
providing a convincing transition between the cognitive workings of the mind (the sub-personal
level), and our everyday experiences. Predictive processing cannot tell a convincing story that
moves from basic cognition to our rich, fully enculturated lives.
Let us take another look at tedium. According to predictive processing the less free
energy and the more predictive grasp of the environment, the more an organism is thriving. This
means that according to predictive processing, the optimal human life is extremely regimented
and safe. Nevertheless, most human beings do not want to or enjoy living such lives. In fact,
boredom is an extensive topic of many literatures and is almost unanimously characterized as
something that must be overcome or something that plagues the human condition. Schopenhauer
famously argued that humans move between desire and boredom and that both conditions are
miserable (Schopenhauer, 2004). The overarching point is that predictive processing leads to a
contradiction between what it posits as human thriving and what most ethical, psychological, or
even existential theories tell us about thriving. If error minimization is as pervasive of a
phenomenon as predictive processing claims, then I see no reason why boredom should be an
existing psychological condition. In fact, many of the situations humans conventionally find
boring should be rewarded according to predictive processing. Sitting at home, looking at the
wall, eating the same dinner at the same time every night, never leaving one’s room are all
behaviors that ought to be highly rewarded by the predictive processing model since they have
very low degrees of uncertainty.
If the phenomenological problem and the scaling up problem seem very similar, that is
because they are. However, the phenomenological problem deals with the inside perspective of
phenomenological experience, while the scaling up problem deals with behavior. Putting the
scaling up problem simply; given the supposed encompassing nature of error minimization and
the free energy principle, we should not observe the many uncertainty generating activities
behaviors we see in human beings. Many human behaviors, especially improvised vernacular
dance, generate high uncertainty and are metabolically expensive. Consequently, we should not
see these behaviors if the mind was truly a predictive processing engine.
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This is meant to be a dissertation on dance and not predictive processing. So, I will stop my
criticisms here. Even so, to summarize quickly, we have covered four problems with predictive
processing: The Phenomenological Problem, The Expressive Movement Problem, The Affect
Problem, and The Scaling Up Problem. In sum, we have seen that Predictive processing does not
match human phenomenology, and predictive processing does not match the affect, emotional, or
existential profile of most human beings. Additionally, predictive processing cannot adequately
account for illusions and fails to explain how it scales up from sub-personal processes to
pragmatic individual and social actions in the everyday world. While there are more critiques
that can be leveled against predictive processing, I will, in the interest of time move on.

Anticipation instead of Predictive Processing
While I am, as the previous sections have shown, suspicious of predictive processing, there is an
important aspect of cognition that predictive processing does get right; cognition is replete with
anticipatory processes, and these processes are (as I will show below) informed by “priors.” As
our bodies act on the environment, they are also always simultaneously readying themselves for
what can be anticipated to happen next. However, this is not a centrally calculated form of
prediction but rather a holistically embodied form of anticipation. As we act on the world, action
potentials in neurons across the entire nervous system prepare us for what is next. Just as we at
the phenomenological level experience constant protention (Husserl, 1991) the brain and the
nervous system (central and peripheral) prepare us for what muscles will be needed next (Alaerts
et al., 2010; Bosbach et al., 2005). In fact, as we act, we experience, and as we experience,
neuronal action potentials are configured. In other words, acting, experiencing, preparing, and
anticipating are all sides of the same (multisided) coin.
In fact, simply thinking about moving in a specific way activates the same brain regions
and the same muscles as when moving in that way (Seeley, 2020, 147). Similarly, when we see
others move, the same brain regions as we would use to move in that way (especially the mirror
neurons), activate and those same muscles in the body build up action potentials (Calvo-Merino
et al., 2005; Seon Hee Jang & Frank E Pollick, 2011; Thompson & Parasuraman, 2012; Zentgraf
et al., 2011). Furthermore, putting our attention towards certain tasks automatically activates
sensorimotor regions associated with the response to that task, and the needed muscles are
readied for action. As we move through and act on the world, our bodies are constantly attuning
87

themselves in anticipation. What is important to understand is that through sensorimotor and
attentional processes, the brain and the body are in a constant reciprocal relationship of
anticipation in which our posture, muscles, and senses are physically being readied to act;
anticipation is built into the perception-action cycle. Motor evoked potentials (MEP’s) are
constantly adjusted so that our muscles are ready to activate in skilled patterns related to our
context (Alaerts et al., 2010; Bosbach et al., 2005).
Studies have shown that being trained in a specific dance increases activation in the
relevant muscle groups and brain regions when watching others perform that dance (Jola et al.,
2012). For example, Jola and colleagues demonstrated that being trained in ballet or
Bharatanatyam (a traditional Indian dance), activates motor evoked potentials in body parts
typically emphasized in those dances when watching those dances. Similarly, studies looking at
the difference between capoeira and ballet found that ballet dances have increased activity across
sensorimotor cortexes when watching ballet, but not when watching capoeira and vice versa
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). In fact, such studies have been
successfully replicated numerous times (Bläsing et al., 2012). Additionally, studies have shown
that using small doses of electric shock to inhibit neuron firing in the pre-motor cortex limits or
removes the subject’s ability to perceive motion (Candidi et al., 2008; Saygin, 2007; Stadler et
al., 2012). In sum, in dance, the action-perception loop is rife with embodied anticipatory
processes, which are ingrained into the body as flexible patterns of act preparedness. These
processes aid the dancer in fluently moving with their partner(s) even in the most improvisational
dance moments.
Furthermore, studies have shown that movements that mimic various affective and social
relationships help guide the attentional processes of further recognition (Clarke et al., 2005).
That is, by recognizing movements, gestures, facial expressions, and other cues that indicate
genre, category, and mood, attentional processes are further attuned to pick up relevant
information. Dancers and dance audiences rapidly find various cues in the movements in front of
them that help them further perceptually attune themselves to the salient features of the other’s
movements (Seeley, 2020, 160).
Again, the notion of a dance system is of importance. Many of the anticipatory
sensitivities found in dancers come from being able to understand the rules of engagement that
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guide the various categories of dance within which they move. Studies have shown that both
trained and untrained dancers can rapidly recognize which dance system is being utilized. More
so, studies have shown that if people know there is a system in a movement style, they can, with
statistical significance, understand if a movement series follows or break that dance system
(Opacic et al., 2009). Put differently; we organize dance movement (perhaps all human
movement) into a coherent structure so we can understand it and anticipate its unfolding.
Such an understanding need not be representational, propositional, or a matter of having a
mental model. Rather, this kind of anticipation happens in the form of embodied attunement, as
we come to learn a dance system, our partner, social and cultural expectations. As we saw, such
attuning happens across various embodied processes, including motor evoked potentials. As
Seeley aptly points out in his chapter on dance, when we learn a skill such as dance, our
attentional processes, and anticipatory processes are tuned towards what is salient for that
activity (Seeley, 2020, 153).
Furthermore, Seeley demonstrates in his discussion of dance audiences and dance
criticism that when watching dance, audiences report experiencing the dancer’s movements
viscerally in their own bodies – a process known as “metakinesis” (Seeley, 2020, 141). The term
metakinesis coined by phenomenologist and dance critic John Martin accounts for the way in
which we experience an embodied simulated response when we watch others dance. When a
dancer leaps, the audience (purportedly) experience a leap in their own body, in part because
they know what it is like to leap (Martin, 1965). Dance, often but not always, takes everyday
motions and exaggerates them; however, the audience can experience this motion because they
have experience with their quotidian counterparts. When we watch or dance with others, the
mirror neuron system is in perpetual activity, preparing us for what to do next by experiencing
what the other mover is experiencing (Gallese, 2020). In other words, a form of low-level
embodied resonance is built into the constant anticipation that facilitates successful dancing.
The priors spoken of in predictive processing that bias our attention is in the case of
dance learned through enculturation. Dance movements are, or for the most part, a product of
human cultural developments; dance systems are socially transferred, which means there is a
strong cultural component to dance anticipation. One is not born knowing how to respond to Kid

89

‘n Play,3 and must therefore be taught how to detect dance relevant movements and cues.
Cultural know-how permeates our anticipatory processes (Hipólito et al., 2021). As Seeley points
out, attention is limited and directed, thus, through enculturation, we learn to rapidly diagnose
just the relevant features we need to initiate the correct anticipatory processes. In dance, we are
sensitive to enculturated patterns of movement that allow for metakinesis, anticipation, and
response (Seeley, 2020, 146). As a form of life, vernacular improvisational dances enculturate us
into the appropriate modes of bodily preparedness (Goldman, 2010).

Problems with Representations in General
So far, I have criticized a specific representational theory within the philosophy of mind, namely
predictive processing, and tried to show how predictive processing has a hard time
accommodating improvisational dance. Next, I will use this same strategy but applied to the
broader category of representational and computational theories of mind in general. In other
words, next, I will demonstrate why mental representation has a problem with dance. My
overarching claim in this section is that achieving vernacular improvisational dance through
representational computation leads to a problem of computational overburdening. Put simply,
while we empirically observe that vernacular improvisational dance is smooth and fluent,
cashing it out in terms of computations and representations will lead to an immense task for the
cognitive system (The Computational Burden Problem). In my discussion, I will additionally
include specific examples from the account of representational philosopher turned dance
choreographer Ivar Hagendoorn and demonstrate why that specific account also cannot
adequately handle vernacular dance improvisation.
The first major problem that occurs when trying to apply traditional representational and
computational theories of mind to dance is what I call the content problem. How exactly do
representations regarding dance movements get their content, and once they have that content,
how does the system make inferences on what to do in response? As we saw in chapter one,
dance moves are saturated with meaning; they are overly expressive. Any minute dance
movement performed typically contains social, cultural, and historical meaning. Dance

The famous party scene from the movie House Party (1990) that gave rise to the Kid ‘n Play dance.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UFSyBBglmpI (1:17).
3
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movements also contain meaning from personal histories between the dancers. Dance moves can
be indices, icons, or symbols. Dance moves often contain gestures. Furthermore, dance moves
are also meaningful simply in virtue of the shapes and virtual powers they display. In the right
contexts, some dance moves can be almost all of these at once. Put simply, dance movements are
jam-packed with meaning.
The meaning contained in dance movements is also interesting because it is
accumulative. As we discussed in chapter one, dance sequences come in the form of a growing
gestalt, in which each dance movement appears meaningful because of everything that came
before it (in that dance session). Akin to Husserl’s analysis of a melody and the specious
presence (Husserl, 1991), dance movements appear as they do because the previous movements
still linger with us. As dancers move with each step, the significance of the movements morphs
as a gestalt. The meaning of each movement is not only determined by what came before it; each
movement itself can also be said to have a proto-narrative or micro-narrative structure. That is,
as the movement unfolds (for example, the opening of a closed arm into a pointing gesture), the
meaning of the movement grows towards its completion. Therefore, any system that perceives
dance movement must contain a large amount of information in its short-term memory systems.
Even if our short-term memory does not capture all the details of a given dance sequence, the
amount of information stored in short-term memory is still sizable.
The meaning expressed in dance movements does not exist in a neat one-to-one
relationship; the same movement does not always mean the same thing. Rather, much of the
meaning in each movement is contextually generated by what came before it (both immediately
and at a more distal scale). Thus, the meaning expressed in dance (from the Alvin Ailey
company to the floppy wobble at Bethany’s birthday bash) is always in an ongoing flux.
The hyper meaningful nature of dance movements presents a problem when a
computational and representational system tries to determine the content of representations
during the perception and processing of dance (The Content Problem). Since the meaning of
dance, movements is growing, and in gestalt form, the system must at each instance of perceptual
processing refer back to the entirety of what it has just processed. With each leg kick, hand wave,
shoulder rock, the system must keep within its central processing every movement that came
before it and what meaning was assigned to those movements. With each millisecond, the
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amount of information the system must process will on a computational model grow
exponentially. In other words, it would be an overwhelming if not impossible task to watch and
adequately interact in dance. The gestalt nature of expressive movements in social situations, in
general, makes representational computation nearly impossible (The Computational Burden
Problem). Human agents would need an immense short-term memory for computing expressive
non-task behavior such as dance. Yet, studies have shown that our short-term memory is rather
domain-specific and short (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Cowan, 2017).
The representationalist could object and argue that I am assuming that the system must
take in all of the different layers of meaning to understand and respond to vernacular improvised
dance. The objector can point out that the representational system only needs to pick up the basic
contours of movements to understand the gist of a dance. Perhaps the system only needs to build
representations that track the physical movement and nothing else. Furthermore, the system
could deploy networks of representations so that when one representation is recognized, it
automatically activates the rest of the associated representations.
This objection is well taken, and it is, of course, highly likely that a representational
system would deal with the issue of complexity by only representing the actual movements and
perhaps some layers of meaning through representational networks. Over time, perhaps with a
re-watch on video, the system can represent added complexity in the movements. This approach,
however, only solves the problem from the perspective of a passive audience member. The story
is entirely different when we consider that vernacular improvisational dances are typically
interactive; the system needs to appropriately interact within seconds, sometimes milliseconds.
The representational story does not add up with the phenomenology of doing improvised
vernacular dance. Participants who take part in dance sub-cultures are keenly aware of the
meaning layered in the movements as they unfold in real time (Goldman, 2010; Ravn, 2016;
2019; Salkind, 2018; Schloss, 2009; Welch, 2019; Kronsted, in press). That is exactly how they
can achieve such complex on the fly virtuosity. Dancers quickly and intentionally respond to
various layers of meaning in skillful and sophisticated ways that demonstrate that they are aware
of the various layers of meaning emerging from the dance interaction. Hence, we must assume
that at least for the expert and the advanced novice, much of the meaning produced in dance
action is “processed” on the fly.
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These empirical observations about the phenomenology of dancers embedded in their
sub-cultures should force the representational philosopher to bite the bullet and concede that at
least a large portion of the meaning produced in dance movements must be processed on the fly.
Nonetheless, as I pointed out above, processing the multilayered meaning of dance moves on the
go becomes immensely computationally taxing if the cognitive system is representational. While
good improvisational dance is typically fluent, a representational cognitive system would have to
work very hard to achieve such a feat. We must remember that many representational accounts
of the mind still argue (akin to Fodor) for separate modules that send information to be processed
by central processing (Baars, 2019; Carruthers, 2006; Franklin et al., 2016).4
The problem is again the open-ended nature of improvisation. If the system is only
representing the contours of the movement and not processing any additional meaning to the
movements, then it becomes hard to see how the system would be able to choose appropriate
responses to on the fly generated brand new movements. When dancing together, the improvisers
are not only interacting using codified steps; they are also fluently interacting to steps creatively
made up on the spot. Fluently reacting to a novel contextually generated step requires that the
representational system represents and processes a lot more information than the bare minimum
skeletal structure of the movements. By necessity, the structure of dance movements quickly
generates a highly demanding computational task for the system. Again, while it is fair to assume
that the system does not need to process all the layers of meaning present in each movement, the
system must to interact with competence, at least process a large amount of data. Dance
improvisation is often about generating novel movements and having others fluently respond to
those movements, and such a process requires a rapid contextual understanding of the situation
that cannot be cashed out in centrally processed representations.
Even if it is argued that the system uses networks of associated representations, such
networks must themselves be involved in processing when dealing with contextually rich,
rapidly generated novel movements. Improvisers can create new movements that require great
context-sensitivity from the other dancer to appropriately interact with, and such responses must
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While there is a similar critique that can be leveled against neural networks and connectionism in the interest of
time and repetitiveness, I shall not address these here.
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in a representational system be generated through processing. Such processing is immensely
demanding whether one uses or do not use representational networks. While a system might be
able the case of dancing one on one, the task becomes ever so more daunting when a large group
is improvising together.
We can continue this line of critique by asking; how does the representational system
know how to respond to dance movements in time for the dance not to get jerky? Let’s say that
two people are improvising together at a wedding. As Backstreet Boys come on, person Jim
reaches his hand out towards the horizon in a classic boyband pose. How does Meg’s cognitive
system know what to do in response? Meg’s system must first perceive the outstretching of the
hand and process that outstretching so that it is ready for central processing. But, as we said,
dance movements are rich with meaning that all factor into how the movement must be
responded to. Thus, the system must deploy rules and memories to accurately interpret the data
and create the right contentful representation. Still, to know why it must deploy those specific
rules to create that specific contentful representation, the system must deploy another set of rules.
So, on and so forth into infinity.
Even if one does not think that this frame problem generates an infinite regress, dance
movements are still open-ended and multi-expressive. The system must use a flurry of rules and
memory systems just to process a basic veridical contentful representation of a single movement.
This, of course, is a highly cognitively demanding task.
Furthermore, once the representation is in central processing, a similarly long line of
rules must be applied to understand the representation and then again to act on the representation.
Put simply, the amount of processing required to understand and then react to dance movements
on a cognitivist model simply is not fast enough to account for the phenomenon as we
empirically see it play out.
Even if we take parallel processing of information into account, the problem still persists
since the various “facts” about the dance environment, the organizing principles of the dance, the
history of the dance, and the many other factors that play into coherently responding to dance
movements must still be combined. So even if several factors regarding the environment are
processed in parallel simultaneously, a representational system must still combine these threads
of information before it can produce an adequate responsive motor command.
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Once a representation has reached central processing, the task of how to respond to the
hyper meaningful representation presents itself as the next regress. The system needs to make an
inference on how to respond to the movement meaningfully and skillfully. However, since this
kind of dance is open-ended, the system must use some set of rules and propositions to make that
decision. Being an inferential system, the system needs justification for why it needs those rules
to determine the response. Being so, the justification for those rules themselves needs
justification, and thus so on and so forth goes the infinite regress.
Again, if one is not convinced that the decision problem creates an infinite regress, the
system still faces an immense computational task to make the right kind of inference and provide
a kind of response to the open-ended dance movement. At any given moment, the dancer could
respond with a multitude of steps. Hence, the system needs to make inferences about what steps
fit the current minute situation, how that step might fit into the larger context at play, how to
execute the step in accordance with the music, and a number of other factors (more on this when
we study Rosenbaum’s account of dance action in chapter 3).
Hagendoorn’s Overwhelming Representations
Ivar Hagendoorn concurs that brains are too slow to efficiently and accurately process dance
through mental representation; it simply takes too long for the visual and auditory systems to
transform input into the right kind of electrical signals and send those signals to the relevant
cortex for processing. However, Hagendoorn does not see this as a problem. Instead, he argues
that being bombarded with representations of movement creates a “sublime” experience of the
dance. The fact that the system cannot keep up with the incoming stimuli creates, in the eyes of
the audience, a form of otherworldly experience of the movements (Hagendoorn, 2003). Sublime
experiences are supposed to be those in which the perceiver is overwhelmed by the vastness of
the aesthetic object, and in the case of dance, this is achieved by having the cognitive system
create a rapidly growing backlog of movement representations. In short, Hagendoorn believes
that part of what makes dance alluring to look at is that we supposedly cannot process it fast
enough for normal appreciation.
Hagendoorn’s theory is applied only from the perspective of a passive audience member,
not a co-dancer. If the representational system truly is too slow to build and process the right
kinds of representations how is joint dancing possible? On Hagendoorn’s picture, dance would
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have to be a solitary activity because the co-dancer would never be able to adequately keep up
with the dance. Put differently, if Hagendoorn’s suggestion is true, then how is high-paced joint
dancing with on-the-spot novel movements possible? It is an odd strategy to concede that a
representational system is too slow to experience dance without being overwhelmed but still
wanting to hold on to the idea of representational systems. Plenty of dance audience members or
co-dancers interact with dance, experience dance, evaluate dance just fine in real-time. In
consequence, there is an impasse between our empirical observations about dance and the theory
of mental representation. Even if it buys us some story about sublime experiences, conceding
that a theory is too slow to account for its phenomenon does not save the theory but only gives us
reason to reject that theory.
Problems with Representations and Motor Mommands
Next, let us switch gears and look at the related issue of how a representational system executes
movements in response once the system has processed a proper response. So maybe the system
gets around to process dance movements; how does the system issue the right motor command?
Some have argued that high speed, high precision action, and interaction such as dance
are simply a matter of rigid pre-rehearsed motor programs. Rather than needing to interpret the
movements in front of itself, the cognitive system simply deploys motor programs. With the rise
of cognitivism, psychologists and cognitive scientists interested in movement introduced the
notion of a motor program to account for highly dynamic situations (Keele, 1968; Schmidt,
1976). Running with the Fodorian claim that the mind is essentially a computer, motor program
theory suggests that the brain stores prespecified programs for how to move the body. Such
programs include highly specific instructions for how the body should be moved with a number
of variables that can be inferentially adjusted before the motor program is executed. As Schmidt
summarizes:
The program is generally thought to contain a centrally stored, prestructured set of
muscle commands that are capable of carrying out movement without feedback
information about the achievement of the environmental goal (Smidt 1976, 242).
Motor programs then are ambivalent towards the agent’s body, goals, and environment. Rather,
these aspects are taken to be variables that are then filled in as the agent gets ready to deploy the
motor program. On this view, motor programs are highly specified preprogrammed movements
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executed by the brain through the central nervous system. Motor programs do not care about the
bodily conditions of the agents and the state of the environment because motor programs are, in a
literal sense, mechanistic nervous programs activated by computations over representations
(Ghez, 1985). Although the notion of motor programs has become more flexible in that its
variables can be updated in action, the notion of a motor program remains inflexible (Neilson &
Neilson, 2005).
Philosopher and dance choreographer Ivar Hagendoorn endorses the representational
account of motor programs in improvisational dance (Hagendoorn, 2003; 2004; 2019). For
Hagendoorn, dance movements are made from representations that specify only movements of
the body. These complex representations are made from less complex motor schema
representations that specify more simplistic components of a given movement. For example, the
motor command for the arabesque contains within it a more simplistic motor schema for how to
lift one’s leg backward, tug in the belly correctly, raising one’s chin, and so on. A dancer’s
movement vocabulary then consists of pre-stored motor schemas that, with practice, come to
contain more refined sub motor schemas.
The first problem is that in improvisational dance, many motor actions and interactions
are created for the first time on the spot. Unique one-off motor sequences often emerge as
dancers entangle themselves in the dance process. Therefore, the flexibility required for dancing
cannot adequately be captured by motor programs. For example, in contact improvisation,
dancers often engage in long segments of novel movements that emerge uniquely from the
situation (Kimmel et al., 2018). These interactions then cannot consist of motor programs unless
motor programs are portioned into micro-motor programs. Nevertheless, if this is the case, then
the notion of a motor program begins to lose its meaning and utility.
Hagendoorn’s appeal to motor programs only explains how dancers can break
movements into their sub-components and focus only on a sub-component. His account and the
motor command account, in general, do not explain how dancers frequently generate new
movements on the spot. Especially since motor commands are meant to be somewhat inflexible
to account for speed. The general idea is that motor commands are quick, in part, because they
are dumb; they are encapsulated so that they can be executed rapidly and with precision once
initiated. However, it is exactly the hallmark of much improvisational dance that new
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movements develop intelligently in the moment. Sometimes, halfway through a movement
intended to be one thing, the movement turns into something else. Vernacular improvisational
dance is often flexible to the degree that cannot be explained by Hagendoorn’s motor commands.
Additionally, using motor programs does not get us out of the decision and frame
problem. The system must still choose when to deploy a motor program, and the system must
still utilize rules to do so. Furthermore, the inflexible nature of motor programs means that they
cannot adjust to the fast-dynamical nature of dance partner interaction. Operating at the needed
level of flexibility using motor programs would mean that motor programs would have to be
divided into a high level of granularity and sent out in rapid succession. Even so, this solution
leads us back into the problem of over computation. The task of doing something that is
empirically observed and phenomenologically reported to be smooth and non-demanding
becomes immensely difficult to solve through computation. I will return to the problem of motor
programs in my section on the new dance cognitivists in chapter 5.
The overarching point is this: because improvisational dance is rich in meaning and openended, it becomes an immense cognitive task to respond to even the simplest movements (The
Computational Burden Problem). Dance movements happen in rapid succession by the time
the system will have made inferences about the first inputs, it will already have to deal with the
next. Put simply, if humans were computational inferential systems, we would not have the
computational speed or power to deal with meaningfully rich, open-ended, fast-paced
interactions like vernacular improvisational dance.
It is natural for computationally inclined thinkers to object and argue that the brain is a
“super computer.” However, I will remind the reader that even our most advanced AI and
robotics systems can at best awkwardly inch forward when asked to play a game of soccer. The
annual RoboCup finals of 2019 were still played at a snail's pace through choppy, awkward
interactions that could only be perpetuated with human judges as scaffolds (for example, by
picking up and resetting robots that have tipped over or malfunctioned).5 Furthermore, research
has shown that even regular day-to-day interactions in which norms for what to do are well

5

The Robo Cup is an annual event where top roboticists and AI programmers have their robots compete in games of
soccer. It is a charming and yet sad sight. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4_BWQl91p9Y
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established are too fast for computation since they can withstand rapid perturbation (Kelso et al.,
1984; Wallot & Orden, 2012).
The problem is that even if we wanted to speed up the computations of the
representational system by appealing to social norms and interaction schemata, many
improvisational dances are still open-ended. One of the key aspects of improvisation is that the
participants are not only responding to each other’s movements with each flurry of movements,
they are also co-developing the rules for how the interaction is going to continue. A
representational system would not only have to use a large number of rules to create
representations of dance movements, it would also have to represent and make inferences
regarding the rules that guide the current interaction and how the movements it chooses might
change those rules. For example, if we go back to our wedding dancers jamming to Backstreet
Boys, Jim outstretching his arm not only indicates a number of things such as “I am doing a boyband movement,” “I am charming the audience,” “I am confident,” it also represents “we are
now pretending to be in a boy-band, and you should follow this as a rule.” At that moment, the
cognitive system of the other person “understands” this gesture and then includes all of the many
gestures, norms, facial expressions, movements, and so on that are associated with boy bands
into its short-term memory of operations. The cognitive system must respond in a manner that
playfully continues the precedence set by their dance partner, or else it will break the dance
interaction. So, while all dances do have norms and rules that can be exploited by the cognitive
system to ease the computational burden, the system is still faced with the challenge of having to
also represent and keep check of the dynamic rules of conduct that are developed through the
interaction.
Computational Burden in Group Dance
The Computational Burden Problem is only worsened once we take into account the role of
affect and theory of mind. According to representational and computational approaches to
cognition, having a theory of mind must either happen through internal simulation or by
theoretical inference (Baron‐Cohen, 1989; Gallese, 2020; Goldman, 2006; 2012). To understand
the mental states, affect, and intentionality of others, we must either inferentially construct a
theory or generate an internal model we can hypothesize through. In either case, the
computational task of understanding dance movements is further increased. In many dances, the
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dancers go through a variety of real emotions as they interact with each other and the music.6
Thus, the content of a representation of dance movements is also predicated on the system
simultaneously either running a simulation or making theoretical inferences regarding the mental
states of the other dancer at that moment.
Running a simulation or making theoretical inferences at a rapid pace regarding one
dance partner might be possible. Doing so in a large dance group becomes highly demanding.
Empirically we can easily observe large groups of people dancing and improvising together. Yet,
computationally, having to “read the room” at a rapid pace on top of the other processes already
mentioned is unfeasible.
A Zeno-Style Problem
Another obstacle is that cognitive systems will run into a Zeno-style paradox when having to
determine the content of representations and when to decide to make a motor command. Again,
the problem is the meaningfully rich and open-ended nature of dance movements. Because the

Figure 8 - Here we see a four-second snippet of an improvisation performed by Frankie J. at the 2017 HipHop Obsessions House Dance Semifinal (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mmvfm2GdtsM). Over the
stretch of four seconds, with each step, the steps convey more meaning as a growing gestalt.

6

In many traditional cultural dances (for example, Greek folk dancing), the dancers will go through a real registry of
emotion as the dance takes the dancer through historical sorrow, victory, movements of reflection, etc. Further, see
Krueger’s work on music as emotional scaffolding (Krueger, 2019).
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meaning of dance is displayed through movement and movement is an unfolding gestalt, the
meaning of a dance movement is not fully expressed until the movement is in some sense
“done.” However, dance movements fluidly overlap in the ongoing development and are
importantly never “done” until the whole dance is done. Accordingly, when a representational
system is reading dance movements, it faces a challenge. Each of the incoming inputs could
“mean” something as they are currently received. Nevertheless, that means that the system will
have to generate a representation and then update the content of that representation as the
movement continues to unfold. We can ask, when is the meaning of the movement fixed enough
that the system can use the representation in an inference to compute a response? (see Figure 8)
Say “Abby” and “Bobby” are dancing, and Abby dramatically flings their right arm out
from their chest. First, the arm is bent; then it begins to open, then it stretches and brings the
torso with it in an outstretched expression. If Bobby is to interact fluently with Abby, at what
point does Abby’s cognitive system determine the meaning of the movement and make an
inference on how Bobby should respond? At each stage of the movement, the movement could
be processed by Bobby’s system to “mean” something. But as the movement unfolds, Bobby is
running out of time to respond to the movement. Each sub-phase of the unfolding of the
movement in itself indicates or means something, and it is not until the movement is complete
that the system will have the full sense of the movement. In effect, responding appropriately for a
representational system must involve anticipating the movement.
Since anticipation is involved, the system must make a determination of when the
anticipation is strong enough that the system will start making inferences. Even so, making the
determination that the prediction is strong enough requires the use of a rule of determination.
Using that rule over another rule in itself requires a contextually based rule of inferences, and so
the frame problem repeats itself all over again.
The issue of anticipation and the ever occurring frame problem is only worsened once we
realize that since dance movements fluidly merge with each other, in order to make a proper
anticipation of meaning, the system must also make a distinction between when a movement
begins and when it is done. Put differently, to build a contentful representation of “a movement,”
the system must also delineate that movement from the unfolding stream of movements.
Therefore, the representational and computational system must compare the movement towards a
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registry of movements to begin making estimations on how to slice and dice the movement
stream it is receiving.
On such a view, it would be very difficult for untrained dancers to dance together since
they do not have an advanced movement repertoire stored to use for comparison when receiving
sensory stimulation. Again, the expressive, open-ended, kinetically fluid nature of dance imposes
a large computational task on the system. On such a model, even simple dance interaction ought
to be incredibly demanding and a major achievement. Yet this is not what empirical reality
demonstrates. Young children, people who are cognitively differently-abled, and untrained folk
all frequently engage in smooth dance interaction. While it could be argued that for some people
it is incredibly hard to get them to dance, being shy, timid, uncoordinated, and so forth does not
itself speak against the cognitive ability to dance or tell us anything about the cognitive process.
In short, dance should on the representational and computational model, be an enormous and rare
achievement given the amount of computation that must be done at once at high speed, yet we
pervasively see it executed with ease.
Summary and on to Action Theory
In this chapter, we have looked at problems with predictive processing and representational
theories of mind more generally. For predictive processing, we looked at the phenomenological
problem, the affect problem, the expressive movement problem, and the scaling up problem.
With regards to representations and computation, more generally, we looked at various problems
all leading to the computational burden problem. Vernacular improvisational dance is a
contextually rich and difficult achievement that does not lend itself to an inferential solution.
Overall the objections I have raised at predictive processing and representational computational
philosophy should show that such frameworks cannot adequately explain and account for
vernacular dance improvisation (The Inadequate Framework Thesis). Next, we will look at
action theory and see how similar problems emerge when we try to compare vernacular dance
improvisation with mainstream accounts of human action.
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3. Action Theory and Why it Struggles with Vernacular
Improvised Dance
Dance is a cultural practice that involves a great number of individual actions; thus, if we want to
give a cohesive account of dance cognition, it is important to first see how philosophers and
cognitive scientists have thought about agential action. In doing so, we will also see how
standard accounts of agential action fit into representational models of cognition. One interesting
upshot of the comparison between action theory and representational theories of mind is the
ambiguity surrounding folk psychological notions such as belief, desire, and intention.
Furthermore, the notion of intentionality (the ability of the mind to be “about” things) also looms
large in action theory. In any event, as we shall see shortly, action theory reproduces the
dichotomy of control; either the agent is in control or not in control of their actions.
In this next chapter, we will therefore take a look at the core accounts in action theory
and look at how they fare when trying to account for dance. Put differently; I will continue The
Inadequate Framework Thesis. As in the previous chapter, I will first cover the core tenants of
action theory before moving on to applying my critique. While I critique the standard tripartite
division of distal, proximal, and motor intentions, I do end up using the notion of distal intention
later in the dissertation when I provide my own positive enactivist account of dance cognition.
This chapter uses dance to make three main arguments against standard action theory:
•

The Problem of Open-endedness.

•

The Problem of Teleological Postponement.

•

The Computational Burden Problem (part II).

The first problem faced by action theory when it comes in contact with vernacular
improvisational dance is The Problem of Open-endedness. Since vernacular dance
improvisation is an open-ended activity, there are few criteria to judge what is the “best” or
“optimal” course of action. Thus traditional action theory runs into a perpetual problem of choice
when trying to account for dance improvisation.
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Secondly, action theory encounters The Problem of Teleological Postponement. Many
improvised movements are executed perpetually without a goal. Rather than setting a goal and
executing the goal, the goal of the movement emerges as the movement unfolds. Furthermore,
the dancer perpetually leaves the movement “unfinished,” thereby moving in a series of nongoal-directed movements. This poses a problem for action theory since this is a highly skillful
intentional action that yet does not seem to fit into the action theory mold.
After having looked at action theory more broadly, I critique two specific sets of action
theory. The first is the (by now canonical) framework by McFee and the second is the cognitive
science framework by Rosenbaum. For McFee, I take issue with his notion of uncaused
spontaneity, which removes the dancer from the environment and makes dance a seemingly
internalist affair. For Rosenbaum, I demonstrate that his framework also leads to The
Computational Burden Problem. In fact, I demonstrate that on Rosenbaum’s framework the
brain would have to compute more combinations every second than there are atoms in the known
universe. With this plan in place, we can now move into our overview of action theory.

Distal, Proximal, and Motor Intentions
The mainstream view within action theory is the causal theory of action. On this view, agential
action (actions chosen by entities with agency) is caused by mental states internal to the agent.
Put differently, free, deliberate, and skillful action is caused by antecedent mental states; the
order of an action is thinking first, then movement. In line with classic computational and
representational theories of mind, representations in the forms of beliefs, desires, attitudes, and
intentions are inferentially manipulated to create an action (Anscombe, 1979; Bratman, 1987;
Davidson, 1985; Grice, 1972; Mele, 1992; Searle, 1983). Thus, to avoid hard determinism where
agents are simply jerked around by their environment, the causal theory of action posits the mind
as an inference machine that can use its rationality to produce action. It is the inner manipulation
of mental states in accordance with “rational” principles that make something an action rather
than mere behavior. Put differently on the causal theory of action, agential action is very much
an intellectual process.
On this view, what it means to be in control of one’s actions is to have a centralized
“rational” process of action selection. Therefore, an agent either is or is not in control of their
actions – The picture of control I will replace with my distributed control thesis in chapter four.
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In philosophy, this general conception of action is very old. We find various versions of
this view in Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas, Descartes, and many others (Broadie, 1974; Descartes
& Hall, 2003; Thomas et al., 2006). The most general form of the causal theory of action can be
seen in Aristotle’s practical syllogism. For Aristotle, agential action is produced as the agent
aims at a goal (the major premise), observes the environment (the minor premise), and produces
a means-end conclusion in the form of an action (Freeland, 1985):
Major premise.
P1: I will drink prune juice every morning.
Minor premise (Perception of the relevant particulars)
P2: It's morning, and here's some prune juice.
Conclusion: Action, I drink this prune juice. (Freeland, 1985, 402)
While Aristotle did not have the vocabulary of personal versus sub-personal, it is not exactly
clear at what level of explanation the agent makes such inferences. The important point is that
the conclusion of the inference is an action. Again, control of one’s actions is a rational
inferential process. If an inference did not produce the action, one is not in control of that action.
In more recent history, Davidson takes up the inferential account of action, to produce an
updated causal theory of action. Davidson agrees with Anscombe (1957) that reasons are causal
notions. Therefore, to get an account that describes the causal power of the mind, we need to
understand how belief and desires are added together in complexes to form intentions.
For Davidson, action at any level (fine-grained such as handwriting each letter in a word,
or coarse-grained such as cleaning the house over a weekend) involves having a pro-attitude
towards a goal and the actions believed to accomplish that goal (Davidson, 1985, 96). Thus, for a
person to switch on the light, they must have a pro-attitude that reaching and flicking the switch
will achieve this goal. Similarly, when painting, the painter must have an awareness of the goal
of each brushstroke. Each independent brushstroke must be done with the belief that this type of
brushstroke will bring about this type of effect on the canvas. Action, whether fine-grained or
coarse-grained, is swept up in having beliefs about how to change the world through action: at
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various levels of explanations, beliefs and desires form intentions and pro-attitudes towards an
aim.
For Davidson, various belief-desire complexes make a multitude of action paths available
to the agent, and the agent will (unless an irrational agent) always choose the path of action that
produces the best outcome given its beliefs and desires (ibid, 6). In light of his reasons as causes
theory, Davidson points out that if an agent does action “A” but intended to do action “B,” then
we can find some description where A seems reasonable in light of the reasons given by the
agent even if those reasons are objectively bad reasons (ibid, 84-85). Consequently, a strict
notion of rationality is built into the causal theory of mind that does not allow for akrasia.
In his essay titled Intending (1980, 84), Davidson further expands on his theory of action
and gives us a more robust notion of intention itself. So far, we have seen that beliefs plus desires
equal reasons and that reasons provide us with pro-attitudes towards doing certain actions to
achieve aims. Still, at this point, Davidson introduces a complication into the framework of
intention; namely, Davidson introduces pure intending. Davidson believes an agent can have an
intention to “A” without actually “A’ing.” Not all intentional actions need a preceding pure
intention, but sometimes there is a disconnect between intentions and actions. Sometimes, agents
form intentions and simply do not carry those intentions into action. So, Davidson introduces
(the vary Cartesian) notion of pure intending (ibid, 89). Pure intending is an entirely mental act
of forming an intention without the body performing any corresponding movements. In
consequence, a pure intention is a “mental action” and a “mental event” (ibid, 89).
Unlike Michael Bratman, who thinks that we can have planning intentions that function
as commitments to ourselves, Davidson does not think that pure intentions are “commands to
oneself.” It is, in an important sense, an intention that is impeded or unexecuted for some reason
or another (ibid, 90). Part of the story is that intending to “X” does not mean that you believe that
you will, in fact “X” (ibid, 91). For Davidson, it is completely coherent for an agent to form the
intention “I will bench press 250lbs today” while knowing that this might not happen; maybe the
agent is not strong enough, maybe the local bodybuilder is not at the gym to spot the agent today.
Thus, sometimes intentions remain in the realm of the mental because the external world
prevents the intentions from being carried out. While there is a lot more to say about Davidson's
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elaborate framework and ontology of actions, events, and reasons, we can, for the purpose of this
overview, follow Mele (1992) in summarizing Davidson's view in the following way:
1. The reason basis of intentional action: An action A is an intentional action only if A's
agent had a reason for A-ing and (his having) that reason was a cause of his A-ing.
2. Reasons-explanations as causal explanations: To explain an action by citing the
reason(s) for which it is done is to explain the action with reference to its cause.
3. Reasons as belief/desire pairs: The reasons for which agents act are composed of
belief/desire pairs.
4. The motivational strength thesis: ''If an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do
y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he
does either x or y intentionally."
5. The judgment/motivation alignment thesis. One is always most motivated to do what
one judges it best to do (ibid, 9)
Davidson’s framework and the representational and computational theories of mind are like peas
in a pod; they both conceptualize the mind as inference makers that propel the body into action
because of an adherence to a rationality-based syntax.
Bratman further elaborates on the causal theory of action by introducing the notion of
future-oriented-prior-intentions or plans (Bratman, 1987). Bratman’s framework not only
explicitly adopts a functionalist representational view of the mind (ibid, 9), his theory implicitly
supports the computational theory too as he opens his book by assuming that: “We are planning
agents” (ibid, 1). In other words, what characterizes human agents is their ability to plan and then
act in accordance with those plans.
Without taking future-oriented intentions into consideration first (that is plans), we
cannot understand why we do any actions intentionally. While beliefs and desires do play a role
in the formation of short-term intentions and the execution of an action, these can only be formed
(and be coherent) if they are formed within a structured network of plans and commitments (ibid,
10). Why is this the case? For one, we have limited resources, limited time, and must, therefore,
balance a number of various considerations any time we act (ibid, 11). If our intentions and
actions only referred to the immediate situations, we would (supposedly) quickly become an
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extinct species. Consequently, from an evolutionary perspective, Bratman thinks that we have
developed into planning agents exactly because it allows us to survive and thrive.
Bratman agrees with Davidson that we need pro-attitudes. Desires and beliefs are not
enough to form intentions; we also need evaluation that a certain cause of action is desirable and
achievable: "Intentions are, whereas ordinary desires are not, conduct-controlling pro-attitudes.
Ordinary desires, in contrast, are merely potential influencers of action" (ibid, 15). Having
beliefs and desires are not sufficient to throw us into action. Hence, Bratman argues that we need
self-commitments to steer our decision-making processes, else we would be hedonistically
running from cheese-steak to cheese-steak without any future-oriented coherence. In other
words, to avoid shortsighted hedonism, agential action must be steered by self-commitments –
what Bratman calls plans.
Plans are future-oriented intentions made at an earlier point in time that dictate what
current intentions can be generated by the agent. If I create the intention to go to gymnastics with
Mike Ardoline on Friday, then I can also not intend to go on a weekend trip on Friday. Further,
throughout the week, because I had formed the intention to go to gymnastics on Friday, it
becomes harder for me to form the intention “I will play video games all day Friday.” In this
way, plans structure what intentions can be formed and make it harder for conflicting currentsituation intentions to be formed. With enough meshing plans and intentions regarding
gymnastics, it should be significantly harder for me to “intend to play video games.” Unlike
Davidson, where the agent simply does what they “want to do the most,” Bratman’s agents can
go against their own inclinations exactly because prior intentions reign in current intention
formation. Consequently, we cannot reduce intentions to beliefs and desires; they are separate
states that fit into the economy of the mind. Without prior intentions, no rational action.
Bratman writes: “We have isolated three central facts about intentions: they are conductcontrolling pro-attitudes, they have inertia, and they serve as inputs into further practical
reasoning”(ibid, 26). Because of the structuring task of prior intentions, they cannot be replaced
or removed easily. If an intention is future-oriented and structuring, it needs to be able to
withstand fleeting desires and even long-term desires. The more inertia an intention has, that is,
the harder it is for us to change the intention, the more likely it is that the agent will behave
rationally and stay on task. While Bratman does not go into explicit detail on the use of the word
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inertia, I take that part of the resistance to change of an intention comes from how well it coheres
with other intentions. For example, my prior intention to work on my paper throughout the week
coheres well with my other intentions to get a Ph.D., to become competent in my field, and so
on. Prior intentions resist change, and because of this, they can help structure our rational
conduct and practical reasoning.
Plans then are future-oriented prior intentions that remain “within the mind” and commits
the agent to certain courses of action (ibid, 28); they are commitments to oneself that should not
be easily broken. As we develop and our lives become increasingly more complicated, a nested
hierarchy of plans begin to develop that give shape to the type of lives we live, and our shortterm actions:
Our plans typically have a hierarchical structure. Plans concerning ends embed plans
concerning means and preliminary steps; and more general intentions (for example, my
intention to go to a concert tonight) embed more specific ones (for example, my intention
to hear the Alma Trio). (ibid, 29)
For Bratman, every time we act, this entire elaborate structure of nested planning is being
utilized to guarantee coherent smooth action. The more conflicting plans an agent has, the more
irrational their behavior becomes. In fact, since the planning structure is nested, it is fair to
assume that an agent's long term plans are causally implicated when the agent picks up a spoon
for their yogurt. Bratman admits that there is a strong demand that plans, prior-plans, and current
intentions all add up in a consistent fashion. However, our desires do not need to be consistent or
coherent; just our plans need to be (ibid, 32).
Again, we see how the planning framework fits with the computational and
representational theory of mind. Actions are nested into a hierarchical network of plans and
intentions, and for the agent to conduct actions, they must make inferences using their plans and
intentions as premises within inference.
Some interesting patterns and tensions emerge when we begin comparing Bratman and
Davidson. Davidson's account seems to be intuitively geared towards short-term actions and the
intentional structure that must be in place for short-term action to happen (for example, flipping
switches, pulling triggers, letting go of ropes). Bratman, on the other hand, seems more
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concerned with long-term coarse-grained intentional structures (planning my week, going to the
concert, what to buy at the grocery store). Still, both thinkers largely avoid the analysis of
intentional, directed behavior within action.
John Searle provides us with an analysis of intentions as they take place within action.
Searle explicitly endorses a representational theory of mind (but not a computational theory).1 In
Intentionality (Searle, 1983), Searle argues that intentions in actions are short-lived
representations with the representational content “this intention causes the action.” Thus, built
into all sensorimotor actions are short-lived representations with success conditions for the action
plus the content that the representation itself causes the action (87-89). Put differently, intentions
in action are representations that cause the body to move and represent causing the body to
move. The content of an intention in action to punch then is the proposition “this causes
punching.” Importantly, it is the content of the representation “this causes punching” that
literally causes the punching. This way, intentions in actions can retain their world-to-mind
direction of fit while also having the ability to be true or false. In other words, intentions in
action are self-referential, have success conditions, and that those success conditions are that the
intention itself caused the movement. Intentions in action supposedly are the intentions we form
simultaneously as the action is carried out, but it is the propositional content of the intention in
action which causes the action. In effect, as we fluidly move through the world, a constant series
of intention in action is generated and updated.
We have seen that Bratman operates at the level of planning for distal aims, Davidson
applies his analysis to more proximal tasks, and finally, Searle looks at the structure of intentions
during action. Next, Inspired by these three accounts, we get Pacherie’s DPM model – distal,
proximal, and motor intentions (Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2018; Pacherie, 2008). Pacherie
extends the depths of the intentional analysis by positing motor intentions. While Searle looks at
intentions in action, Pacherie takes his analysis to still happen at the proximal level. Therefore,

One of the conclusions from Searle’s famous Chinese Room thought experiment is that computational theories
cannot explain the mind because they have no way of explaining how a system gains semantic content for its
representations.
1
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she introduces motor intention to account for the intentional structure of action across fast time
scales during motor execution. Next, we will look at Pacherie’s DPM model in a bit more detail.
The DPM model explains agential action as a unified framework consisting of three tiers
of intention: distal intentions (I want to get a Ph.D., I want to swing dance on Saturday, tonight I
will watch The Witcher on Netflix), proximal intentions (I want to get a cereal bowl, I want to
unlock this door, I want to move this chess piece), and motor intentions (the updating of my
sensorimotor processes as I reach for the cereal bowl, unlock the door, move the chess piece). As
we move through the world, these different levels of intention guide our actions across the
personal sub-personal divide. Importantly, there is a hierarchical structure in place so that the
distal intentions an agent develops steer their proximal intentions, which in turn influence how
sensorimotor processes are aimed at entities in the environment.
In the DPM framework, proximal intentions are important because they include
instructions on “how to do something.” A proximal intention to grab a cereal bowl not only
means aiming to get the cereal bowl but also what steps the agent motorically must go through to
do so. With such specifications present in the proximal intention, the agent can carry out the
intention, while motor intentions help carry out the action smoothly at high granularity. For
Pacherie, motor intentions are control processes that keep the action on track.
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Figure 9 - Pacherie’s DPM model.
Many of our actions are on a daily basis guided mostly by proximal and motor intentions;
however, we often create, appeal to, or deliberate through our distal intentions. For example, a
distal intention to get to dance practice on time might start a stream of proximal and motor
intentions that involve the agent packing their dance shoes, getting in their car at a decent time,
and driving to the studio. Hence, distal intentions often organize our activities across longer time
scales.
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Figure 10 - The causal relationship between distal intentions, proximal intentions, and motor
intentions. Distal intentions largely constrain and enable proximal intentions, leading to the
execution of relevant motor intentions. Such processes lead to new perceptual input from the
environment that the agent must then process to form further intentions. We see Bratman’s
insight that distal intentions are conduct controlling.
D-intentions, P-intentions, and M-intentions exist in a causal relationship so that when all
goes well, these various levels of intention representations cohere. Distal intentions dictate in
which general activities the agent partake. Proximal intentions set concrete in-the-moment action
plans for those activities. Motor intentions track and adjust the agents' motor engagement with
the task by sending motor representation to motor systems and central processing. When all goes
well, all three layers of intentions are typically simultaneously at play as we act in the world.
Importantly as events in the environment present themselves, any level of intention, D, P, or
M, can be responsible for changing the agent’s behavior. For example, if an agent is pulling a
fish out of the water, the wiggling of the fish will often perturb the agent’s intended action so
that M-intentions must be hard at work adjusting the agent's motoric actions. Similarly, when
reaching for the keys, the agent might realize that these are the wrong keys and decide to look
elsewhere, switching from one P-intention to the other. Finally, being told that the new
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Hollywood blockbuster is boring, deliberation might make the agent switch from one distal
intention of movie-going to one of boardgame playing.
Generally speaking, in the DPM model, different types of intentions are the caretakers of
different representational and computational processes. Intentions activate, prohibit, and monitor
computational processes at various levels of generality. As we move through the world, setting
these different intentions keep our motoric, calculative, and deliberative processes on track.

Problems with Action Theory and Vernacular Improvisational Dance
Now that we have toiled through this generalized review of action theory, we can begin looking
at why action theory has a hard time accounting for the phenomenon of vernacular
improvisational dance.
On the one hand, improvisational dance is an intentional activity; on the other hand, it
does not fit neatly into the belief, desire, intention model of traditional action theory. For
example, if we on Davidson’s model only act intentionally when we do what we believe is the
best cause of action, then we are forced to either reduce dance to a math calculation or bite the
bullet and argue that dance is not intentional.
The problem is that because improvisational dance often is open-ended, there are no
criteria to judge what is the best action (The Problem of open-endedness). Of course, dance
systems and norms such as, stay on beat, follow the tune, don’t hurt yourself, and others might
help rein in the realm of possible actions a little, but these do not help the dancer choose an
action (whether personally or sub-personally). This is the case even within dance forms that have
stricter dance systems. The issue is that there are no specified better or worse criteria to guide
action, yet the dancer must choose movements to execute. Even when a dancer executes their
steps excellently, it still does not make the pas de bourree better, more optimal, or more correct
than, say, the cabbage patch. If both steps are within the dance system, they are both equally
good, and the system will therefore be faced with a fifty-fifty lock. The Open-ended nature of
many improvisational dances will therefore lead to indecision should action selection happen the
way posited by Davidson and other action theorists.
Furthermore, as I demonstrated earlier, it is highly implausible that a centralized control
system trading in beliefs and desires could make the kinds of calculations required to move fast
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enough to execute dance fluently. Nevertheless, the problem is compounded because there are
few, if any, principles that can guide the action selection process. On Davidson’s account, when
watching a video of a dancer, we would have to explain their action in terms of belief and desire
complexes that, with each step, fulfill what the agent wants to do the most. However, it is
implausible that dance activity can be explained by beliefs or what an agent deemed the best to
do. When say someone is dancing and a jazzy song comes on, it might be said that they believed
it was the best to switch to a jazzy style. However, did they believe it was the best action to do
the kick-ball-change over the kick-shuffle-kick? No such belief can be generated or be causal
since many movements are open possibilities in the improvisation process.
Again, we see the dichotomy between control and non-control in play. On this view, if an
action is not inferentially produced, then the agent is not in control of their actions. It is worth
mentioning that some social dances, for example, Indian classical dance is technically slow and
codified enough that a practitioner could reason their way through a performance. However, this
is not the case for many (if not most) vernacular improvisational dances. Generally speaking, the
problem still stands; cashing out fast-paced improvised artistic movement in terms of beliefs and
desires is an overly laborious process that would make such activity impossible.

Teleological Postponement
Typically intentions are seen as (representational) mental states that have a goal; that is,
intentions aim at something. When improvising, many of our movements do, in fact, have a goal
that is carried into completion, and as such, do not pose a problem for action theory. However,
many dance movements do not have an aim (The Problem of Teleological Postponement). As
many dance phenomenologists have described, the dancer begins their movements without a goal
or an aim. While this not true of all improvisational dance or at all times during improvisation, it
does pose a significant problem for action theory. The dancer might simply begin a motion, and
as that motion unfolds, the dancer sees where it takes them (Sheets-Johnstone, 1966; 2011). In
other words, dance is often described as a process of exploration rather than goal achievement.
This form of movement can be described as an ongoing teleological postponement; the dancer
keeps pushing the creation of an aim in front of them. Normally, an agent can easily start a nonaimed movement in this way and then somewhere through the movement give the movement an
aim – make it traditionally intentional. Yet, in many instances of dance improvisation, the dancer
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practices teleological postponement; they keep moving and keep postponing the moment in
which they attach an aim to their movements. One dance practice that often takes this technique
very far is contact improvisation, in which the aim of the movement is dispensed indefinitely.
Phenomenologists Maxine Sheets-Jonstone writes:
To say that in improvising, I am in the process of creating the dance out of the
possibilities that are mine at any moment of the dance is to say that I am exploring the
world in movement; that is, at the same time that I am moving, I am taking into account
the world as it exists for me here and now in this ongoing, ever-expanding present.
(Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, 422)
In a similar vein, enactivist Michelle Merritt writes:
In a nonchoreographed dance, it most certainly cannot be the case that the dancers are
carrying out movement in the first manner characterized above. That is, they do not think
before they act; they simply begin moving. There might be some prespecified rules to the
improvisation—you must maintain contact with a person or an object, e.g.,—but for the
most part, movement is spontaneous and unplanned. (Merritt, 2013, 98)
From these two paragraphs, we begin to see how dance phenomenologists describe how dance
improvisation can be unplanned, in the moment, and, importantly, a practice that stays in the
moment. Rather than falling back on planning, rationalizing, or beliefs, the dancer (at the
phenomenological level of description at least), suspends setting the kind of intention that
Davidson, Bratman, and Mele, would claim are necessary for complex action.
Importantly, practicing teleological postponement does not entail that the movements
look uncoordinated or random. Anyone who has had the pleasure of looking at a master
improviser will know that this process looks nothing like random or uncoordinated movement.
Teleological postponement then poses a problem for conventional action theory. What are the
beliefs and desires involved in such a movement? What are the rational criteria for choosing one
movement over the other? If we are to believe the phenomenological accounts of dance, then
there is no calculation involved in such movement, yet it remains intelligent, structured, and
coordinated (Midgelow, 2018). Teleological postponement demonstrates that it is possible to
perform complex actions without having to form prior-intentions or having rational inferences be
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the causal antecedence of action. Oftentimes, the exploration of where the movement is taking
you is enough to create structured, coherent high-level dance (Sheets-Johnstone, 1966; 2011).
If we go with Davidson’s idea that reasons for actions are belief-desire pairs and that
agents just do that which they think is best, then we cannot explain how improvisation comes to
look structured and intentional. If a dancer is pivoting with their arms out and slowly drop into a
jazz split, there must be on Davidson’s account some belief-desire pair that goes into an
inference about why this is the best movement to perform. However, at the moment of pivoting,
the dancer could do any one of thousands of movements; thus, the agent’s system must compare
the desire and value of thousands of movements before the opportunity has passed. It could be
that an agent “desires” to do some range of movements more than others, but then the model
must also account for how one comes to “desire” doing a dance movement. While it is true that
sometimes a dancer really wants to do a movement because it feels good, maybe they just
learned the move at practice. Perhaps, they rediscovered the move and want to reestablish it into
their repertoire. Still, such cases are much less frequent and cannot account for the constant
unfolding of movements that are needed.
A way we could try to defend the belief-desire framework of action in dance is to argue
that the “desires” felt by the dancer are to create certain expressions (I want to express fear, I
want to express joy, I want to express heaviness or lightness). Thus, belief-desire pairs could
then be something like “I desire to express lightness” and “I believe that moves A-L, can express
lightness.” However, many movements do not single-handedly express one thing or another.
Their expressive powers depend on what came before them immediately and distally and what
will happen after the movement. In consequence, the belief-desire pairing will still have to go
through a heavy computational burden to pick any movement. Furthermore, dancers during
improvisation do not always desire to express one thing or another, just as they are not always
aware of what movements will express once performed. Intending to express X is a static and
mostly intellectual exercise that does not take into account the embodied engagement with the
world that takes place during dance.
The overall point is that belief-desire pairs cannot account for actions in which the agent
suspends having an aim or a reason. On most accounts of intentional action, we would be forced
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to say that such action is unintentional. Being so, this seems to be an absurd conclusion given the
coordinated, expressive, and structured execution of dances performed as a form of life.

Recent Action Theory of Dance
McFee
Graham McFee has written several books on the issue of dance identification (McFee, 1992;
2012; 2018). While the main focus of these books concerns the ontological status of dance works
for purposes of historical identical, preservation, and reproduction, McFee does provide a view
of dance action. While his work is most well known for the metaphysics of dance works, I will
focus on what McFee says about dance cognition and actions. I should note that while there are
other authors that provide accounts of dance “actions” (see for example, Beardsley, 1982;
Montero, 2016; Pakes, 2013, 2020), I focus on McFee because he is the progenitor of the
contemporary debates on dance actions and the most persistent in arguing for its relevance. Even
so, going further into this debate than McFee will get this dissertation far out of scope.
For McFee, dance is created from basic actions; that is, actions that do not have a
previous mental cause and consist of basic bodily movement (McFee, 2018, 12). For example,
when wanting to drive my car I do not need to think about how to hold the wheel or how to push
the brake. Rather, for McFee these are “uncaused” actions; that is, they do not have a
propositional or explicitly conscious thought prior to their execution. A novice dancer might
have to think about what they are doing at the beginning, the same way we often have to think
about what we are doing if we are walking on ice. As the agent’s movements slowly become
more skillful and habitual, they stop being a matter of explicit “mental” causation and a matter of
basic action. While this is an unintuitive way of talking about skill, we can think of what McFee
is doing as outlining a distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that (but not from a
Rylean framework).
Importantly for McFee dance movements (whether improvised or not) are non-volitional,
that is, “We should grant these [basic actions] as powers and capacities of persons, at least in
favored cases: we can just behave in these ways without doing anything else” (ibid, 13). Trying
to avoid the classic infinite regress found in action theory between volition and action, Mcfee
argues that dance actions are non-volitional. This means that we are not doing anything else
when we are executing dance movements we are simply just moving - a concern like that of
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Goldman (1970). In classic action theory, a regress is found between volition and action when
we posit that volition is needed to cause an action. It then seems that another volition is needed
to create the volition to move, and so on into the infinite. For McFee, dance movements then are
spontaneous; they do not require deliberate thinking or volition, the dancer simply springs into
action.
Again, McFee is getting at an account of know-how. Asking, “how did you hit the
baseball?” is for McFee, not an intelligible question since it is a matter of know-how and not
propositional knowledge. Thus the question cannot be coherently answered. While one can give
a description of one’s technique, the fact that arms were moved and a bat were swung is, for
McFee, simply a capacity of autonomous agents. We might as well have asked: “how did you
smell the coffee,” there is (for McFee) no better answer than, “I smelled it.” Dance being a
matter of basic action does not mean that it happens fully, randomly or spontaneously; dance
action is a matter of skilled know-how. For McFee, dance actions do not contain planning and, in
that sense, cannot be said to be conventionally intentional (ibid, 16). Like Bratman, McFee
believes that intentions, regardless of their temporal scope, always involve some at least minimal
level of planning. Nevertheless, dance movements for McFee do not involve planning. Yet, it is
important to note that only the act of doing the dance for McFee is unplanned; choreographing or
composition does involve planning and are considered dance actions.
Furthermore, unlike sports in which the aesthetic qualities of the game are an accidental
feature, the purpose of dance movements is aesthetic. In other words, dance movements are
meant to look, feel, and sound, aesthetically expressive (beautiful, strong, timid, grotesque, sleek,
whimsical, etc.). For McFee, this adds another question regarding the status of intention to the
debate regarding dance actions. Namely, does the artist's intention matter for our analysis and
appreciation of dance? While this question is technically outside the scope of this dissertation,
McFee’s answer to the question does tell us something about his view regarding dance
movements generally. Namely, McFee argues that while dance movements are basic in the sense
mentioned above, the dancer is still intentional about the meaning they wish to convey with their
movements (ibid, 22-24). This claim, however, seems to directly contradict McFee’s claim that
dancing does not involve any level of “planning” since intending to convey something is not
basic or spontaneous.
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We must remember that for McFee, dance is constituted by confusable counterparts; that
is, movements that could be confused for ordinary non-dance motions outside the context of
dance. The dancer puts movements together in a dance context to make these movements dance.
Hence, there is an overarching intention to produce meaning in dance even if the actions
themselves are strictly speaking non-intentional or non-volitional.
I wish to distance myself from McFee’s view of dance action as it pertains to the act of
dancing. The first problem is that McFee thinks of dance action as uncaused and takes uncaused
to mean not caused by some mental state. This way of thinking is cognitivist in that it separates
the environment from the mind, separates the dance environment from being causally part of the
dance. McFee’s account of know-how still runs a classic cognitivist error by assuming that
dancers must somehow spontaneously, yet internally, decide to move. Furthermore, it is hard to
see how it can be claimed that dance actions are not parts of chains of mental causation if we are
also committed to dancers being intentionally expressive. If a dancer is explicitly choosing to be
expressive, as claimed by McFee, then dance movements are intentional and non-intentional at
the same time.
Additionally, dancers do not always choose to express in certain ways but are rather
brought into expression by the situation (by affordances, as we shall see in a bit). Having spent
over two decades in the dance industry, it is simply a well-known fact that dancers do not always
intend to express something. For example, in the heat of a dance battle, a dancer might not think
to express one thing or another, rather it comes out as the dancer explores the affordances
available to them in the moment (I will talk a lot more about this when I develop my positive
account). Furthermore, arguing that dance actions are in some sense “basic” makes them
mysterious outside the realm of analysis. We always find ourselves in contextually rich,
meaningful situations, in the midst of the action (think back to the form of life thesis). Claiming
that dance actions are basic brings them outside that context. Although, no action is noncontextual. In part, what McFee tells us is simply the fact that dancers have free will. However,
such a claim is not particularly informative in telling us how dance movements are made and
function. This sort of argument does not tell us how these movements are brought about.
McFee defenders could object that his account only applies to European stage dance, and
as such, the dancer performing a choreography can spontaneously perform a trained
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choreography. Part of my gripe lies with McFee’s use of spontaneity. The problem is that even
when doing choreography, dancers must always be sensitive to that night's audience, the texture
of this floor, and a range of other contextual factors that make dance action always
environmentally interactive (Ravn, 2020, Bresnahan, 2014). If the dancer is not in interaction
with these factors, they will likely trip, slip, get injured, or have other kinds of mishaps. Dancing
is never just a repetition of the choreographer's intentions because dancers must always be
sensitive to how their body feels today (maybe they are injured or tired in specific muscles) and
what the environment is like on that day. As unintuitive as it might sound at first glance, there is
no such thing as purely spontaneous dance action (in the McFee sense).
By arguing that dance movements are spontaneous, McFee is taking the dancer out of the
rich cultural, social, physical, and pragmatic contexts that we always find ourselves within.
Dancing does not take place in a void, as we shall see in my account of affordances, it is largely
those contexts that dictate how we can move and scaffold us into moving. Furthermore, McFee’s
account of spontaneity ignores the contribution of the dancer to the meaning that is being
generated when a dance is being performed. McFee focuses on his account of the ontology of
dance works and how dancers simply reperform those works. While it is outside the scope of my
dissertation to deal with this question, I distance myself from this view. The problem is that in
assuming that dancers are reproducing some “work,” McFee is essentially forced to say that
improvised dance movements are not intentional and that improvised dance does not generate
artistic meaning since there is no choreographer who planned the movements. In short, McFee’s
account of dance action renders most of non-art dance non-meaningful (the opposite of the form
of life thesis). But in contrast, as we have seen in chapter one, it is exactly one of the prominent
features of vernacular improvised dances that they are meaningful forms of life that we move
through.
Furthermore, the meaning expressed through dance movements is not just a product of
the dancer’s intentions. When we are dancing together, or for others, especially when dancing is
improvised, the meaning that is generated from the movement is a distributed product. Meaning
is created between dancers, between dancer and audience, between dancer and the surroundings.
Since McFee is taking classical European concert dance as his main model, he overlooks the
myriad of folk, and non-western, and non-white dance traditions, in which the meaning of the
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dancing is generated communally by everyone in the dance space. As I will show in the sections
on dynamical systems, affordances, and enactivism, dancers are not the sole authors of their
actions. Rather, dance actions are typically generated as an emergent product of the holistic
dance situation.
McFee’s account stems from his concern with the metaphysical status of dance works
and his prioritizing of the choices made by choreographers. Nevertheless, even in the case of
performing a choreographed dance, the dancer’s intentions are not necessarily to express what
the choreographer has intended for them to express. Sometimes the dancer is more focused on
completing the difficult movement phrases rather than expressing anything.
Rosenbaum
Recently cognitive scientists working within action theory have tried to create a specific action
theory framework for dance (Bläsing, 2014; Bläsing et al., 2019a). In this new cognitivist
approach to dance David Rosenbaum, argues for a two-tiered decision-making process in dance
(Rosenbaum, 2019). Based heavily on mental representation and intention, Rosenbaum argues
that in all movements, including dance, the cognitive system chooses a goal state and then goes
through a hierarchical decision-making process before movement execution (Rosenbaum, 2019).
In other words, first, the system evaluates representations from incoming sensory information to
decide what physical “goal” the system should achieve. Here the “goal” is a representation of
some static state, a bodily position, that the body should move towards.
Once such a goal has been decided, then the system will move through hierarchical
processing of all the different ways the system could move the body to achieve this goal. The
evaluation takes place by using a large number of parameters that have been stored in the system.
These parameters include short-lived contextual parameters relevant to the current context, as
well as parameters related to the general kind of situation the agent finds themselves in: in this
case, a dance situation. Thus, once a goal state has been represented, the system must weigh its
various options for moving against a long list of task-related parameters before it chooses the
motor program that it wishes to execute.
With a goal and a motor program selected, the system then translates this motor program
into a motor intention that carries the movement into fruition while updating the context relevant
minutia of the movement (for example, subtle wrist angling) through rapid dorsal stream
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updating. In short, Rosenbaum and colleagues argue that for each dance movement (even the
ones that take place within tenths of milliseconds), the system evaluates its situation, chooses a
goal, goes through an elaborate selection process, converts the choice to an intention, and then
starts moving.
There are several problems with Rosenbaum’s approach. First, Rosenbaum admits right
off the bat that he has no dance experience and is instead a hobby violinist (ibid,141). This is not
a problem in itself; however, next, Rosenbaum simply assumes, without being a dancer, that:
Aiming for goal positions not only applies to pirouettes; it also applies to other dance
moves. Dance, for its appearance of being a continuous activity, is actually controlled, or
is supposed to be controlled, by aiming for one target position after another. (ibid, 141)
Rosenbaum assumes without actual evidence from dance that dancers aim for one static position
after the other, and this is meant to show that cognitive systems generate representations of static
goal states. Yet, anyone who has any expertise in fluent dances such as breakdancing, Jazz, Tap,
and the list goes on will know immediately that this is simply not the case. A multitude of dance
techniques across disciplines do not aim for a static position but smoothly flow in and out of
various movements. These techniques aim for constant continuity, and if the dancer does not
move in such a way, the movement collapses.
This kind of theorizing is a classic example of cognitive scientists making claims about
dance, with evidence from other fields, without looking at dance itself. In fact, all of the
empirical sources that Rosenbaum cites are from lab experiments not involving dance (and, as
discussed below, the ecological validity of those lab experiments is in itself dubious). The claim
that dancers always aim for one static position after another simply does not hold up empirically,
phenomenologically, or anecdotally. This is especially the case when looking at improvisation.
Rosenbaum argues that in dance, the system chooses what to do because it has a stored
database of representations of movements that it can hierarchically evaluate against task
constraints. This could be true in the case of choreographed dance, where the dancer has a
specific routine they must execute, but it cannot be the case for improvised dance. While dance
systems, norms, and the situation itself does set a lot of parameters for what an improviser can
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do, it is exactly the point that improvisation is open-ended. There are no task-relevant criteria
that can let the system choose between one movement representation or the other.
Additionally, Rosenbaum argues that if no motor representation can be chosen, the
system simply chooses at random (ibid, 143). Again, this argument does not work in the case of
improvisation. If the system truly chooses at random, then improvised dance would look chaotic
and unorganized. Yet, improvised dance looks cohesive and coherent. Furthermore, choosing at
random or setting goalposts before each movement does not cohere with any of the
phenomenological data we have surveyed so far. In fact, as dance phenomenologist Erin
Manning reminds us, experiencing the body in dance is experiencing the body as a force of flux,
not a body moving from static pose to static pose (Manning, 2007). Similarly, Clair Wills
describes partner dance as an ongoing blending between the self and the other (Wills, 2020). In
such interactions of blended agency, no one partner can aim for static poses as goalposts.
Despite the speed of brain processes, I find it inconceivable that the brain should be able
to smoothly work through millions of potential movement representations in a hierarchical
fashion for each moment of dance interaction (we must remember that many dances can be
immensely fast). In fact, Rosenbaum points out that the human body has an unprecedented level
of degrees of freedom (ibid, 142). The goal representations ahead of each movement selection
phase are meant to limit the degrees of freedom. Choosing the desired goal position will
naturally limit the ways one can move to get to this desired goal position. However, Rosenbaum
again forgets that task constraints in improvisation are diminished and of a large open-ended
nature. The human body in an adult has approximately 230 movable joints, each of which can be
moved across six different degrees of freedom the x,y,z dimensions plus pitch, roll, and yaw
angles (ibid, 142). Hence, when it comes to the number of combinations we have available with
230 joints, we get a staggering number of combinations (The Computational Burden
Problem). Assuming for the sake of overwhelming simplicity that every joint can only be in one
of the six directions, we still get the following number of combinations:180(230×6) . Just to
contextualize, this number is larger than the estimated number of atoms in the universe 1082 .2
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I want to thank my good friend and former dance student John Sim who is a mathematics graduate student at
Boston University, for showing me how to crunch the numbers.

124

Even if we apply to Rosenbaum (and other cognitivists) the principle of charity and argue that
the cognitive system would only have to choose between movements within a certain dance
system under certain contextualized task-relevant conditions, and taking habitual movements
into account, we still get a staggering number of movements to hierarchically evaluate at each
moment. For example, if an agent is hip-hop dancing and knows the basic rules of the dance,
they would have roughly three hundred basic movements to choose from at each moment.
Furthermore, they would have at least a hundred different standard transitions to choose from
(ways to move from one step into the next step). Additionally, each of those steps can, let’s say
for the sake of simplicity, be performed at normal, double, half speed, or with a slow-motion
effect. Each step must have an arm movement (let us assume another 300 possibilities for the
sake of simplicity) and a head movement (let us assume 12 possibilities). We still get a number
of combinations in the millions. In other words, even when we are being incredibly generous and
severely lowballing the number, we still end up with a cognitive system that has to hierarchically
evaluate millions of possible representations before making a choice, all within a matter of
milliseconds. Despite the brain's billions of connections, this is simply not a tenable position.
It is contrary to our everyday experience of moving through the world that we should use an
overwhelming amount of bandwidth to do something we typically achieve fluently without
strain. It is exactly one of the insights of the phenomenological tradition that when we are at
ease, we move through the world uninhibited, with low mental and often low physical effort
(Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2014; Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
Finally, it is worth looking at the validity of the studies that Rosenbaum and other cognitive
scientists of action use as evidence. While I do not have the page space to cover every
experiment, it is important to note that these experiments largely make the same mistake; that is,
these experiments are typically not ecologically valid. Rather than studying how humans move in
real contextualized situations, these experiments create highly artificial conditions. In such
experiments, the artificial conditions bias a certain kind of result, the result the researchers have
assumed from the beginning. For example:
Brown and colleagues (2002) observed that when people began moving the hand toward
a screen to place a handheld object up against an image on the screen, the orientation of
the hand-held object as it left the start gate was measurably different depending on which
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final orientation the hand-held object would have to occupy. In reaching out to grasp an
object, grasps likewise reflect anticipation of future positions. (Rosenbaum, 2019, 144)
In the experiments by Brown and Colleagues, participants were asked to stand statically and
simply move an object with their hand to the projected spot on the wall (Brown et al., 2002). The
fact that participants change their hand and object orientation to match the object to its projection
on the wall indicates to Rosenbaum that human agents internally represent a goal state before
carrying out an action.
There are several problems with this reasoning. First, it is unclear how this artificial
setting can tell us anything about dynamically unfolding activities such as dance; the two
activities do not seem to carry enough similarity to make the comparison. Second, matching an
object to its shape is a task that requires that the participant make a comparison between the
object and shape for the two to fit together. The experiment is designed so that the subject must
choose the strategy that fits with the experimenter's hypothesis. It is the kind of task that is
hungry for pre-planning, especially when performed in a lab when there is nothing else going on.
Nevertheless, the fact that a pre-planning hungry task shows signs of pre-planning does not tell
us anything about all movement tasks and movement in general. At best, such an experiment
tells us that when required, we sometimes envision a goal before moving. Again, we must
remember that many movements, especially in the dance context, have teleological
postponement. In consequence, it is not valid to move from a conclusion about very task-specific
movements in an artificial setting to a theory about dance movements (or all movements).
Summary and on to Dynamical Systems and Enactivism
In this chapter, we have covered the basic frameworks of action theory and looked at the
distinction between distal, proximal, and motor intentions. I argued that action theory has a
problem with vernacular improvisational dance because much of such dance is open-ended and
therefore does not have an optimal solution; The Problem of Open-endedness. We also looked at
The problem of Teleological Postponement, a form of movement that is intentional but not goaldriven. The problem is that action theory cannot easily account for skillful, intentional, non-goal
driven action, such as some forms of improvisational dance.
Additionally, we have surveyed two recent frameworks within the action theory of dance
one from philosophy and one from cognitive science. I argued that McFee’s account of dance
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action removes the dancer from the environment and from context and makes dances an
internalist affair. However, when we look at vernacular improvisational dance, it is a highly
enculturated practice. The problem lies in McFee’s idea of uncaused actions. We also surveyed
Rosenbaum’s theory of dance action and found that its hierarchical nested computational system
leads to an immense computational task (The Computational Burden Problem). Additionally,
Rosenbaum’s work is a classic account of non-dancers trying to theorize about highly skilled
dance without having any experience in dance.
Overall, we have seen how representational computational philosophy of mind, predictive
processing, and now action theory cannot adequately account for improvisational vernacular
dance improvisation (The Inadequate Framework Thesis). Given that I have taken a scorched
earth approach, it is only appropriate that I provide a positive counter-proposal. In the next
chapter, I will explain the dynamical systems and enactivist frameworks and use them to build a
general model for vernacular improvisational dance. So, next, for my positive account, I will
argue for The Distributed Control Thesis.
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4. Dynamical Systems and Enactivism for Dance Cognition
We have looked at various traditional approaches to cognition, and I have presented a list of
arguments for why these approaches fail or struggle to accommodate the phenomenon of
vernacular improvisational dance. In what follows, I will begin to build my positive proposal for
a model that I believe can handle the case of improvisational vernacular dance. I will be utilizing
dynamical systems theory and enactivism to provide an affordance-based theory of dance
improvisation. I will first give a (very condensed) introduction to the needed basics in dynamical
systems theory. Then I will proceed with unpacking enactivism. As I proceed, I will try to weave
my case for dance in and out of the explanation of the theoretical framework.
Overall, I will be arguing for The Distributed Control Thesis: Vernacular dance
improvisation is the process of simultaneously being in control and not being in control of one’s
movements. Put differently, vernacular improvised dance is a form of controlled non-control. On
this view, dancers, their environments, the music, and the form of life they partake in create a
unified emergent non-linear dynamical system. Such a system has more agency (that is, the
system can do more) than its parts individually. In consequence, how the system unfolds is a
product of the whole system, not its individual components. Put simply, the steps being
performed during vernacular dance improvisation comes about as a combined product of the
entire situation. As we shall see, while we should still praise individual dancers for their
virtuosity, the final product, the unfolding dance is a distributed phenomenon.

What are Dynamical Systems?
The first thing to understand is that dynamics systems is a very broad framework that unifies
empirical and theoretical insights from physics, math, biology, neuroscience, and a slew of other
fields. It can most generally be described as the science of change. Dynamical systems look at
how systems of entities impact and change one another over time. Concepts such as chaos,
resonance, synchrony, and self-organization are all crucial underlying concepts in dynamical
systems theory (Gleick, 1988). In short, dynamical systems is a unifying theory of physics that
can be utilized to model a vast number of phenomena in the world that pertain to change over
time.
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A dynamic system is most broadly defined as a system that unfolds over time. Such
systems can be described using differential or difference equations, where the unfolding of the
system is governed by its starting point and future inputs. Thus, dynamical systems range from
the unfolding of chemical reactions, animal population models, physical interactions, moving
mechanical parts, emergent behaviors of the stock market to the behaviors of cognitive agents. In
short, dynamical systems are systems that "behave," "act," "unfold," or "change" over time in
line with a given set of parameters – their regime. Dynamical systems can exist in linear, nonlinear, and chaotic regimes, where non-linear and chaotic regimes tend to be those of interest to
those interested in modeling the world of cognition.
Given the nature of dynamical systems, we map their unfolding using vectors in a statespace. A phase portrait is a graphic representation of how the system will unfold over time, given
a particular starting point. The range of possible states the system can be in is represented as a
manifold, a topological figure on which the system moves through as it unfolds over time (see
Figure 11). Note that, unlike linear functions in which time is often mapped onto one of the axes
in the plane, in phase portraits, time is usually collapsed. Put differently, we can think of time as
a feature that will start “running” as we drop our system onto the manifold and watch the system
unfold.

Figure 11 - Here, we see a state-space; the system contains a basin that eventually leads to a
stable limit cycle.
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Each state-space can contain (amongst other things) representations of attractors,
repellers, basins, saddle points, and limit cycles. These are various representations of areas in the
state-space in which the system will begin to change its behavior. For example, if a system is
pulled towards a particular state, we are dealing with attractors and basins. If the system is
moved away from a specific state, we have a repeller. Moving towards and then repelled away
from some state is a saddle point, and if the system is moved into a repeated stable cycle of
states, we have a limit cycle. Reaching a threshold to be pulled in a different direction suddenly
is usually called a bifurcation. As an example, we can look at the state-space in Figure 11. Going
from right to left, the system moves towards an attractor and then falls into a stable limit cycle.
When looking at non-linear systems, the starting point and the direction of the change
matters for where the system will go next in its unfolding. In other words, when mapping nonlinear dynamical systems, where the system begins and the inputs it is given determines where it
will go next (Norton, 1995). For example, if we look at Figure 11, each of the arrows represents
the direction in which the system will move depending on the starting values chosen. Note that
for the system represented in Figure 11, regardless of the starting point, the system will
eventually move into a non-dissipative limit cycle. Put differently, for non-linear dynamical
systems, the history of the system matters – we can loosely say that where the system is going is
determined by where the system was (a truism that also applies to human cognition).
As we will see, non-linearity is key when trying to explain many biological systems; in
our case, human agents dancing together. Such systems will unfold differently depending on
their starting condition, in part because such systems contain a large number of variables that
impact the unfolding of the system – they are what in the dynamics literature is sometimes called
complex systems. When dealing with mathematical models of non-linear systems, we can map
their unfolding using simulations. When mapping the unfolding of cognitive agents such as
human dancers, which are complex systems, the modeling of this unfolding happens at a certain
level of abstraction. So, we use dynamical systems theory to say something general about how
human cognition functions and unfolds. Still, we cannot provide an accurate simulation of how
people will literally behave, for example, during dancing. That would require having a list of
math equations that could cover all of human cognition (Kugele, et al. 2021, under review).
Hence, the modeling laid out pertains more to the general style of unfolding that systems
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undertake, rather than providing an "accurate mapping" of one specific system (for example,
Bridget and Dan, at 2 am at Tin Roof nightclub, on March 5th, 2020). In other words, we will
learn how dancers as complex, chaotic dynamical systems generally tend to unfold and what
parameters guide this unfolding. In particular, processes of self-organization and synchrony
become important to the enactive account I will flesh out.
The reader should note that the modeling of chaotic systems is also an important aspect
of dynamical systems theory. But, for our purpose in this dissertation, we shall not dive deeply
into the theory explaining chaos. Rather it is enough to say that chaotic systems are, in fact, still
deterministic systems. That is, their effects follow lawfully from their causes (even when there is
true randomness or autonomy involved). Still, chaotic systems are sensitive to initial conditions
(Lorenz, 1972). Sensitivity to initial conditions means that even the most minute difference in the
starting point of the system will eventually lead to a large deviation in a trajectory through the
state-space. Two starting points, even if seemingly identical, will end up having different
trajectories through the state-space because of the minute difference in the starting point.
Although chaotic systems can be modeled to tell us how any particular starting point will unfold,
we have to run a simulation. The more time passes, the harder it becomes to predict how the
system will unfold. For many non-dynamists, their most common interaction with chaotic
systems is the daily weather forecast. The "weather" is a highly complex, chaotic system.
Consequently, forecasts are made by running simulations, and such simulations become
increasingly inaccurate the further into the future they are trying to predict.
While dance moves and dance interactions are not themselves chaotic, many dance
interaction environments such as clubs, jams, carnivals, rituals, festivals, etc. are chaotic. That is
to say, that how people interact and with whom people interact within dance spaces often is
sensitive to initial conditions and determined by a high number of dimensions (the music,
physical layout, lightning, air density, social norms, customs, and more). When theorizing about
the dynamic unfolding of improvisational dance as systems, we can provide general models of
their unfolding but not specific trajectories.
An essential aspect of dynamical systems is the ability to explain the dynamic coupling of
various mechanical, biological, and cognitive processes. Coupling is the process in which the
oscillations of one autonomous system and the oscillations of another autonomous system
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interact with each other through some force so that their oscillations fall into a fixed pattern
together (Pikovskij, Rosenblum, and Kurths 2001). If this description of coupling seems opaque,
we can look at the famous example of Huygens pendulum clocks (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).

Figure 12 - Huygen's Synchronizing Clocks (1665)

132

Figure 13 - Updated Huygen's Pendulum Clocks. The clocks are attached to the same surface
and develop a coupling relationship by perturbing each other through that surface. In this case,
minuscule vibrations through the wall synchronize the clock pendulums.
Huygen's discovered that two pendulum clocks, each attached to the same wooden beam,
would eventually synchronize. This synchronization of the clocks happens because the clock
pendulums every so lightly perturb each other's oscillations through the wooden beam. Hence,
we say that the clocks are weakly coupled because they can perturb each other ever so slightly by
transferring energy from one to the other through some medium – in this case, the wooden beam.
Due to the vibrations sent through the beam, each pendulum affects the other and
eventually, they find a commonly repeated pattern of oscillation. Although this coupling is weak
eventually, the pendulums fall into a phase-locked relationship of being in-phase (they move
together from side to side). Coupling can be weak, strong, or anything in between; the important
takeaway is that systems perturb each other in a variety of ways so that their oscillation
eventually fall into an (at least temporary), stable relationship of phase-locking. In dynamic
systems theory, when two or more systems are coupled, and they perturb each other into a phaselocked relationship, we say that the systems are synchronizing.
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Oscillations can be in-phase, both oscillators repeat the same pattern, anti-phase the
oscillators go opposite of one another, and off-phase a repeated pattern that is not symmetrical.
Autonomous oscillating systems naturally begin to synchronize through even the most minute
coupling and typically end up falling into some (at least temporary) relationship of phase
locking. Looking ahead when we think of dance, we should think of dancers as (complex)
oscillators whose physical unfolding synchronizes with other oscillators. Dance movements quite
literally oscillate and perturb their environments, making dancers fall into a variety of phaselocked relationships across various time scales.
Even so, it is important to know that synchronization is not unique to dance cognition.
Relationships of perturbation, oscillation, and synchronization, are widespread throughout
nature. Ontologically speaking, we can say that it is a general principle of nature that oscillating
systems perturb and synchronize with each other. In this way, there is deep connectivity from the
most basic physical interactions of physical systems to the complexities of human cognition and
social activities. Often wherever there are systems, there will be perturbations and
synchronization, especially if those systems are autonomous.

Figure - 14 an example of two systems being in-phase (left) and anti-phase (right)
However, what is meant by an autonomous system? While there are various definitions of
autonomous systems (Franklin & Graesser, 1997), the dynamic systems literature provides a
broad mechanical definition. An autonomous system is one that has an internally generated
source of energy and therefore has an internally generated rhythm of oscillations. If an
autonomous system is non-coupled, it will still continue to oscillate (Abraham and Shaw 1982).
It is essential to understand that synchronization happens between two autonomous systems.
In contrast, resonance happens between an autonomous system and a non-autonomous
system, in which one system drives the other. Thus, the driven system in a resonance relationship
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will come to a halt if the driving source is interrupted. Autonomous systems, on the other hand,
will continue to oscillate, even if synchronization is interrupted. Note that some of the cognitive
science and philosophical literature use the term resonance with some variation (Ryan &
Gallagher, 2020). Especially the literature on enactive cognition has taken up the concept of
resonance but often uses it slightly differently than how it is used in the dynamic systems
literature (Fuchs, 2018). Typically when philosophers speak of resonance what they actually
mean to say is synchronization.
In synchronization between autonomous systems, each system has a natural frequency
that is optimal for the coupling. That is a frequency (or range of frequencies) in which the system
achieves its maximum transfer of energy from one system to the next to gain the largest possible
amplitude (Pikovskij, Rosenblum, and Kurths 2001). The natural frequency can change
depending on the state and constitution of the system. Let us use the example of two mass-spring
oscillators coupled through another spring coil (see Figure - 15). The natural frequency for such
a system is the frequency of oscillation that makes the masses oscillate with the largest
amplitude. The natural frequency depends on the rigidity of the coil. If we, on the other hand, are
talking about biological systems such as human dancers, level of fatigue, affect, skill, and several
other biological factors may determine the movement frequency at which the dancers will
entrain/align the most optimally.

Figure - 15 Two mass-spring oscillators connected by a mass-spring in the middle.

Studies have shown that the presence of rhythm generally improves motor coordination
and drives interpersonal synchronization. Human synchronization mediated through music is
sensitive to several features within the music itself - one being pitch. For example, when holding
pendulums, listeners synchronized more efficiently when listening to lower-pitched sounds than
to higher pitch sounds (Varlet, Williams, & Keller, 2018). Additionally, research has shown that
human agents entrain more efficiently when coupled with bass drums and lower pitch rhythms
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than higher pitch (Edith Van Dyck et al., 2013). Like other simpler autonomous systems, humans
have a range of frequencies to which they synchronize more easily (our natural frequency). But
given the number and complexity of systems that must synchronize when human agents
synchronize, a large number of factors impact the natural frequency.
Furthermore, in the case of dance, overall group synchrony is modulated by several
factors, including auditory, visual, and haptic input (Chauvigné et al., 2019). Chauvigné and
colleagues, measured dance synchronization through motion tracking of three dimensions X, Y,
Z over time. Motion trackers were attached to the dancer's hips and feet. Their study looked at
synchrony through three manipulations: no touch, no vision, and no music. In the first
manipulation, dancers were not allowed to touch one another, thereby gaining no haptic
information from the environment. In the second manipulation, dancers were blindfolded,
thereby missing visual input. Finally, the dances were also performed without music. Chauvigné
and colleagues demonstrate that tactile, auditory, and visual information each modulate the
overall synchrony of dancers as a joint system. However, this global synchrony is, in part,
determined by the dynamics of tactile, auditory, and visual information separately. For example,
auditory information modulates synchronization across the Z and Y axis, while tactile
information modulates X-axis synchronization.
Furthermore, overall dance synchronization is the highest when all three modalities
(haptic, auditory, and visual stimulation) are present, and synchronization significantly increases
over time (Chauvigné et al., 2019, 205). Put simply, the more time we spend interacting with
each other (whether dancing or not), the more smooth our interactions become.
From Chauvigné et al., we can see that not all couplings are the same. Rather different
types of coupling are responsible for different aspects of synchronization. This is especially so in
dance synchronization and interaction. Haptic and visual coupling and synchrony tend to
modulate distance and placement of dance steps, while auditory coupling modulates timing and
expression. Simply put, being able to hear the music and each other's footsteps helps dancers
synchronize with regards to when to step. This result is consistent with findings that poor beat
perception decreases agents' ability to synchronize their gait patterns when walking and listening
to music together (Ready et al. 2019). The light push and pull of handholding help modulate
distance and posture, thereby carrying information on where to step.
136

Further, removing haptic information from the dancers strongly decreased synchrony
across the horizontal axis, indicating information pertaining to directionality from haptic
channels (ibid, 206). These findings are in line with research that shows that haptic coupling
strongly synchronizes the movement fluency of dyads in task completion. Put simply, when
coupled through touch and sharing a goal, we directly perceive the force of directionality through
our partner. In short, much information about the intentions of our partner is directly transferred
in the force of pushing and pulling itself (Knoblich, and Sebanz 2011).
From the Chauvigné et al. study, we learn that dance interaction in part is a matter of
coupling and synchrony across various processes and modalities. Overall synchronizing systems
will typically move towards their natural frequency of synchronization if possible for optimal
amplitude. Put poetically, systems naturally want to and will move towards optimal harmony
with each other. The same happens in dance; dancers will, across their interacting biological and
psychological processes, fall into alignment at the natural frequency of each other with various
modalities, each impacting the overall level of synchronization. This tendency has recently been
further empirically supported in motion capture and alignment studies on Electronic Dance
Music and clubbing (Burger & Toiviainen, 2020).

Enactivism and Dance
So far, we have seen that dancers can be described as autonomous oscillating dynamical systems
that fall into synchronization across a variety of channels. Yet, one could object and argue that so
far, all we have done is describe that synchronization happens, but we need to say more about
how synchronization happens. In other words, what “cognitive” mechanisms are in play instead
of representations and computations. Hence, next, we must weave in the concepts of selforganization, enactive cognition, and participatory sense-making.
We have spent some time getting a basic grasp on dynamical systems; next, as I explain
enactivism, we will also see how basic dynamic processes through their interaction can scale up
and become “intelligent” and “mental” without having to posit representations or an inner realm
of the mental. To help us understand how we can have cognition without representations, I will
invoke the example of the Watts Steam Governor, an intelligent system that achieves its
intelligent behavior purely through the dynamics of its physical interactions. I will then use this
example as a helping metaphor for how we should understand human cognition during
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improvised vernacular dance interaction. In short, we will look at enactivism and how it
demonstrates that cognition is in and for action. From this, we will see how, on this framework,
all the intelligence needed can be manifested in the dynamics of the physical interactions
themselves (no representations or centralized control needed). To illuminate the case of dance
interaction, I will especially utilize the enactive theory of social cognition known as participatory
sensemaking. Overall, we will look at three interconnected theories in this section;
•

Autopoietic enactivism (embodied cognition in and through action).

•

Intelligence manifested in physical dynamics (the Watt’s Steam Governor).

•

Participatory sensemaking (enactivist social cognition).

Enactivism, as is implied in the name, begins with action. In contrast to cognitivism that
begins with passive perception, computation, and then action, enactivism argues that action and
perception are two sides of the same coin. What it means to perceive is to act, and to act is to
perceive. Importantly for enactivism action is cognition. So rather than arguing (like Fodor and
friends) that action is the result of a cognitive process, enactivism demonstrates that the cognitive
process is the action. As dancers writing on enactivism have noted, our movements quite literally
are our thoughts (Maiese, 2016; Merritt, 2013).
As we will see, the enactive framework of cognition shares many commitments with
dynamical systems, one being that intelligent thought and behavior are the product of the entire
system; brain, body, and environment together constitute cognition. Thus, following Ryle (1976),
to look for the mind in any one location is to commit a category mistake.
While there are now a few varieties of enactivism on the philosophical menu, I align
myself with autopoietic enactivism. As the name indicates, autopoietic enactivism locates the
foundation for cognition in the process of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela,
Thompson, and Rosch 1991). In short, the notion is that wherever there is life, there is cognition
(in some rudimentary sense). There is a fluid continuation from the cognition performed by
single-celled organisms all the way to complex animals such as humans. As we will see, one of
the characteristics of living things is that the processes that make them “alive” are the same
processes that make them cognizers. This is not to say that vital processes serve two functions.
Rather, the biological process of living is what we call cognition (Thompson, 2007). This is a
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radical break from the computational theories we have surveyed since these separate out the
functions of the “body” from the processes of the mind/brain. With the risk of sounding overly
romantic, autopoietic enactivism is not only a theory about cognition; it is also a framework for
life itself. So, what is autopoiesis?
An autopoietic system is a self-organizing system in which each sub-system of the
organism participates in the perpetuation of the other sub-systems. For example, the
cardiovascular system, the endocrine system, the digestive system, the nervous system, and so on
are all very precarious systems. Each of these systems needs the other systems to keep going. In
turn, each of these systems supports the other systems in doing so. Consequently, the totality of
the organism becomes self-perpetuating and self-organizing, creating a semipermeable
membrane between itself and the world (Di Paolo et al. 2017). The classic example is the single
cell, which is the smallest autopoietic unit we know of, and very clearly upholds the selfperpetuation criteria.
An autopoietic system is self-organizing because each of its parts continually produces
the other parts, and in turn, the system continually produces and perpetuates itself. In
consequence, the very physicality of the dynamics creates an ongoing, self-perpetuating system.
In such a process, there is no designer or centralized controller. Rather from the dynamics of the
various processes emerges a new level of self-organizing complexity (Colombetti, 2014; Di
Paolo et al., 2017; Gallagher, 2017; Maiese, 2016; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1991).
Autopoietic systems are very precarious; they must take in energy (usually nutrients)
from the world and avoid states that will destroy the system (dangers). Therefore, autopoietic
systems must constantly act on the world to remain in the ideal metabolic condition. What we
call cognition, whether in simple single-cell organisms or in complex mammals such as
ourselves, is the process of physically acting on the environment to remain in the ideal
metabolically balanced state (Gallagher, 2017). As processes in the body run their course, they
need nutrients and adjustment. Further, our environments are often changing at a fast pace. In
accord, the organism is always striving to keep itself in the most optimal condition possible,
which happens through action.
Through their constant acting on the environment, organisms change their internal states
and change the environment in an ongoing feedback loop. As the organism acts on the
139

environment, that environment changes which brings about new demands on the organism,
which then changes the environment. There is constant commerce between the environment and
the agent. Hence, as mentioned above, perception, action, and cognition are all different sides of
the same coin. Cognition happens through the ongoing interplay between the organism acting on
its environment and that environment changing as a result; all in the name of upholding
autopoiesis. Nevertheless, this is not meant to be a reductive theory. From this process emerge
ever more complex layers of meaning.
Because of the precarious state of the autopoietic systems and their constant interaction
with the world, the world becomes meaningful. The very constitution of the system, its bodily
makeup, cares about the world, thereby making the states of the world matter to the organism. In
contrast, a rock cannot care about the state of the world because there is no better or worse state
for a rock to be in; a rock is just a rock. Autopoietic systems of a certain complexity, on the other
hand, have an implicit sense of self (the minimal self) from the ongoing constitution of its body
as that body attempts to self-perpetuate. In consequence, there are states that are better or worse
for such a system to be in. Hence the world becomes meaningful to the organism. Cognition, on
this model, is conceived as the organism physically becoming increasingly sufficient at
sensorimotor schemes that regulate their coupling with the environment (Di Paolo et al., 2018).
Beginning from the most basic sensorimotor schemes, organisms gradually enact more
complex meaningful worlds as they evolve sensorimotor schemes relevant to different levels of
interaction. Such schemes slowly begin to scale up in complexity and eventually also in
abstraction. Through ongoing sensorimotor affordance-action-perception loops, intelligent
behavior emerges as a product of autopoietic organisms trying to stay in equilibrium (Gallagher,
2017). It is crucial to understand that for fully social and enculturated agents such as ourselves,
equilibrium is not just metabolic. Rather, equilibrium is metabolic, social, cultural, existential,
and so on. The autopoietic organisms' process of staying in equilibrium through action on the
world is causally connected from the lowest level of biological processes to the highest level of
the agents' existential outlook on life (Thompson, 2007). Hence, there is a direct continuity
between the basic physical dynamics of physical self-organization in the body all the way to our
intimate personal choices. Note that this is the story of scaling up from simple microscopic
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processes to macro-level dynamics that predictive processing, which we surveyed earlier, is
unable to provide (the scaling up problem).
In this model, self-organization, as a basic ontological fact about nature, extends from the
low-level processes in our bodies to several bodies self-organizing into larger joint systems. Put
differently, autopoiesis is at play across many levels of analysis, from the most coarse-grained to
the level of microscopic cellular biology. The important point for our purposes is that social
interaction, on this model, is two or more autopoietic systems self-organizing into a larger joint
system (a stabilizing dynamic systems limit cycle). Two partners immersed in dancing are two
self-organizing systems temporally coupling into one larger system of self-organization through
the dynamics of synchronization and co-regulation of social affordances. In such a case, the
meaning-making process becomes joint: meaning exists not in each person but in the process
across individuals (Di Paolo, Cuffari, and De Jaegher 2018). Dancing is a process in which,
through co-regulation and self-organization from various synchronization dynamics, agents
become a joint system of meaning-making.
If the reader is having a hard time understanding how enaction and interaction are enough
to constitute intelligent behavior, we can here invoke a famous example from engineering –
namely the Watt's Steam Governor, an intelligent system without any representations or
centralized control. I will begin with this non-biological example and then scale up the example
to biological systems.
All the "intelligent behavior" displayed by Watt's steam governor comes from the
dynamics of its physical parts working together (Thelen & Smith, 1994). The steam governor is a
device that controls and maintains the desired speed of a steam engine. The steam governor
functions by having the valve controlling the output of steam directly coupled to the metal pieces
that rotate to generate power from the steam. As vapor pushes the metal pieces around, the
centrifugal force pushes the pieces apart, which in term adjusts the steam valve (see Figure - 16).
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Figure - 16 Watt’s Steam Governor
The dynamics of the Watt Governor can be described and mapped using the following
equation:
𝑑2 𝜃
𝑑𝑡 2

𝑔

𝑑𝜃

𝑙

𝑑𝑡

= 𝑛𝜔2 cos 𝜃 sin 𝜃 − sin 𝜃 − 𝑟

In this equation, 𝜃 is the angle of the arms, is a gearing constant, 𝜔 is the speed of the
engine, g is the gravitational constant (Tim Van Gelder, 1995). The equation maps how the arm
is moving in relation to the velocity. At any given angle, the equation also describes the velocity
of the motor and its rate of acceleration. Note that the angle of the arms is the only real variable
of this dynamic system. We can therefore create a state-space that will demonstrate how the
system will balance itself out, given any starting angle of the Watt’s Governor (Chemero 2009).
Rather than the need for symbolic computations or centralized control, the interactions
between the various physical components of the steam governor intelligently regulate the speed
of the engine. The multiple parts create a dynamic from which (from our perspective) intelligent
behavior emerges. As Thelen and Smith put it: “Watt’s governor does not represent anything; it
just does the job. It does a near-perfect job because, at every point in time, everything is
dependent on everything else… Note also that Watt’s device is smart; it embodies (although it
does not represent) as much knowledge as the computational governor” (Thelen and Smith
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1994). On the enactive and dynamic view of cognition, human agents are, metaphorically
speaking, made from billions of living steam governors, all co-causally interacting with each
other. For example, the brain coupled to the rest of the body can (and there is plenty of evidence)
be seen as such as system (Fuchs, 2018). Such agents full of dynamic systems impacting each
other interact in a world of other similar agents, and the process continues, although this time at
the scale of agent to agent coupling. When understood in this way, at no point in the landscape of
cognition and interaction do we need to posit a centralized source of control or a centralized
representer (Hutto & Myin, 2013; 2017).

Figure 17 - Example of two self-constituting agents coupling and co-regulating one another in
an environment.
Watt’s steam governor does not need symbolic representations to create a physically
balanced interaction between parts of the system, and neither do coupled human systems; all the
intelligence is in the joint system itself as it unfolds over time (see Figure 17). In Participatory
sense-making, we get a similar account of social knowledge:
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In this way, a shared know-how is jointly constructed between the participants. This
shared know-how does not amount to the sum of the individuals’ know-hows nor does it
strictly “belong” to any of the participants. It involves instead the practice of coordinating
sensorimotor schemes together, navigating breakdowns, and it belongs to the system the
participants bring forth together: the dyad, the group, the family, the community, and so
on. (Di Paolo, Cuffari, and De Jaegher 2018)
Here we learn then that social knowledge is a matter of knowing-how rather than knowing-that;
social interaction is the emergence of a joint system operated through sensorimotor skill. To
elucidate the point, let’s compare social interaction with knowing how to use a hammer or ride a
bike. Operating a hammer or riding a bicycle is a matter of embodied sensorimotor know-how;
one does not know how to use a hammer or ride a bike by knowing facts about hammer use or
bike riding. Similarly, social interaction is a matter of sensorimotor know-how. When we learn
to use the hammer or ride the bicycle, we develop certain sensorimotor habits and bodily
dispositional skills (James 1890). That is, we have a disposition to act skillfully, given specific
situations and contexts. There is no need for propositional representations of the task because the
hammer-body or bike-body coupling is a matter of direct engagement with the world; it is a skill
(Dreyfus, Stuart E. and Dreyfus 1980; Hubert L. Dreyfus 2005; 2014). If it is hard to think of
social interaction as an embodied non-propositional dispositional skill, I invite the reader to
consider any of the following aspects that must be finely attuned for interaction to run smoothly;
interpersonal distance, posture and body orientation, vocal volume, and pitch, eye contact timing,
gender norms, hierarchy, and the list goes on. Each of these aspects of interaction (and many
others) must be smoothly and skillfully attuned for interaction to take place. As we have already
discussed, having to act on each of these aspects in a manner of propositional inference simply
leads to cognitive overload. Rather than computation, as humans get to know each other, for
example, through conversation or dancing, an increased non-propositional skill is developed
through the interaction. The human agents as systems attune themselves to one another. That is,
social interaction, such as dance, is an embodied skill that is increasingly finetuned during the
interaction and each time the interaction takes place.
We now have three closely related concepts that take part in participatory sense-making;
habit, skill, and know-how. Fluent interaction in participatory sensemaking is a matter of
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developing dispositional skills. For example, when my dance partner pushes me in a circle using
their front left foot, I do not need to think “ah yes, they must want me to rotate with them in a
clockwise direction.” Rather smooth interaction is having a disposition to move in a clockwise
direction when feeling the push. The skill is knowing how to do so well. Doing so well in
participatory sense-making means gracefully executing the movement but doing so in a way that
is sensitive to the other person’s continuing movement. Additionally, the skill is also to let one’s
partner simultaneously feel one’s own intentional push. It is the ability to move with the other
person's intention, being sensitive to their ongoing unfolding intentionality, and simultaneously
giving the other person one’s own embodied intention. Thus, dispositional skill means being
disposed (having readiness) to use one’s know-how in interaction. Dispositional skill is both
moving and being moved at the same time (part of the Distributed Control Thesis).
Part of the dispositional picture is habit. Habits are not rigid unbreakable patterns of
behavior but flexible patterns of behavior that are highly attuned to the changing environment
(Dewey, 1922). As dancers develop more skill and comfort with one another, they also develop
habitual patterns of impacting their partners while being impacted. These habitual patterns can be
deployed and redeployed in the ongoing interaction and unfolding of the joint system, which in
turn engrain more dispositional skills and more habits. Habits then are flexible interaction
patterns that get refined and redefined over time and include the utilization of dispositional skills.
Ultimately habits and skills are different ways of talking about reliable patterns of
interactional know-how. Habit is the broader category, a pattern of behavior that flexibly utilizes
a series of dispositional skills. Importantly, at no point in our analysis is there necessarily the
need for propositional processing or propositional thinking. Typically it is only the cases where
interaction breaks down that we might need to engage in overt propositional thinking.
Again, if this picture of interaction is hard for the reader to accept, I encourage them to
reflect on their own experience getting to know another person. At first, interactions might be
stiff and awkward, and each agent might feel as if they cannot truly be themselves. However,
over time interactions slowly become more fluent and at ease. This is not because each agent
suddenly has more beliefs or theories about the other person (although they might have some of
that too). Rather, the increase in social fluidity comes from getting better at interacting with the
other person. In our case, dance interactions are no different.
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Enactivism, Ecological Psychology and Participatory Sense-making
We have looked at the science of dynamical systems and enactivism. In line with the
Distributed Control Thesis that I am arguing for, a picture has begun to emerge of vernacular
improvised dance as an embodied, enacted, extended, and distributed process. So far, the claim is
that dancers are autonomous oscillating encultured systems that couple and synchronize. This
coupling happens across numerous biological, cognitive, and encultured processes. All the
intelligence needed for dancing is captured in these interactions as they scale up and create
possibilities for action execution based on social affordances. With a general notion of dynamics
and synchronization under our belt, we can now look at dance cognitive processes in a bit more
detail. This requires one more piece of the theory puzzle; namely, we need to understand dance
through the lens of affordances. To elucidate my theory of dance cognition, I shall especially
draw from the interactionist accounts found in Linguistic Bodies (Di Paolo et al., 2018) and
Action and Interaction (Gallagher, 2020). Once we have a solid grasp on affordances, we will
finally have all the puzzle pieces in place to understand why we can think of dance as distributed
control.
In ecological psychology, affordances are generally taken to be possibilities for action
within an environment specific to the organism. Gibson, who first coined the term affordance,
began with the rather opaque definition that "the affordances of the environment are what it
offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill" (Gibson 1979). The notion
is that an organism directly perceives information in the environment and that information is in
the form of possibilities for action. Varela et al. provide what has now become the more
streamlined definition (of what people believed Gibson had in mind), namely that "affordances
consist in the opportunities for interaction that things in the environment possess relative to the
sensorimotor capacities of the animal" (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Importantly,
affordances are specific to the capacities, skills, biology, enculturation, and history of the agent.
For humans, chairs afford sitting, doorknobs afford turning, and buttons afford pressing. These
affordances exist between us and the object exactly because of the morphology of our bodies, our
skills, and our habitual and social enculturation. Put plainly; hammers don't afford to hammer for
cats because they do not have opposable thumbs or live in social tool-using niches.
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While Gibson mostly described affordances as pertaining to agent object interactions, a
rich literature has continued Varela et al. 's (1991) work and brings affordances into the realm of
intersubjectivity and culture.
Affordances are not only related to sensorimotor interaction with physical objects. There
is a strong cultural, social dimension to affordances. Through enculturation, we become
increasingly more adapted to our social, cultural niches, which means smooth interactions with
cultural, social affordances in cultural niches (Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Ramstead,
Veissière, and Kirmayer 2016). For example, in some neighborhoods in Chicago, it is customary
to put a chair on the side of the road to reserve a parking spot for someone who lives on the street
or for an expected guest. Being enculturated into such an environment, chairs can afford parkability or non-park-ability. Similarly, an espresso maker could be used as a hammer or a book
stopper; however, because of our cultural niche, Italian coffee makers afford filling, heating, and
pouring. Our cultural environment entrains sensory-motor schemes within the agent so that they
can fluently interact with their cultural environment in terms of culturally specific affordances.
The problem with affordances is that their ontological status is still up for debate;
affordances are possibilities for action, but what are they? This question is especially tricky since
Gibson, ecological psychologists, and enactivists all claim that affordances are not
representations in the mind. Chemero helps us understand affordances by providing an ontology
of affordances as physical relationships (Chemero 2009). If a rubber duck is in contact with
water (say in a bathtub), buoyancy is a relationship that exists between the rubber duck and the
water because of its physical properties. Similarly, flammability is a relationship that exists
between paper and a lit candle in virtue of their physical properties. Chemero argues that the
relationship between organism and environment is similar to these examples; affordances are
relationships between the physical properties of the organism and environmental objects. A
relationship is, in a sense, a "real" measurable thing but exists only between the objects with the
relevant properties. Buoyancy is not a relationship that exists between a rock and a flame;
similarly, being legible exists only between symbols and organisms that can read them.
Thinking of affordances as relationships allow us to introduce the notion of social
affordances – the possibilities for action that other agents provide us (Gallagher 2017; 2018,
2020). The classic example is the handshake or the high five; by putting my hand in a certain
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position, I afford and solicit a certain kind of action from the other agent. Their response to my
social affordance (the grasping or high fiving of the extended hand), in turn, provides me with a
new social affordance. Thereby, the interaction is perpetuated in an ongoing affordance action
loop. Through socialization and enculturation, agents gain competency in embodied
sensorimotor schemas. Such schemas include cultural and social affordances with which the
agent can gain increasingly higher levels of embodied expertise. Of course, the high-five hand is
only a social-cultural affordance in cultures that have the high-five as a practice. Similarly, the
Kid ‘n Play or the Cupid Shuffle are typically only social affordances to North Americans who
are privy to vernacular dance trends.
It is important to understand that in general but especially during dance, agents perceive
the intentions of their co-agents directly. Unlike the heavy computational and inferential
accounts of Theory Theory, dancers directly perceive the intentions of their co-agents
(Gallagher, 2020, 98). Rather than having to make an inference about what it is the other person
is intending, dancers see the intention of their partners in their movement. The mind is not
something hidden away behind a fleshy exterior. Rather, as we have already seen, minds are
enactive dynamical systems, which means that bodily movements are part and parcel of mental
processes such as intentions. In this sense, intentions are like an iceberg in the ocean; we can
perceive much of the iceberg even if parts of it are hidden underwater. Similarly, humans
directly perceive the intentions of others in their posture, facial expressions, gestures, and
movements (ibid, 104).
As dancers dynamically couple with one another, a context is created that makes
movements meaningful and intentional in relation to one another. For example, experiments have
shown that children and adults can easily recognize the emotions and intentions of other people
simply from their movements. For example, when dancers wearing point lights at their joints do
movements in the dark, both children and adults are easily capable of recognizing the conveyed
emotion and intention (Dittrich et al., 1996). Further, point-light experiments have been
replicated with more general non-dance movements (Alaerts et al., 2011; Bidet-Ildei et al., 2020;
Moore et al., 1997; Pollick et al., 2005; Ross et al., 2012). Within interaction, even with very
little information, humans are typically able to recognize the emotions and intentions of others.
For example, studies have shown that when simply seeing a hand reaching and grasping an
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object, most people can, with high accuracy, determine what the person will do next with the
object (Becchio et al., 2012).
Given the context, social norms, and history of interaction, the situation itself that dancers
find themselves in foreclose certain kinds of actions and enable others. In line with Dewey, we
can say that the situation itself scaffolds a form of interactive agency (Dewey, 1922). The
affordances available to us are a direct product of the material and social conditions of our
context. The situation that agents find themselves in pragmatically enables the meaning and
intention of movements. For example, if we are dancing together and I point at you, I intend for
you to playfully come closer. But, if I do the same pointy movement at my local jujitsu gym, it
means that I want to start a grappling match. In each situation, the norms, histories, social roles,
and physical make-up of the situation all help constitute our movements into being directly
legible. We do not find ourselves in barren landscapes with mysterious others we must solve like
puzzles. Rather, we are always already in the process of enactively responding to a rich context
laden with meaning (Gallagher 2020, 110).
Further, as a joint system, dance, and interaction in general, is highly dependent on joint
attention (Gallagher, 2020, 107). Intentions and social affordances become directly perceivable
to each coupled agent because of the context that they find themselves within, and that context is
in part built through joint attention. First, it is important to understand that joint attention is
ubiquitous throughout human interaction. Through decades of research Tomasselo and his team
have demonstrated that very young children engage in joint attention and continue to do so at
each step of ontogeny (Tomasello, 2019). Our interactions are highly scaffolded by the ways in
which we as coupled systems turn our entire systems towards joint attention.
Through our movements, facial expressions, gestures, humans negotiate a field of joint
attention (Gallagher, 2020, 112). That is, various low-level and close-to-automatic bodily
processes actively regulate the body and the other person into a shared field of attention. For
example, the way we evaluate objects has been shown to be highly dependent on how others do
or do not attend to those objects and how they may or may not draw our attention towards the
object (Bayliss et al., 2007; Bayliss et al., 2006). Research has shown that infants get incredibly
upset if a co-agent suddenly stops jointly attending to a joint object and makes a blank face
instead (Messinger & Fogel, 2007). Further, young children often regulate their emotions
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depending on how others react to a jointly attended object (Repacholi & Meltzoff, 2007). In fact,
it has been proposed that we can think of the developmental trajectory of infants as a long-term
dynamical system unfolding in part through the mechanism of joint attention (Fogel, 2011;
Thelen & Smith, 1994). Developmental comparison studies between humans and great apes have
demonstrated that, unlike great apes, human children develop a shared attentional field that gives
rise to a sense of “we” (Tomasello, 2019, 89). Merely by being co-present human agents begin
aligning their attentional processes to develop a shared sense of “we” and a shared field of
meaning in which they can directly perceive each other’s intentions and social affordances.
Human agents are not only scaffolded by their material environments, but various social
norms, traditions, histories, and so forth all regulate the many embodied systems that create a
shared field of meaning and sense of “we.” In fact, because of our embodiment, we cannot help
but fall into relationships of synchronization and co-regulation in which we both implicitly and
explicitly monitor each other (Knoblich & Jordan, 2003). Gallagher provides the following
example:
We know, for example, that things change dramatically when after the [football] game
we go out to have a few pints at the pub. Our immediate relations to others clearly
change. Yet, we continue to engage them in joint attentional ways that remain pragmatic
and specifically social. In the noisy pub we may have to depend on custom and gesture,
pre-defined social roles, and environmental arrangements, more than clear propositional
communication, to obtain the pint and to engage in our celebrations with others, the game
changes, the rules changes, but the basic capacities of primary and secondary
intersubjectivity, including joint attention, continue to give us access to the other persons’
meaning. (Gallagher, 2020, 111)
In this example, the physical make-up of the environment as well as the social roles all regulate
the interactors as dynamical systems and shape the continuation of their interaction. Of course,
joint attention, gestures, movements, and so forth still remain at the forefront of social cognition;
the shared field of meaning. The insight of a shared field of meaning in which we directly
perceive the intentions of others has long been captured by phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty
argues that a shared field of intercorporeity emerges between agents. Activities such as games,
sports, or in our case dance, become shared fields of meaning from which a joint meaning
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emerges (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, 168). Dancers have long shared this insight regarding being
coupled to the environment in the shared field of meaning. For example, through careful
reflection on her career in improvisational dance, phenomenologist Vida Midgelow describes
improvisational dance as an organized way of going about dictated by a mostly pre-reflective
shared habitus (Midgelow, 2018, 60-61). That is, a shared field of meaning emerges as we
interact in dance immersed in environments. Recent studies have, in fact, shown that dancers not
only become joint dynamical systems, they directly and immediately respond to “microaffordances” and intentions (very rapid moment-to-moment affordances). In a recent study,
Kimmel and colleagues interviewed life-long career contact improvisers using the microphenomenological interview method (Kimmel et al., 2018). The interview subjects were
videotaped, engaging in contract improvisation, and asked to engage in a think-out-loud method.
Additionally, the dancers were asked in immediate follow-up interviews to describe their
experiences. Kimmel and colleagues found that through all three methods, dancers ended up
describing or displaying a coupled system that generated a shared field of meaning. Within this
system, the dancers, as co-agents, constantly provided and responded to affordances down to the
time scale of milliseconds (Kimmel et al., 2018). Studies have shown similar results when
interviewing black belt Aikido practitioners. Interviews, think-out-loud, and video evaluation has
shown Aikido interactions to be a joint dynamical system highly sensitive to affordances at the
millisecond scale (Kimmel & Rogler, 2018).
Interactors such as dancers create a field of shared attention in which the jointly attended
objects (whether that is a triangulated object or the bodies of the agents) become jointly
meaningful. Moreover, there is a difference between the way in which objects are meaningful to
an agent on their own and the new emergent meaning that can exist jointly between agents.
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Figure 18 - A segment from a contact improvisation session between Amara Maksimenko and
Sergei Semichev (2017), video available at (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y944TF9a9_s).
The movements are improvised by simultaneously acting and reacting to the affordances
provided by one’s partner. Here the gentle pushing, pulling, facial expressions, gestures, joint
attention and more, let the dancers join as one autonomous dynamical system. As Kimmel et al.
(2018) point out, contact improvisers often experience the sensation of being a joint “mind.”
Through highly contextual situations and enactive embodied mechanisms, agents are
capable of directly perceiving and responding to intentions and social affordances. The
perpetuation of social action affordance loops is at the core of the theory of "participatory sensemaking" (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher 2010; Di Paolo,
Cuffari, and De Jaegher 2018). The notion is that human agents function as coupled oscillators
across various low-level biological processes (as we have already discussed). These
synchronizations allow for a smooth unfolding of the turn-taking between affording and acting
on affordances. In this model, human interaction consists of two or more complex dynamical
systems (the human agents) synchronizing and unfolding over time. Consequently, we can, in
principle, map the state-space of human interactions as complex dynamical systems. De Jaegher
and Di Paolo provide us with an intentionally broad definition of social interaction:
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Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents,
where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an
emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without
destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter's scope
can be augmented or reduced). (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 485-507)
For participatory sense-making, the paradigm case is a conversation, but for us, the paradigm
case is social dancing. In a conversation, several physical systems begin to synchronize between
participants, including posture, gesturing mimicking, gaze tracking, and more (Paxton and Dale
2013; Abney et al. 2015). As these systems attune their synchronizations, each speaker will take
turns providing social affordances to the other person by speaking and listening. Thus, the
speaker provides an affordance, and the listener lets the speaker adjust their biological state with
their words.

Figure - 19 Participatory sense-making.
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Through this autonomous turn-taking, both participants perpetuate their joint coupling.
Participants regulate one another for the sake of the perpetuation of the joint system without
taking away the other agent's autonomy. This process happens in the giving and acting on social
affordances – thus, we can think of this process as a form of self-organization (see Figure - 19).
Empirical Studies
When we look at some of the empirical literature on dance, two things begin to become clear.
First, that dance improvisers create self-organizing systems and, second, that the empirical
literature on self-organization in dance speaks directly against representational, computational,
and centralized control theories of the mind.
Let’s begin with looking at studies utilizing both phenomenological reports and video
tracking software. One of the findings from Kimmel and colleagues is that setting intentions, like
the ones posited by most of action theory (distal or proximal), is detrimental to the
improvisational process. The expert dancers filmed and interviewed for the study reported that
setting intentions usually leads to a breakdown in the improvisational process and often
physically puts their partner at risk (Kimmel et al., 2018, 29). The give and take of intentional
flow is especially pronounced in contact improvisation. If one partner sets a full intention and
attempts to go through with the intention, it usually will not fit with the intention set by the other
dancer. This typically, as I can personally attest from my experience with contact improvisation,
leads to either an abrupt jolt, a complete stop, or even physical injury. Rather, dancers must
constantly engage in what, as a shorthand, Kimmel et al. call micro-intentions (ibid, 24).
For clarity, it is helpful to contrast with conversation. In a conversation, we must be
sensitive to our partners and listen actively to go with the flow of the conversation. Even so, in a
conversation, we can easily set an intention without destroying the interaction. For example, I
can intend to talk about it being my roommate’s turn to wash the dishes and try to steer the
conversation in that direction without the conversation coming to a collapse. In dance
improvisation, on the other hand, if one person comes into the interaction with the intention to
lift and spin their partner and attempts to force the interaction into this movement, the interaction
will most likely collapse or even lead to an injury. In improvisational dance interaction, the
dancers must be much more finely attuned to the emergent product of their individual micro
intentions coming together.
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Here micro intentions are a shorthand for the way that dancers must constantly regulate
the body of their partner while also paying attention to how the partner is regulating their body.
To avoid the clash, each dancer must constantly be in a state of attunement to what the other
person is doing. If either dancer overreaches and engages in acting out a full-blown intention, the
interaction breaks down; “I will flip him onto my back” or “I will drop her torso towards the
floor” will most likely lead to an abrupt stop in the interaction. Yet through the careful
attunement process of acting and sensing at the same time, dancers doing contact improvisation
frequently generate incredibly acrobatic movements (including full flips in the air and rotations
on one another’s bodies).
These descriptions of improvisation combined with the “think out loud” video recordings
of both expert martial artists (Kimmel & Rogler, 2018) and expert dancers (Kimmel et al., 2018)
both cast serious doubt on the idea that improvisational action is mainly driven by intentions. In
regard to this latter idea, both philosophy of action and many strands of cognitive science argue
that human beings have stored flexible motor plans that get instantiated with the specifics of a
situation (Dong & Franklin, 2014). For example, when I put a credit card in the ATM slot, I am
executing a motor plan in which the variables are the specifics of the situation. If an
experimenter quickly moves the angle of the slot every so slightly, the dorsal stream of
perception is supposed to adjust the relevant variable in the motor plan resulting in the subject
still successfully inserting the card into the slot (Goodale & Milner, 2013). Supposedly, experts
engage in the activation of stored motor plans in which they can rapidly change the variables. In
this framework, intentions initiate motor plans, and once the motor plans are in motion, they
must either be stopped completely or be replaced with another motor plan.
In contrast, as we have seen, expert dancers (especially in contact improvisation)
problematize this picture. Having an intention to do X and trying to stick to that intention
usually leads to a complete breakdown of the interaction. Rather, the improvisers must
constantly act on their partner and be acted upon. Because of this constant need for microadjustment, motor program automaticity like the ones we studied in chapters two and three are
also ruled out. In fact, Kimmel et al. explicitly argue that dancers, rather than setting intentions,
are enactive joint dynamical systems. The emergence of a system that acts over and above what
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any one person’s intentions can accomplish can be seen in the dancers reported phenomenon of
the third mind:
The phenomenological consequence of distributedness is ambiguous “ownership of the
movement”. Occasionally, dancers would report a, what we call, “wasn’t me” moment:
they sense that neither of the dancers has initiated the movement. This phenomenon
relates to a canonical CI concept: The idea of agency through a “third mind”. A dancer
explicitly described the experience as follows: “there are ways and times that we aren’t
separate agencies. When we come together and the fact of togetherness starts to drive
what happens”. A possible explanation for this experience of agency is that dancers often
go with the joint flow and momentum. It creates a strongly synergistic (and effortless)
feel when an individual’s choices are continuous with the ongoing dynamics, because
external biomechanics are continuously incorporated and exploited. (Kimmel et al. 2018,
24)
The contact improvisers of Kimmel and colleagues repeatedly reported that when all goes well,
the dance interaction takes on a life of its own in which the agency of dancers exists in neither of
the individuals, but in the system, they generate as a whole (ibid, 26). Dance is described as a
constant stream of micro-intentions that generate a shared field of affordances that both partners
must constantly enact upon (ibid, 26). Here every minute factor all the way down to the partners
breathing and minute postural and gestural movements regulate the interaction. Here the notion
of the “third mind” or a joint agent with a distributed agency is consistent with interview reports
from a variety of dance styles in which professional dancers report falling into a flow state with a
diminished sense of self (Hefferon & Ollis, 2006). In fact, Kimmel et al. summarize their
(explicitly enactivist and dynamical) findings when they say that improvisation “subjects the
participating individuals to moment-by-moment adaptive pressures that arise through the
interaction itself” (Kimmel et al., 2018, 2). And that;
If, in the radically interactive cases, participatory engagement becomes the very principle
of co-creation, there are two alternative viewpoints on what happens here: From the
individual’s angle, reciprocal engagement generates “context-dependent information
fields”, a constant influx of new emergent affordances, hence inspirations and
springboards into synergies to pick up on, and actions which in turn constrain or enable
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the partner. Meanwhile, from the third-person viewpoint the participatory microdecisions scale up to a collective dynamic with interesting macro-properties. At this level,
what meets the eye is the processes’ ability to auto-catalyze under the right
circumstances. Hence, a collective process may generate self-amplifying, self-buffering,
change-resisting, delayed reaction, or otherwise non-linear properties. This auto-catalysis
arises as a combined effect of “upward emergence” (micro-macro) and “downward
causation” (macro-micro), a dynamic which is often summed up as “self-organization“ of
the interpersonal system. (ibid, 25-26)
This more holistic approach to dance improvisation clashes with the classic perception,
computation, intention, action story. Dancers do not hold set individual intentions and then carry
them out through motor plans; this would lead to partners clashing. Rather, as they are constantly
in the midst of action-perception loops, a joint field of affordances is generated that each partner
must maintain and act upon. The standard story of computation, representation, and intention
setting, simply is not flexible enough to avoid the clashing that dancers report when they actually
try to set a “full intention.” If the reader is having a hard time imagining this notion, try to
remember the last time you went to a party and tried to spin your partner on the dance floor, but
they wanted to do something else.
This notion of “enaction” instead of intention setting and computation has further been
replicated by other studies on dance improvisation, and especially studies on contact
improvisation. Studying the interactions between contact improvisers through video tracking
software, Torrents and colleagues found that they could actively manipulate the various factors
of the dynamical dance system to create predictable styles of movements (Torrents et al., 2011).
Even when dancers went into the engagement completely without expectations, the interaction
could be mapped as a dynamic system in which some types/forms of interaction would emerge
when given certain restraints—furthermore, manipulating various factors such as breathing
predictably increased or decreased synchronization. So, even when dancers are fully in the
moment improvising, certain predictable styles and patterns can emerge given certain
constraints, giving credence to the notion that the joint dance system is what emerges in dance
rather than individual intentions that must mesh. In fact, using video tracking, software coding of
movement styles, and dynamical systems, Torrents and colleagues were able to reliably predict
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the emergent style of two dancers dancing together. Knowing their movement style predicted the
outcome of the two dancers coming together even though neither dancer pre-planned their
movements (Torrents et al., 2010). Similar results have been found when studying the
phenomenological experience and when motion-tracking dancers performing improvised
Argentinian Tango (Kimmel, 2012; Kimmel & Preuschl, 2016), and folk dancing (Castañer et
al., 2009). Additionally, when using software to track the complexity and styles of dance
movements in solos and duos, duos were found to produce more variability, dynamism, and
complexity (Torrents et al., 2010). These findings indicate that rather than two people simply
adding their intentions together, an emergent system with a life of its own is formed during joint
dance improvisation. Overall, Torrents et al. summarize the overarching point beautifully:
The dynamic and non-linear relationship between both and the context gives rise to
specific configurations or movements and transitions among them. As in all non-linear
systems the nonlinearity emerges as a consequence of self-interaction of the performers’
perceptual-motor systems. Self-interaction is manifested as a co-adaptive change between
the system components: the behavior of a certain component changes itself through
influencing another component, which in turn influences the first one. As a consequence
of the non-linear interactions, movement configurations, i.e., patterns, arise following a
process of self-organization, without the need of being consciously controlled by one of
the dancers or imposed, pre-scribed, by an external agency. (Torrents et al., 2016, 95)
What the dynamical analysis of the empirical data provides is a clear indication that agency,
action, and interaction, do not occur simply due to internal computation that spits out intentions
and then a motor command. Across the physics and physicality, chemistry, phenomenology, and
a number of other factors, all systems involved continually and recursively adjust, augment,
regulate, and influence each other. The intelligence in the dance interaction cannot be located in
any one spot, or anyone process, because it emerges as a holistic product of all the processes at
work.
Part of what should be emerging is a picture of vernacular improvisational dance as a
practice in which the dichotomy of being in control or not being in control of one’s actions does
not hold up. Rather what is emerging is a picture of improvisational dancing as a participatory
sense-making process of controlled non-control (The Distributed Control Thesis). Next, I will
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develop this picture further as we look at enaction in more detail and then introduce the notion of
the massive hermeneutical background (part of the form of life thesis).
To summarize, we have seen that when dancing, a multitude of processes begins to
synchronize across levels between the dancing agents. For example, in trained dancers, there is
increased inter-brain synchronization (Orgs et al. 2008, 3380). Posture, breathing, facial
mimicry, and many other processes align, including the gross physical oscillations of the
dancer’s core (Andrea et al., 2012; Ellamil et al., 2016). As these lower-level processes
synchronize, the opportunity arises for dancers to regulate and be regulated through social
affordances (the participatory sense-making process just discussed). In other words, just as in the
example of conversation, dancers interact through an ongoing loop of providing and acting on
social affordances. As synchronizations begin to reach their natural frequency, the give and take
of affordances become increasingly more smooth. As we discussed, dancers become an emergent
self-organizing dynamical system in which increasingly more and more fine-grained affordances
become available to the dancers. We can poetically say that the dancers gain physical fluency
toward and with each other. In short, getting to “know” someone and getting to know someone
through dance are very similar processes because they both rely on the co-regulation of one
another through the use of sensorimotor schemes.
The sensorimotor schemes that enable the development of fine-grained affordances in the
dance interaction are precisely the sensorimotor schemes that I appealed to in the previous
section. Through sensorimotor coordination, dancers provide each other with affordances for
sensorimotor schemes that become increasingly more meaningful as the interaction unfolds. It
can be helpful to think of the typical example of wedding dancing. You attend a wedding as the
plus one. As you begin to dance with the bride’s friends from high school (that you do not
know), the interactions are stiff and awkward. Even so, over time, movements not only begin to
flow back and forth more smoothly, but each movement also gains a history that increases its
meaningfulness. For example, if we already did the Kid ‘n Play, then doing it again has a new
meaning attached to it in light of our history together as dance partners.
Dance steps on this argument are drawn out of the situation as a product of agents
coupled with environments. The skill of the agent and the situation are co-constituting the
aesthetic outcome. As a consequence, when dancing with the same person and provided the same
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moves to react to, the untrained wedding guest dancer will have very different affordances
available to them than the trained dancer who attends the wedding. Yet, in both cases, a joint
system of co-regulation emerges from which the participants provide each other with
affordances. Through this process, the enactment of meaningful sensorimotor schemes continues.
At this point, it is important to underscore that people often do dance alone. People often
dance with themselves in clubs, at parties, in the mirror, and on numerous other occasions.
However, the model laid out so far does not need to be augmented to take solo dance into
account. For example, when a person is dancing in the mirror, they can literally see themselves
and the affordances that they provide. In the mirror case, the dancer becomes a dynamical system
that self-organizes and synchronizes around itself and the mirror. In part, the reason why dance
studios contain mirrors is so that dancers can control what affordances they create and also act on
their self-generated affordances. Even without a mirror, solo dancers entrain to their own
affordances. When dancing with oneself, the dancer engages with affordances provided by the
music, the floor, the surroundings, and so forth, as we have already discussed. As we shall see in
the next sections, dancers also entrain with themselves as a product of personal style.

The Role of Intentions
At this point, it would not be surprising if the reader were to think that dancers, on this argument,
have no personal choice or autonomy. However, the point of the distributed control thesis is that
the dichotomy between control and non-control does not capture the phenomenon of dance
improvisation. So far, I have emphasized the role of the brain-body-environment coupling and
how interactions gain life on their own as self-organizing emergent joint systems. Therefore, it is
natural to raise questions regarding choice, autonomy, and personal style. How on this model do
dancers express their autonomy and personal style?
It is important to flag that I will not be entering into a metaphysical debate regarding the
nature of free will. Instead, in the interest of time and page space, I will focus on how personal
style can be expressed through the concept of distal intentions. The version of distal intention I
develop will, of course, be one that fits with the enactivist and dynamics arguments laid out in
the previous sections. So, while I will borrow some of Pacherie’s (2008) terminology, I by no
means wish to invoke the notion of intention as a discrete mental item that we discussed earlier.
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While the dancer-environment coupling produces an emergent system that generates
movement, the dancer is not without “choice.” The dancer can still steer the interaction in ways
that are dictated by their style and intention, through a process of self-attunement, or put in
traditional philosophy language by setting distal intentions. I want to note that I am here using
the word “choice” as a stand-in until I am done explaining the process.
As we saw with Pacherie, unlike proximal and motor intentions, distal intentions are
intentions that cannot be fulfilled immediately. Distal intentions are aimed at the future in some
capacity. That is, distal intentions can be very distal such as getting a Ph.D., or they can be more
immediate, such as “completing this workout class.” In either case, they are intentions that can
only be fulfilled by the agent performing a number of other actions. Furthermore, as Bratman
points out, distal intentions (whether short-term or long-term) have inertia because they function
as a kind of commitment to oneself (Bratman, 1987). The distal intention of getting a Ph.D. is
not worth much if it cannot help steer an agent's behavior. As Bratman points out, distal
intentions help steer our behavior.
The more committed we are to a distal intention, the more certain possibilities emerge
while others foreclose. If I am committed to getting a Ph.D., then possibilities regarding
backpacking or working as a surf instructor do not appear as live options. Similarly, with regard
to affordances, being authentically committed to a distal intention means that some affordances
become salient, and others do not. Our commitments structure not only our long-term
engagements but also the ebb and flow of our landscape of affordances. If I am genuinely
committed to getting through this workout class, then the door does not afford exiting and does
not solicit me into action. Furthermore, the instructor’s words of encouragement might be more
effective given my distal intention. Distal intentions help steer our conduct over shortish to
longer timescales and in our immediate interactions with affordances.
Especially the affordance aspect of distal intentions is important for our account of
agency in dance improvisation. In the dance case, distal intentions often function as implicit or
explicit commitments to oneself. That is, dancers often set self-imposed commitments regarding
how to continue their engagement with the situation. In such a case, distal intentions function as
organizing principles for the next few seconds, minutes, or the whole dance. For example, one
such intention could be mid-dance; the dancer sets the intention, “I will create a theme by
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dancing using wavy motions,” “I will make my legs rigid but my upper body rubbery,” or “I will
make motions that mimic a zombie.” Setting such an intention then creates a temporary theme or
style in the performance until a new theme or style emerges. Note that the dancer could explicitly
think these intentions as a form of self-talk, or the intentions can be set non-propositionally.
Dance phenomenologists have described the improvisational process as giving oneself
constraints to explore (McDowall, 2019; Midgelow, 2018; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011) or setting
and moving through modes of movement (Doughty, 2018). Setting a distal intention for oneself in
the shape of a constraint or mode of movement functions as an organizing principle (or we could
say a boundary condition) that structures the unfolding of the improvisational process. That is,
the distal intention set by the dancer not only dictates how the dancer might continue but also
augments what affordances are available to the dancer, given their newly set self-commitment. In
their phenomenological work on dance improvisation, Blom and Chaplin writes:
Form is being spun into existence as phrases of movement pour out and directions are
taken. […] We sense the direction of the phrases: we find ourselves making choices that
seem consistent with the forming pattern. Patterns provide an internal framework: a
skeleton around which an overall form is placed. Form is emerging: however when a
form is realized it also becomes a driving force that ‘dictates’ and shapes future forms.
Form unites intent and content: ‘it generates a forward motion towards unity and
wholeness. (Blom & Chaplin, 1988, 9)
This passage from Blom and Chaplin tells us multiple things about agency and intentions in
dance. As a dancer completes movements that adhere to distal or proximal intentions, each of
those movements dictates what movements can be performed next. Each movement pushes
future movements to be “completed” in a coherent form. With each movement, the intention
belonging to that movement lingers in short-term memory and in the phenomenological
experience of retention. As we experience our own movements in dance, we also experience the
intentions and forms of the previous movements.
These short-term memory intentions and the phenomenological retention of movement
jointly create phenomenological protention of where the movement is going next and
dynamically dictates what future intentions can coherently be set. As we are dancing, short-term
memory, and retention, contain our previous movements and intentions relating to each other in a
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manner that generates a unique gestalt of newly available affordances and possible distal
intentions.
We need to think of intentions as a form of self-attunement to affordances as the joint
dance system moves through a state space. In this model, “intentions” are not representations “in
the mind.” Rather “intention” is a heuristic for the process in which an agent re-adjusts their
embodied processes (posture, action readiness, neuronal firing, muscle tension, breath, etc.) so
that the agent as a whole will be solicited to a different group of affordances. Setting intentions is
a distributed process throughout the brain, body, and environment. Just as we cannot locate
representations in the mind, we cannot locate “the intention.” Rather what we call intention is a
shorthand for the totality of embodied processes working in the environment to create a specific
kind of readiness to act.
Functioning as self-created organizing principles, distal intentions often function as
boundary conditions. For example, the distal intention to “Dance with Shaun” or to dance
merengue rather than bachata function as boundary conditions that narrow in the landscape of
affordances available to the dancing agent. If the distal intentions set are to dance with Shaun
and dance merengue, then those intentions dynamically organize the landscape of affordances so
that some affordances are more salient while others are not present at all (for example, the
affordances to up-rock with Somogy).
The notion so far is that agents can reconfigure their landscape of affordances through
self-attunement, and this happens by setting distal intentions; long or short-term selfcommitments (see Figure 20). For example, an agent might be highly solicited by the
thanksgiving dinner table as the various meat dishes afford eat-ability. Still, the agent can
reconfigure the pull of the affordance landscape in front of them by reconsidering one of their
distal intentions. For example, “I intend to stop animal cruelty.” Such an act of “self-talk,” in
turn, reconfigures what affordances the agent will be sensitive to and solicited by as the
interaction goes on (Brancazio & Segundo-Ortin, 2020; Dings, 2019). In other words, setting a
distal intention is to reconfigure one’s landscape of affordances.
In line with the idea of meshed architecture in expert performance, dance improvisers
often use high-order cognitive processes to set distal intentions even while they are
simultaneously directly engaged in commerce with the environment. For example, from her own
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professional dance experience and from interviewing other expert dancers, Barbara Gail Montero
argues that dancers often monitor, strategize, rationalize, evaluate, intend, and other higher-order
processes without detriment to their performance (Montero, 2016). Accordingly, when dancers
set distal intentions, the commitment trickles down to affect low-level direct engagement with
affordances in real-time. Thus, dance improvisation is characterized by the meshing of higherorder meta processes and processes of direct environmental engagement (Christensen et al.,
2016; Gallagher & Varga, 2020; Høffding & Satne, 2019).
Put in dynamic systems language; dancers are dynamical systems that move through a
state space in which the landscape of affordances functions as attractors, repellers, etc. However,
human agents are capable of recursively reorganizing the dynamics of their system so that they
are presented with new affordances, that is, a new state-space. Setting distal intentions during a
dance leads to short-term re-attunements to the environment so that the dancer has new
dispositions to act on different affordances. However, we must remember, as we saw with the
studies on contact improvisers, the distal intention cannot be to force through a specific
movement since this might lead to a clash, crash, or other breakdowns of interaction. In any
event, during the process of setting a distal intention, there is a recursive interplay between what
the enactive action-perception affordance loop brings out of the dancer and how they, at the same
time, can structure their overall style of engagement with the situation. In dynamic systems
language, we can then say that the setting of distal intentions changes the dynamics of the system
to generate a qualitatively different state-space (see Figure 20).
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Distal intentions help add structure, improvisational coherence, and sophistication to a
dancer’s performance. For coherent themes, structures, contrast, associations, virtual powers,

Figure 20 - The setting of distal intentions changes the landscape of affordances for the dancing agent.
etc., to emerge from improvisation, it is often needed both to be in the moment and
simultaneously to set commitments for the present-future unfolding of the improvisation. Put
simply, for improvised dance to look good, the dancer must plan as they are executing it.
Improvisation is characterized by the dual nature of both planning ahead through distal intention
but also being engaged with whatever the environment is bringing. Improvisation exists as a
constant tension and meshing between the dynamics of unfolding and the agent's autonomy of
intention setting and re-attunement.
In short, distal intentions are a form of self-alteration of the body into being disposed to
new kinds of actions and being solicited by specific affordances. Such embodied self-attunement
changes the state-space of affordances through which the dance system unfolds. In this way,
when the appropriate affordance appears, the individual is disposed to act on that affordance. If
this argument seems confusing, I encourage the reader to think of Ryle’s idea that beliefs are
dispositions to act (Hornsby, 2012; Ryle, 1976) and Dewey’s more flexible notion of intelligent
habit (Dewey, 1922). Intending to create a certain theme or to engage in a specific style is to
generate a readiness to act. Put differently, style or autonomy in dance is, in part, expressed by
changing one’s own dynamics.
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Figure 21 - Within each agent, there is a constant causal interplay between higher-order
cognitive processes (strategizing, monitoring, intending, etc.) and low-level processes
(engagement with affordances, sub-personal anticipatory processes, embodied processes, etc.).
As each agent regulates the other and lets themselves be regulated, a system emerges in which
the autonomy is strictly speaking not centralized in either agent. The system as a whole reacts to
the environment, the music and can flexibly and intelligently adapt to the situation.

Distributed Control
What has emerged from this discussion so far is a view of dance in which the locus of control is
distributed across the entire dance system (See Figure 21). Dance interaction and autonomy do
not rest within the agent, but neither is the dancing agent simply at the mercy of the environment.
Rather, in line with Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) and later Varela et al. (1991), the inner, outer
distinction of cognitive science needs to be reconceptualized. Notions such as autonomy and
choice in dance do not neatly map onto an inner, outer binary distinction. Dance autonomy and
choice is a recursive product of agent environment interaction where the locus of control cannot
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be identified in either, but rather in the emergent product of agent environment coupling (The
Distributed Control Thesis). When we think of dancing as a joint dynamical system, we can
understand why dancers report improvisation as being both in control and not in control
simultaneously (Kronsted, in press). In this section and the next section, I will further elaborate
on the way that vernacular dance improvisation is a matter of distributed control. I will focus
especially on the role played by sensorimotor schemes and culture.
Both classic behaviorism and cognitivism run the error of centralizing control in one
place or the other, either environment or the brain. However, a recent reconceptualization of the
brain shows that the brain is more akin to what enactivists call an organ of resonance (Fuchs,
2018). This model begins with the notion of the brain as a self-organizing dynamic system
(Kelso, 1995). Thomas Fuchs argues that the brain is always in a resonance relationship with the
environment and the body. To confuse the brain with the locus of control is to argue that a train
station is equal to the traffic (Fuchs, 2018, 46). In other words, it is a category mistake. Brains
are important, but it is only by understanding the organism as a whole in its ongoing dynamical
coupling to the environment that we can understand cognition. The brain is not in the business of
representing but rather resonating with various sources of coupling in a consistent isomorphic
relationship (Fuchs, 2018). Rather than thinking of the brain as modular, neuroscience now
shows that we should focus on the plasticity of the brain as it constantly reorganizes itself in selforganizing patterns (Anderson, 2014). Brains then synchronize with the rest of the body and the
environment at multiple layers of organization across varying timescales. Neither at the level of
explanation of the brain, the holistic agent, or in dance interaction should we think of the locus of
control as being fully in one place or the other.
Part of Fuchs’ argument is that there is constant causality between various layers of
explanation that we can apply when examining the body (Fuchs, 2018, 108). What happens at the
phenomenological level of subjective experience causally impacts what happens across the body
all the way down to the hormonal level. Just as hunger, thirst, hormone production, or immune
responses can causally impact the phenomenological level. There is, in other words, a constant
interplay between the various levels of causality within the body and between body and
environment. Therefore, we cannot simply ignore what happens at the phenomenological level or
at the sub-personal or chemical levels of explanation. A classic example has to do with expertise
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and perceptual learning; learning a new language change the way the language is heard. One can
never un-hear meaning and go back to hearing how the language sounded before having learned
the language. Similarly, in perceptual learning, experts who are skilled at recognizing certain
perceptual features cannot un-see those features; the features are now directly in their
phenomenological field (Briscoe, 2015; Nanay, 2011; Siegel, 2016; Stokes, 2014). Experiencing
higher-level features at the level of phenomenology directly impacts how a person’s body attunes
to the environment. In the language case experiencing a poem as “beautiful” also changes what
happens across the body.
Dynamics and enactivism force us to think of explanations for phenomena that cut across
all levels of explanation, and this too goes for dance. Notions such as control and agency as they
have typically been conceptualized in action theory and cognitivism do not align well with
activities such as dance. Dance is not in the conventional sense a matter of “choice.” Rather,
dance is the emergent property of many integrated processes, some of which are phenomenology
conscious, others which are entirely sub-personal, and others yet again at the pre-reflective
periphery of consciousness (see Figure 21). Metaphorically speaking, we can say that the
autonomy that dancers experience is much like surfing; once the surfer is on the wave, they will
be moved by the wave regardless of what they do. While the surfer cannot stop the wave from
pushing them towards the shore, they can integrate their movements with the wave. Similarly, in
dance improvisation, when all goes well, the dancers autonomy is a combined product that does
not neatly fit onto a binary in-control out of control framework. The dancer is the conduit for the
musical environment the same way the surfer in some sense is the conduit of the wave; the
dancer acts on the affordances that the environment provides but can also add their own flare to
how those affordances are expressed.
The expressive autonomy of the dancers does generate an interesting question regarding
affordances. Namely, how specific are affordances? The classic example of affordances seems to
be the chair. The chair affords sitting. The action specified by the chair affordance is described at
a fairly gross granularity of description. The chair affords sit-ability but does not specify
precisely how to sit; that is a product of sensorimotor processes within the organism. Similarly,
dance affordances provided by the music, one’s partner, or other environmental factors tend to be
rather broad. Most North Americans know exactly what to do when the chorus of YMCA kicks
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in – the affordances here are very specific. Even so, most musical affordances do not contain
such carefully specified instructions. While most people familiar with the song know that they
must get lower when the artist sings “A little bit softer now” and slowly get up when the artist
sings “a little bit louder now” in the classic Shout (The Isley Brothers, 1954), there are no
specific instructions for how to drop or rise. Rather, each dancer displays their individuality by
acting on the same affordances through their own unique coupling (see Figure 22).

Figure 22 - Here, we see the typically perceived affordances that an untrained dancer might
experience when engaging with (American wedding classic) Shout (1954). The figure
demonstrates the many affordances that are available to the dancer. In a well-known song like
Shout, the lyrics will likely be particularly salient to the dancer soliciting the dancer into acting
on the lyrics. Hence why so many wedding guests lift their hands or jump at the “shout.”
Furthermore, dancers do not exploit one affordance at a time. In most music, multiple
affordances can be acted on at once. In the case of Shout, dancers can step into the ground on
the core rhythm while also raising their body upwards on the lyrics while shaking their
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shoulders to the tambourine. Furthermore, the tempo and mood of the song aid in dictating the
style of expression performed when dancing. When dancing, the combined presence of the
various affordances enable and constrain each other. For example, in Shout, the mood and the
tempo modulate both the upwards-body affordances in the lyrics and the core rhythm so that
both afford a happy, friendly movement rather than an angry, aggressive movement.
In dance, if a dancer “decides” or “generates” an intention at the level of phenomenology,
we should neither explain “intention” away purely in the form of sub-personal processes or
explain it just in the form of internal speech. Rather, we must look for an explanation that goes
across various levels of causality. Again, the point is to highlight that providing an account that
is consistent with dynamical systems and enactivism is not to rid the agent of autonomy or
capabilities of intention formation but to holistically re-describe what these terms mean.

Distributed Control Continued, Sensorimotor Schemes, and the Shared
Hermeneutical background
So far, we have characterized improvisational dance as a self-organizing autonomous system
based on affordances. We have also looked at the physical synchronization mechanisms involved
in such self-organization and how distal intentions functions as a form of self-attunement.
Importantly, the overall picture is that dance improvisation is a matter controlled non-controlled
(The Distributed Control Thesis). The dichotomy of being in control of one’s action or not
being in control of one’s action as it is often presented by laypeople and representational
philosophy of mind and action theory is not applicable to the phenomenon of dance
improvisation. Still, there are two more pieces of the puzzle missing: namely, sensorimotor
schemes and the massive hermeneutical background. As we saw in chapter one, dance is a highly
social, cultural, historical, and contextual matter (The Form of Life Thesis). In consequence, we
need to bring the social-cultural know-how of dance into our account. This know-how expresses
itself through sensorimotor schemes and the massive hermeneutical background. Let us begin
with sensorimotor schemes.
Sensorimotor Schemes
The notion of sensorimotor scheme is important for dance action and interaction. In Linguistic
Bodies, Di Paolo and colleagues (2018) defines a sensorimotor scheme as: “a string or cycle of
coordination patterns.” (ibid, 50). Largely utilizing the notion of a scheme found in Piaget (1975),
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a sensorimotor scheme is a flexible, adaptable series of movements that regulates the environment.
At the most basic level, schemes uphold the process of autopoiesis by regulating the environment
so that the organism remains (as much as possible) in a meta-stable state of equilibrium with the
environment. The classic example from Piaget’s developmental psychology utilized by Di Paolo
et al. is the infant reaching for the bottle, suckling, swallowing, then breathing in a repeated
rhythmic pattern (ibid, 50). Sensorimotor schemes are recursive world-involved actions that aim
at regulating the environment and, in doing so, bring out new perceptions for the organism. For
example, grabbing a sponge not only regulates the environment it also brings out the relationship
of softness between the agent and the sponge itself.
In the organism's ongoing primordial quest for equilibrium, a form of normativity
develops; sensorimotor schemes can be better or worse at bringing the organism into equilibrium.
Through ongoing action onto the world, the agent perpetually learns new schemes, augments their
schemes, refine their schemes, and so on. Bodies are always in the process of attuning themselves
to the environment through the subtle updating of their countless sensorimotor schemes.
Importantly then, from the normativity of having a body comes learning and mastery.
Rather than sensorimotor schemes being controlled by a central control system, they exist
in dynamical clusters (ibid, 52). The execution of a sensorimotor scheme enables the further
execution of nearby and related schemes while physically foreclosing the possibility of others.
This is particularly apparent in speech science, in which the literal physical configuration of the
vocal folds, tongue, lips, facial and throat muscles, and so on, exist in a dynamical relationship
that determines speech motor control. The dynamical relationship between the physical parts of
the speech system determines what can and cannot be uttered next (Ramanarayanan et al., 2016;
Saltzman & Kelso, 1987; Saltzman & Munhall, 1989; Van Lieshout, 2004). Whether in speech
acts or gross bodily movements, the physicality of sensorimotor schemes enables and forecloses
the execution of other schemes. On this view, the brain is a dynamically organized organ that
resonates with the rest of the organism by further enabling and foreclosing the execution of
sensorimotor schemes and sensorimotor scheme clusters (Fuchs, 2018; Kelso, J. A., 1995; Kelso,
2016; Varela, 1995). As Di Paolo et al. put it:
Sensorimotor schemes organize themselves into several kinds of relations of supporting,
priming, inhibition, and so on. They form a network of relations. Each enacted scheme is
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linked in various ways to other neighboring schemes, the action possibilities surrounding
our current act that become inhibited preactivated, or in some other way virtually present.
(Di Paolo, et al. 2018, 52)
Sensorimotor schemes organize themselves into increasingly more and more complex clusters
spanning from our most basic actions to high-level actions and interactions. In part, agency is a
matter of dynamically coupled sensorimotor schemes at play across a variety of levels and time
scales. Put simply; we do not need representations when there are world-involving sensorimotor
schemes all the way down. Simple sensorimotor schemes organize themselves into patterns that
allow us to learn more complex sensorimotor schemes while still staying within the environmental
equilibrium. Through the ever-growing adjustments of schemes, we become capable of higherlevel schemes such as operating a computer, moving a couch, or getting the timing right when
telling a good story (Figure 23).

Figure 23 - Sensorimotor schemes are emerging at various levels of integration and across
timescales. As the agent flexibly executes schemes, some schemes become available while others
become closed off. This integration happens across various time scales and enables the use of
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more meta-level schemes such as higher-order cognitive processes to impact lower-level
processes.
As we switch between contexts, we also switch into various genres of action and interaction
and apply context-relevant sensorimotor schemes (ibid, 55). Preparing a meal, being on a zoom
call, teaching a dance class, writing a paper, being out for drinks are all contexts with their own
network of appropriate sensorimotor schemes. Even so, sensorimotor schemes are not action
programs that are stored and activated. Rather, they are world-involving; they are always
happening in dynamical interplay with the environment. The sensorimotor schemes for cooking
cannot be activated in a weightlifting gym. Not only are there no pots and pans around, but the
very physicality of the pots and pans is part of the scheme (Malafouris, 2013). We are always in
the middle of a context, a context that involves doing something concrete in the environment.
Schemes are not automatic motor programs that can be turned on in the absence of their target.
Rather, schemes are dynamically brought out by the very environment and context.
One way we can see that schemes are not centrally controlled motor programs is that their
physical organization often correct itself faster than the speed of brain processing (Kelso et al.,
1984; Wallot & Orden, 2012). That is, even when perturbed, sensorimotor interaction can often
intelligently re-align itself with the situation faster than the estimated speed of human centralized
neural processing. Sensorimotor schemes are in direct dynamical physical coupling with the
environment and can therefore intelligently adapt at lightning speed.
In the case of dance, the steps and movements that dancers have rehearsed are sensorimotor
schemes that further allow the dancer to improvise (alone or interactively). Part of dance practice
is to develop sensorimotor schemes that are applicable to the dance context. As the dancer becomes
more skilled, these sensorimotor schemes become increasingly more stylish but also more flexible.
That is, the schemes can be easily applied in and out of each other, mixed and matched fluently,
and so forth. Dance sensorimotor schemes are in part characterized by a great deal of flexibility
towards the rapidly shifting particularities of the situation. Next, we will see how the situation
helps sensorimotor skills adaptively bring us through the world. Namely, we will look at the
massive hermeneutical background.
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The Massive Hermeneutical Background
In chapter one, I argued for the Form of Life Thesis; vernacular dances are meaning-bearing
cultural practices that we live through. Part of this thesis is that vernacular dances function as
systems we can live through because they produce Deweyan aesthetic experiences, experiences
that envelop the agent. In this section, we will see how the enveloping aesthetic experience adds
to the Distributed Control Thesis. In particular, I want to invoke the concept of a hermeneutical
background.
In Action and Interaction (2020) Gallagher argues that human social interaction is highly
scaffolded by what he calls the Massive Hermeneutical Background (MHB). The MHB is the
totality of background knowledge, narrative practices, habits, and skills that an agent possesses
(ibid, 170). Importantly large parts of the MHB are shared between agents so that they operate in
the same meaningful context. Here we should think back to chapter one and the Form of Life
Thesis. The MHB also contains a large sum of “ongoing embodied interactions and narrative
practices that we have described as characterizing most of our everyday encounters with others”
(ibid, 171). Through culturally and socially transferred narratives, and practice, human agents
develop a long repertoire of flexible sensorimotor schemes that they can rely on for smooth
interaction with others. From infancy and continually throughout life, our existence is thoroughly
permeated by cultural narratives and learned sensorimotor schemes that highly scaffold our
interactions. In other words, we always find ourselves in the midst of some context that highly
dictates our interactions and the meaning created from those interactions. Gallagher here invokes
the notion of a habitus:
We can think of habitus as an individual’s particular background. As such habitus is a
system of long-term, acquired dispositions (habits, schemas) of perception thought, and
action. These are embodied, affective, and pragmatically situated dispositions that are not
necessarily consciously manifest in our practices, but they function prenoetically; that is
they shape our experiences without our being aware that they are doing so (Gallagher,
2005). They are formed in response to physical and social environmental factors, and
they continue to depend upon and evolve in tandem with those factors; in this respect,
they are not reducible to neurophysiological states. (ibid, 172)
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Human agents, our perceptual and interactive processes are highly modulated by embodied
know-how that is informed by the MHB. That is, sensorimotor schemes are always already
operating in the background of the various contexts we find ourselves in so that we can move
through the world smoothly. Thus a “skill” does not only apply to something explicit like
knowing how to use a wheel saw or operate a plane. Rather, skills can more broadly be described
as the know-how of sensorimotor schemes that let us obtain a maximal grip on our situation. As
phenomenologists have pointed out, our daily experience is not characterized by explicitly
attending to every little thing in our surroundings. Rather, we smoothly act on our environments
so that we can attend to the (often distal or higher-order) tasks that matter (Merleau-Ponty 2012,
Dreyfus 2004). Through continual action and interaction with environments, our bodies become
attuned to those environments so that we can move through them with ease (our sensorimotor
schemes become increasingly adaptive to their contexts). For example, after being a part of
international breakdancing culture for almost twenty years, my body automatically comports
itself differently when I enter a breaking environment; my posture changes, my mannerisms
change, my language changes, my interactions are permeated by that environment. This, in turn,
explains the confusion and sometimes discomfort my academic friends experience when they run
into me hanging out with my breaking friends or vice versa. Human interactions are highly
scaffolded through learned knowledge, dispositions, narratives, histories, and sensorimotor
schemes. These different non-representational ways of knowing express themselves in how we
comport ourselves, skillfully attend to tasks, the language we use, and more; that is, we are
always holistically integrated with our contexts. For a great phenomenological treatment of both
being holistically integrated into contexts and simultaneously alienated from them, see (Ortega,
2016).
It is important to remember that sensorimotor schemes in dance are not just steps. All of
the cultural know-how that is passed down through dance integrates itself in a network of
dynamically enabling and constraining sensorimotor schemes. Part of what lets dancers become
the self-organizing, autonomous, dynamical system that I have described is the reliance on
scaffolding from the MHB and the skillful deployment of sensorimotor schemes. Each situation
that we find ourselves in utilizes a selection of relevant features from the MHB. Dance as an
activity is no different; when agents improvise dance (alone or together), they rely on a shared
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background of norms, practices, expectations, narratives, and sensorimotor schemes (all which
comes with the form of life).

Figure 24 - The enactive model of dance improvisation. All processes of the dynamical
autonomous dance system are permeated by the shared dance background.
The affordances present in the dance environment are in part dictated by the shared
hermeneutical dance background; a sub-set of the MHB (see Figure 24). For example, different
dances have different organizing principles that make each dance form recognizable as that form
of dance. Hence, the shared hermeneutical background for New York salsa is different from that
of Appalachian square dance. Not only do these dances rely on different sensorimotor schemes
such as steps and expression, but they also have different norms and expectations. Dancers,
trained and amateur alike, become attuned to these dance environments so that they can navigate
them with ease. Many of the affordances available to dancers are uniquely tied to the shared
hermeneutical dance background. For example, the affordance to switch partners during
Appalachian square dance is very different from hustle swing, which is again different from club
or wedding dance. In breaking (especially in the East Coast United States), it is customry to trash
talk the opponent regardless of how well they are performing. While such talk is often
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tremendously harsh and personal, it is part of the locally shared hermeneutical background (it is
part of that dance form of life). As a result, dancers know not to take such talk too seriously.
Still, the trash talk itself adds an additional layer of available affordances since the dancer being
trash-talked often utilizes the opponent's words in their improvisation. For example, my
teammate was once called a “Dirty shoe roach” by his opponent. As the opponent uttered the
slur, my teammate, in real-time, did a back-flip in which he landed on his back pretending to be
an upside-down cockroach, then proceeded to roll onto his head, perform a head-spin while
pretending to brush his shoe. Knowing the norms of the shared dance background, my teammate
did not stop to question the bizarre insult.1 Rather, given the norms of the shared dance
background, he was able to use the insult as an affordance.
When we say that Deweyan aesthetic experience envelopes its participants and regulates
their conduct, part of what we have in mind is that the aesthetic experience is created through a
shared hermeneutical background. Vernacular dance forms come with a shared hermeneutical
dance background through their organizing principles, history, norms, etc., and such
backgrounds regulate and scaffolds the dancer's sensorimotor schemes and interactions. In this
way, the Form of Life Thesis and the Distributed Control Thesis are intimately connected.
In sum, each dance form comes with a shared hermeneutical background, which includes
narratives, histories, knowledge, habits, which shape sensorimotor schemes for the dancers to
easily become self-organized, affordance-based, autonomous, dynamical systems. When we look
at such systems, the classic dichotomy of being in control of one’s actions or not being in control
does not fit the phenomenon. Improvisational vernacular dance, as I have described it, are
systems in which each agent and the environment co-constitute the system with equal levels of
effort. Put colloquially; each agent gets as much from the dance system as they give. The
distributed control thesis is the idea that the marvels of vernacular dance improvisation are the
result of all agents in the system, the environment, the music, the background, culture, and so on.

The insult was meant to point to my teammate’s sneakers which were in fact rather worn out, and to insult him on
his status as a resident of the New York City borough The Bronx. In breaking culture, regional background is often
used as a point of playful tension between competing dance crews
1
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It is distributed control because the various factors we have visited self-organize into an
emergent system in which each part regulates and is regulated.
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5. Arguments from Within the Philosophy and Cognitive Science
of Dance
At this point, I have developed a fairly extensive enactive model of cognition during
improvisational dance with specific emphasis on the distributed control thesis. Next, I will look
at some accounts from the cognitive science of dance and the literature on expert performance.
Instead of covering the entire literature, I will here highlight a selection of articles and books that
either clash with my account or that can be modified considering my enactivist account. I will
begin with a group of thinkers I dub the new dance cognitivists. I argue that their methodological
framework is flawed and, therefore, cannot be used to make conclusions about dance. I then
move on to the literature on expert performance and address the problem of self-attention (is
attention towards oneself detrimental to performance?).

The New Dance Cognitivists
While many researchers within dance studies, philosophy of dance, and the cognitive science of
dance support various accounts and degrees of embodied cognition, there are still those that
adhere to a more cognitivist picture of dance. In this section, I will cover and critique a selection
of the New Dance Cognitivists.
Schack’s Hierarchy
Thomas Schack (2019) has developed a four-tiered hierarchical model of dance cognition. Just
like me, Schack is trying to account for the cognitive mechanisms that make dance possible. But
in contrast, Schack’s model is heavily based on mental representations and classic computation.
Schack argues that the mind operates with a four-tiered system in motor control. The
lowest level of representation is the level of interaction with the environment and automation. At
this level, the system directly compares sensory input with stored representations of what
movements “ought to feel like” (ibid, 121). Schack argues that motor programs such as dance
steps or how to operate a hammer are stored as representations in the format of a “sensory
profile.” Hence, the cognitive system keeps checking on how movements feel in comparison to
how they should feel. When something goes awry, higher-order levels of control in the
sensorimotor hierarchy can make adjustments to ensure proper execution of the movement. In
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other words, representations across four levels of increased cognitive control check to see if
incoming stimuli fit the stored sensory profile representation of the movement that is intended.
Note the comparison between Schack’s model and predictive processing. Movements are stored
as representations of what sensory profile the system should expect to experience when a
movement is carried out. Differences in experience due to context-specific conditions then alarm
the system that adjustments must be made. In this way, the system adjusts the execution of dance
movements depending on the environment. For example, dancing on marly feels different than
dancing on a concrete or wooden floor. This difference in texture demands different footing
when movements are executed, and higher levels of representations can check for this difference
and make the appropriate adjustments to action execution.
While Schack does not explicitly say this, I assume that some of the anticipated sensory
profiles of movements will slip into phenomenological experience. For example, in
breakdancing, when we perform power moves (the rotating movements that the dance is famous
for, such as the headspin or the windmill), the dancer uses the feeling of the body in movement
(kinesthesia) to track and adjust the execution. The headspin or the windmill has a unique
experiential profile that is used to track if one is executing the movement optimally. Similar to
athletes in sports, phenomenological interviews with dancers report that optimal performance is
experienced as “just clicking,” that is, the movements feel right (Hefferon & Ollis, 2006). In a
breaking power move, there is no time to carefully think and manipulate one's bodily position.
Rather, most dancers use proprioception and kinesthesia to adjust the movements so that they
feel right as the movement is being executed. At high speeds, even a small difference can
significantly impact the execution of the move, and the dancer must therefore be in constant
contact with their somatic experiences as they execute a power move. What is being underscored
is that Schack, despite his representational leanings, is right about some aspects of dance
execution. Many trained dancers do utilize an online feedback loop between the known sensory
profile of a move and what the movement currently feels like.
Still, it is a leap to argue that sensory comparison must mean that movement sequences
are “stored” as representations. Part of the problem is that a representation of a movement
sequence is highly inflexible and therefore cannot accommodate the many factors that play into
the execution of movement in fast-paced contextualized environments and situations.
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Schack argues that the sensory profile representation gets “chunked” together at each
level of the hierarchy to become more fine-grained. Level one deals with the automated
execution of motor programs and sends afferent copies of themselves to level two. At level two,
information regarding the afferent copies and the world are chunked together into larger
representations and then sent to level three. Schack argues that level three functions as a
“workbench” for level four (ibid, 122). Level four is the semantic level; the system chunks
various representations together into basic action concepts (BAC). Basic action concepts can be
uttered in a proposition, can be imagined, and taught to others: “bend your knees,” “roll your
wrists,” or “the pivot” are BACs. The semantic content of BACs is then grounded in the sensory
profile of movements performed in the past.
When we are engaged in dancing, whether improvised or not, the four-tiered model
suggests that higher-order executive parts of the mind chooses basic action concepts and apply
them to the dance situation. That is, at the level of intention, the mind chooses from a vocabulary
of BACs. When such an order is given, the order trickle’s through the system, activating the
relevant lower-level representations that then lead to action execution. As action execution is
taking place, rapid dorsal stream sensory information and other sensory input slightly adjust the
various parameters of the representation to accommodate the specifics of the situation.
On the four-tiered model, other task-related representations, that is, representations that
track what must be done next, guides the high-order levels of the system in choosing which BAC
representations to execute. Task-based representations keep track of the situation, while motor
representations keep track of what the body is supposed to experience as it executes movements.
Interestingly, for Schack, task representations are not in the same “format” as BAC’s, and the
two can therefore only be in causal contact with each other indirectly through higher-order
intentional action execution:
The appraisal of events, action effects, or stimuli in the environment is the first cognitive
process in action organization. Subsequently, the result of one’s appraisal is not only
stored in memory, but is also of central meaning for eliciting emotions. Here, the level of
mental control (Level IV, see Table 6.1) comes into play. Processing at this level begins
with making a decision about a relevant course of action. The result of this decisionmaking process is the intention to achieve specific action effects. Based on this intention,
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an action plan is created, and the mental control processing runs to a module that is
responsible for action execution. This module is linked to the level of sensorimotor
control (Level I), and includes all motor components necessary for the production of
goal-directed action effects. (Ibid, 129)
For Schack, at each minuscule moment, the system goes through a loop in which it appraises the
situation logically and affectively, computes a plan, which in turn generates an intention. The
intention then activates motor-plan representations that are then finally executed. Note also the
commitment to a specific module responsible just for action execution. Again, we see the idea
that to be in control of one’s actions is to create an inference.
Affect, for Schack, plays the role of action regulation. With each action, as the system appraises
whether an action created the intended outcome or not, the system generates positive or negative
affect. According to Schack, affect can lower mental control, thereby having the agent lose
control of what intentions they initiate and thereby how many action programs they initiate. This
negative affective cycle can short circuit the feedback loop between anticipation and action,
leading to increased performance anxiety. For Schack, affective appraisal of one’s own
movements can explain the choking effect in sports and can hinder how representations are
utilized through the system.
It is worth looking at the studies that are being used as evidence for this account of dance
cognition. Schack’s treatment of dance cognition is yet another example of a cognitive scientist
who does not dance himself and who mainly uses empirical evidence that is not about dance.
Even the empirical research from studies on dance seems to be subject to some dubious
inferences. For example, ballet dancers are better than non-dancers at memorizing lists of
movement names when they know how to perform those movements (Smyth & Pendleton,
1994). Schack argues that this is evidence that the mind stores representations of dance
movements as sensory profiles that can be quickly recalled. However, it is just as likely that
having heard the names of these movements in training repeatedly through years of practice, that
these words are simply more familiar to ballet dancers than to non-dancers. Such a study tells us
nothing about motor execution or the cognitive processes leading to motor execution.
In general, I want to call into question the validity of the experiments used to support
Schack’s theory. First, it is questionable whether the results produced under non-ecological
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laboratory conditions can be transferred to the domain of dance. Second, because of the artificial
nature of these experiments, we can generally call their validity into question. Like Rosenbaum
(2010; 2019), Schack makes similarly questionable inferences when drawing from artificial
laboratory experiments to the realm of contextualized action and dance. While It is not fruitful to
go through every experiment, I will focus on the use of the Basic Action Concept (BAC) and the
research method “structural dimensional analysis-motoric, SDA-M” (Schack, 2004). I focus on
this method because Schack and colleagues have performed several studies directly related to
dance using this method and take this method to provide insights into the representational
structure of dance cognition (Bläsing, et al., 2009; Bläsing, & Schack, 2012; Schack, 2004).
Additionally, others have used the SDA-M model to analyze latin-dance (Geburzi et al., 2004).
In the SDA-M method, three groups of participants are included in a study: experts, midlevel, and novices. The method consists of four steps. First, participants are presented with
pictures of a movement with a label on it—for example, a series of pictures of a dancer going
through the motion of a pivot. The first picture will contain the first part of the pivot and have a
label with the tag “pivot opening” (Schack, 2019, 124). Each card is meant to represent a Basic
Action Concept (BAC). Participants are allowed to look at all the labeled cards throughout the
experiment.
Before the study begins, other experts are interviewed to determine the different steps,
the BACs, that are going onto the labeled cards. For example, in a study on gymnastics and the
front flip, expert gymnasts would be interviewed ahead of the study to determine the various
phases of the front flip that can then be captured on cards with labels. For the dance pivot, expert
dancers are interviewed and identify the various phases of the pivot that can be captured on the
cards.
Participants are introduced to one of the labeled cards on a computer screen. The rest of
the BAC cards are then presented in randomized order. Participants will then describe for each
presented BAC if it is functionally related to the fixed card on the screen. The procedure then
produces two lists, one containing BACs the participants deem functionally related to the
original BAC and another list with the ones that are not deemed functionally related. This
process is repeated once for each of the original BAC cards on the table. Each BAC of a
movement sequence gets to be the anchored picture once (ibid, 124).
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Second, the lists produced by each participant group (experts, mid-level, and novices) are
subjected to cluster analysis to measure the “subjective distance” each participant has to a certain
BAC (ibid, 125). In other words, the cluster analysis is meant to see how well each participant
understands each step in a movement sequence, such as the pivot. Supposedly, if the participant
does not understand BAC’s as functionally related to each other, they do not understand the
movement well. For steps three and four:
In the third step, the dimensioning of the cluster solutions is performed using a factor
analysis applied to a specific cluster-oriented rotation process, resulting in a factor matrix
classified by clusters (see Schack and Mechsner, 2006; Schack and Schack, 2005).
Finally, in the fourth step of the SDA-M, cluster solutions are tested for invariance both
within and between groups. (ibid, 125)
In other words, in the third and fourth step, statistical methods are applied to the cluster lists to
see how experts, mid-level, and novices compare in understanding which BACs are functionally
related to other BACs. As predicted, these studies demonstrated that experts are better at
recognizing whether a picture of a BAC is structurally related to the current BAC on the screen
and better at recognizing where in the process a certain shown BAC is in relation to the anchored
BAC. The SDA-M method measures how well experts, mid-level, and novices have stored a
representation of the movement and understand how the different parts of the sensory profile of
that movement fit together.
This method of analysis has several problems. First, looking at pictures of a movement in
a static laboratory setting does not allow us to make inferences about how a cognitive system
motorically operates. Picture recognition and movement execution are not the same things.
Naturally, experts are going to have a better understanding of how a movement is connected to
another movement within the domain in which they are experts. Experts not only practice but
also spend time studying and thinking about the subject in which they are experts. The kind of
pictorial and critical thinking exercise performed in the SDA-M model at best tells us about the
visual recall of experts. Jumping from visual memory recall in experts to the existence of a
representational cognitive system is unfounded. Being able to critically evaluate a picture of a
movement does not tell us anything about how the expert operates in situ. If this were the case,
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novices should be able to read a book about dance movements, look at the pictures, and then
become expert dancers.
Furthermore, it is unclear what the SDA-M model is even measuring. Participants have
access to all the labeled BAC cards throughout the experiment, and these cards pretty clearly
indicate what phase of the movement is being shown. So, are experts simply better at comparing
cards on the desk and cards on the screen? We can also ask what mechanisms are actually in play
when two BAC are being evaluated as functionally relevant to one another? Participants are
semantically and visually comparing two pictures, but this does not entail that they are recalling
a stored sensory profile representation of the movement. It could simply be that experts have
more semantic knowledge about their domain of expertise and that this is the knowledge that is
being utilized when comparing the functional distance between two images.
Again, experts typically not only practice their craft but also read, discuss, and think
about their craft. So it is not surprising that they have increased propositional knowledge
regarding their domain. It would not be surprising if art critics who do not dance but watch a lot
of dance would also do well at the SDA-M task without being able to ever actually perform a
pivot. Non-dancing art critics have plenty of propositional knowledge about dance and should
therefore be able to recognize the BAC’s that are functionally related without a problem. Yet,
they do not have a sensory profile for what movements feel like when they are performed.
The SDA-M model outright assumes that the format, knowledge, or item used to execute
a movement is the same that is being utilized when visually and critically evaluating two images
of that movement. This assumption is circular; the method and the experiments are meant to
show that athletes utilize representations. One cannot assume the existence of representations to
demonstrate the existence of a representational system. Similarly, cognitive scientist of dance
Bettina Blaasing assumes that dancers use representations when she uses the SDA-M model to
demonstrate how dancers use representations in long-term memory to guide movement execution
(Bläsing, 2014; 2019). Again, the model begins by assuming that representations are being used,
to then arguing that representations are being used, a circularity that renders the model invalid.
While I shall not repeat my general critiques of representations already brought forth in
this dissertation, they certainly also apply to Schack’s framework. Besides the SDA-M model,
Schack’s account suffers from other ills; namely, the use of a four-tiered representational system
185

is still both slow and rigid. I applaud the introduction of a sensory profile, at least at the
phenomenological level. Without speaking for other fields, it is true for dance that sensory
profiles are often used to guide the performer; there is something it is like to perform movements
correctly. However, Schack’s sensory profile representations are still contextually rigid.
According to Schack, upper levels of control must constantly engage in the selection, adjustment,
and identification of representations. Instead of letting the environment directly adjust and attune
the body as in the enactivist framework, representations must do the heavy lifting of attunement
through computations.
The problem is that a sensory profile representation must constantly be compared to the
incoming sensory feedback as the dancer is going through their movements. However, various
dance situations have different sensory profiles. For example, one could be dancing on concrete
instead of the usual wooden floor, on the beach, or in the rain. These different contexts produce a
variety of different sensory experiences that will not match the sensory profile of the stored
representation, so the various layers of control must adjust what is to be expected through mental
simulation. On Schack’s model it becomes immensely cognitively expensive to dance in contexts
that are different from one’s ordinary context. As we saw with Bresnahan’s article, it is a
common part of dance execution to adjust flexibly to a variety of changing contexts and
situations (Bresnahan, 2014). For the system to dance outside of context, the system will have to
compare the sensory profile representation to incoming sensory stimulation while also running a
mental simulation of how the movement ought to feel under these new conditions.
Bläsing’s Dance Memory Model
Bettina Bläsing has argued for a representational account of dance that is based on complex
multimodal embodied representations (Bläsing, 2019). Bläsing argues that through practice,
dancers build complex multimodal representations of movements. Much like Schack, she agrees
that these representations contain sensory profiles of how a movement ought to feel across all the
senses. Furthermore, these representations function as advanced motor programs that push the
body into precise action execution. As the dancer spends time practicing verbal, visual, auditory,
memory is stored in episodic memory. Over time these various representations are moved from
episodic memory into procedural memory as one integrated growing representation:
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We have come to understand that such representations in long-term memory are not
purely procedural or declarative, not learnt either implicitly or explicitly, but that they
comprise procedural, semantic and episodic aspects that are integrated and updated with
every new access, and the dancer’s memory that they underlie the execution as well as
the imagination of the learnt actions. (ibid, 175)
Because movements are stored in a representational format dancers can undue and fix bad
technique or bad habits through propositions. That is, propositions regarding technique, “keep
your back straight, lower your center of gravity,” can be stored in long-term declarative memory
and implemented into the movement representations. While it is not explicitly said, the
assumption is that the “format” of the verbal instruction representation is either transformed into
the format of the movement representation so that the two can interact, or all representations are
ultimate of the same format. Either way, for Bläsing, the fact that verbal instructions can be used
to change our habits supports the idea that complex movements are stored in the form of
multimodal representations.
Furthermore, Bläsing argues that the fact that complex dance sequences (phrases) can be
turned into propositional descriptions means that complex movements are stored as
representations that can be recalled and transformed into an explicit linguistic format. Bläsing
refers to an art experiment in which dancers from the Forsythe Company were asked to translate
their dance movements into propositions: “In the creation process for the piece Theatrical
Arsenal in October 2009, the dancers of The Forsythe Company were asked to turn the
movement phrase on which they were working into its opposite (Elizabeth Waterhouse, personal
communication)” (Bläsing, 2019, 175). In fact, Bläsing argues that marking1 as a technique
demonstrates how gestures can be used to refer to representations and help the cognitive system
make connections between complex movement representations without having to actually
perform the movements all out (ibid 175). Marking is thought of as a form of mental motor
simulation (Jeannerod, 1995; 2004).

1

When a dancer gestures movement instead of dancing all out. This is often done in rehearsal to preserve energy. It
is not always productive to do a choreography at full intensity. Sometimes it is better to mark the well-known parts
and dance all out on the parts that need practice.

187

By comparing dancers and non-dancers, Bläsing has demonstrated that dancers generally
have better memory capabilities across the board compared to non-dancers. (Bläsing, 2012) This
research also demonstrated that dancers, through their practice, develop a variety of memory
techniques typically not used by non-dancers.
In line with her research on dance memory, Bläsing argues in agreement with Schack that
complex movements are stored as complex multimodal representations and stored in an ordered
network of relations (Bläsing, 2019, 176). Related representations of complex movements are
stored in an ordered network sorted in relation to how often they are used in conjunction, how
similar the movements are to one another, and a number of other factors that allow the dancer to
rapidly call upon those representations. On this model:
The better a dancer can perform such a movement, the more orderly the network is
organized, and vice versa. The higher the degree of order the network features, the better
the knowledge can be accessed, the better the movement can be performed, and the less
attention and concentration are necessary for completing the task correctly. (ibid, 176)
Movement representations are neatly organized “within” the cognitive system, and skill
acquisition, whether through practice, memory consolidation during sleep, or explicit mental reorganizing, involves categorizing, organizing, and strengthening connections between complex
sensory profile representations. On such a model, habitual movement phrases in improvisation
are habitual because chains of representations are organized close to one another so that the
dancer can rapidly execute those representation chains. To support this account, Bläsing also
conducts several SDA-M experiments. Additionally, Bläsing and colleagues use the SDA-M
model to argue that trained dancers have better egocentric spatial representations than beginners
or non-dancers (Bläsing et al., 2009). Since I have just criticized the SDA-M approach, I will not
repeat these critiques.
Furthermore, Bläsing observes that dancers are better than non-dancers at identifying
movement phases (Bläsing, 2014). It has been generally found that experts in their respective
fields are visually better at compartmentalizing events into more discrete phases (Zacks et al.,
2009). On Bläsing’s model, dancers are better at visually and cognitively portion unfolding
movements into more fine-grained movement sections:
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In two consecutive experiments, participants watched a 90-second video clip showing the
dancer and choreographer performing a sequence from her dance piece in a training
studio. All participants watched the clip 20 times on a computer screen, and only the last
five presentations were accompanied by music. They were instructed to press the space
bar of the computer each time they perceived that a part of the movement ended and a
new one began. (Bläsing, 2019, 181)
The ability of dancers to identify more fine-grained phases is according to Bläsing because
dancers have more developed complex sensory-motor profile representations and that these
representations are better organized. A well-organized movement representation network allows
the dancer to quickly visually identify various sub-phases of a movement and cognitively process
these phases discretely.
There are several problems with Bläsing’s new dance cognitivism. First, both Bläsing,
Schack, and their various co-authors, make the same mistake as the roboticists I covered in
Chapter One; they assume that dance is simply about movements. Bläsing and Schack both look
at dance as a motor program problem. If we can solve how the brain generates precise
movements and exercise motor control, then we have explained dance (here, notice the looming
cognitivist dichotomy between control and non-control in the background). However, as we have
seen throughout this project, dance is highly integrated with human culture and sociality; dance
is not simply a matter of motor control. Dancing is closely integrated with the environment, with
the meaning of cultural contexts, co-dancers, and the list goes on; vernacular dances are forms of
life. Thus, Schack and Bläsing’s sensory profile representations must therefore either grow
exponentially in size to account for all the added cultural information needed for execution, or
they must have a credible story for how the complex motor representations are processed
together with social, cultural, and contextual representations.
Bläsing describes physical skill the same way we would describe files and folders in a
computer. The more organized the network, the better the skill. The problem, however, is that
physical skill is not a file cabinet. Furthermore, there is no valid inferential relationship between
language description of movements and physical skill. On Bläsing’s account, we ought to be able
to literally talk and think ourselves into expertise since skill is a matter of reorganizing the
associations between representations. Bläsing has already argued that language modulates
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physical skill because they are both representations and thereby able to interact. If Bläsing’s
account is true, then I ought to be able to talk myself into a jiujitsu black belt. It is true, that
practitioners of various activities can somewhat improve their skills by watching others and
talking about the activity. Even so, on Bläsing’s account, there is nothing stopping us from, in
theory being able to achieve armchair expertise.
Furthermore, many philosophers and cognitive scientists seem to be infatuated with
language. Yet, I do not think that language plays the crucial role in the mind that so many
philosophers tend to think. Unlike both Schack and Bläsing, I do not believe we can draw many
inferences from language use to physical expertise. The fact that trained dancers can describe
their practice in great detail does not entail that they must know their skills in terms of stored
representations. Schack, Bläsing, and others assume that if something is describable, then it must
be stored as representation in the mind. It is not surprising that dancers are better at processing
dance, that they have better memory functions, or that they can describe their own practice. Still,
these empirical observations do not automatically validate a representational framework. The
fact that we think in a language when we perform “self-talk” does not entail that all cognition
follows some sort of syntactical structure.
It is tempting to think that activities such as dance rely on complex movement
representations that are systematically organized since most dancing follows a dance system.
Dance systems have a syntax of execution; for example, in most cases, there is an ordering of
how, where, and when steps can be performed. So we can critically evaluate dance and think
about dance through declarative memory; for example, I can tell you that the Six-Step ThreeStep combination requires raising the hip and is usually done with a Sweep transition. Still,
knowing-that does not equate to knowing-how. I assume that most of my readers are not
breakdancers, yet they can know that to switch from the Six-Step to the Three-Step, you
typically need a Sweep. Even so, having this knowledge does not tell us anything about how the
body achieves such a feat.
Calvo-Merino and the Mirror Neuron System
Calvo-Merino is well known in the dance world for a series of experiments that compared
the mirror neuron activity of dancers to those of non-dancers. Across a series of experiments,
Calvo-Merino and colleagues have found that dancers have increased mirror neuron activity
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when observing dance movements with which they are familiar (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005;
Calvo-Merino et al., 2008; Calvo-Merino et al., 2006; Christensen & Calvo-Merino, 2013).
Nonetheless, dancers did not have increased mirror neuron activity when watching unfamiliar
movements. As a control, non-dancers also did not have increased mirror neuron activity when
watching dance.
Calvo-Merino argues that this observed mirror neuron effect takes place because motor
representations are used by mirror neurons both when executing movements and observing those
movements: “We seem to code external motor events through our own motor repertoire” (ibid,
202). Thus, dancers (and other domain-specific experts) are not only experts at performing their
craft; they are also experts at perceiving the craft.
Additionally, the studies performed by Calvo-Merino, and others in the mirror neuron
literature, supposedly support the idea that when observing movements, we run an internal
simulation of those movements. On such a view, readiness for action and observing action
involves the brain running a simulation of what will happen when the movement is executed by
the agent (ibid, 200). This theory is supported by the idea that seeing others move also increases
the action readiness of the required muscular neurons required to execute those same movements
(Fadiga et al., 1995). Hence, this framework is built around the brain running constant motor
simulations using motor representations. However, before we continue, it is worth taking a look
at Calvo-Merino’s own definition of a motor representation:
Nowadays, a motor representation is understood as a dynamic unit that can be modified by
experience. This representation is the core of an assembly of relationships between different
sensory and motoric components. An action representation encompasses internal or mental
content related to intention to act, action goals, or the knowledge of either physical or more
general consequences of a given action, as well as the covert neural operations that are
supposed to occur before an action begins, and the physical implementation of motor
commands into the muscles…. Therefore, an action is the observable outcome of previous
internal information processing stages (Jeannerod, 1997). Finally, the elements that compose
action representation should not really be considered as independent components, but as a
network of different nodes where all are related at cognitive and neural levels. (Calvo-Merino
2019, 195)
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The account developed here can be read as a form of weak embodiment; representational, but
many of the representations are about the body. Nevertheless, this definition of representation is
so underspecified that it can just as easily be co-opted to fit into an enactivist framework based
around sensorimotor schemes. If motor representation really just means “a dynamic unit” or a
“network of nodes” at the core of various processes, then there is no reason why we can’t just
explain cognition in terms of these processes themselves rather than representation.
Representations on this picture are akin to Dennett’s “center of gravity,” they are a useful fiction
that we deploy to easily speak of processes of immense complexity (Dennett, 1991; 1992).
The problem is that Calvo-Merino invokes the notion of content; I will not repeat my earlier
criticisms or the general enactivist critiques of content (Hutto & Myin, 2013; 2017). Nonetheless,
it is worth noticing that the way content is being used here is also underspecified. If content is
taken to be used in the classic philosophy of mind sense, then I have already provided reasons for
why this does not work. On the other hand, content, in this case, could also be taken to simply
mean a pattern of neuronal activation that corresponds to some aspect of a physical movement. If
content is simply covariance between environment and patterns of neuronal activation, then we
can just as easily speak of embodied self-organization—the empirical observation support either
explanation. Saliently, if we apply Occam's Razor, then representations clearly lose out to a
dynamics explanation since representations require an inflated ontology.
The real issue is the claim that mirror neuron activity equates to inner simulations. If we go
with an inference to the best explanation, then we are similarly justified in arguing that the
mirror neuron and muscle readiness potential processes that take place during movement
observation are a matter of bodies synchronizing with one another for constant attunement and
engagement. We can, in other words, just as easily and credibly describe mirror neuron and
muscle activation as a dynamical systems process in which bodies synchronize or resonate for
ongoing smooth interaction. Again, the empirical evidence points as much in the enactivist
direction as the representationalist direction. Thinking of Occam’s razor, we need to consider
which explanation provides the least theoretical and ontological inflation.

Arguments From the Literature on Expert Performance
The enactivist distributed control model I have provided of dance improvisation has
consequences for a number of other fields both inside and outside of dance, one being the field of
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expert performance studies. Within the sub-field of expert performance, there is a long-standing
debate whether expertise is characterized by automatization or by explicit attention (Schear,
2013). On the side of automaticity, philosophers and cognitive scientists have long argued that
expert action is fully automatized; that is, expert action is automatic, unconscious, and largely
pre-rehearsed (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Masters et al., 1993). The
general gist of these views is that experts do not need to explicitly think about their actions, and
when they do, this is a detriment to the performance (Beilock, 2010; Beilock & Gray, 2007; Ford
et al., 2005). Fitts and Posner, for example, argue that novice dancers think explicitly about their
steps. As the dancer gains expertise, less attention and finally no attention is paid to the steps
(Fitts & Posner, 1967).
On the other side of the debate, theorists have argued that expert performance is
characterized by and benefits from conscious and deliberate attention. Most famously,
professional ballet dancer and philosopher Barbara Gail Montero argues that expert performance,
especially dance, is characterized by effortful conscious attentional processes (Montero, 2013;
2016; 2019; 2010). Montero points out that we have a pervasive myth within popular culture that
expertise is automatic, popularized by books such as Zen in the Art of Archery and the Nike
slogan “Just Do It” and countless other manifestations of the myth of automatization.
Furthermore, Montero (2016) rightfully points out that most of the empirical studies on expertise
and attention do not measure the effect of explicit attention on one’s actions. Rather such studies
measure the impact of doing unrelated tasks and being distracted (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock &
Carr, 2004; Beilock, 2010; Ford et al., 2005). An argument echoed in Cappuccio et al.’s recent
review article of literature on self-attention and choking (Cappuccio et al., 2019). Montero,
through introspection, without claiming to do phenomenology, interviews with professional
athletes and dancers, argues that expert action is characterized by higher-order processes such as
strategizing, deliberating, intending, monitoring, and so forth. It is important to understand that
Montero is not arguing that all processes in expert performance are conscious and explicitly
monitored, but rather that the expert, especially the expert dancer, often utilizes higher-order
processes while performing. In consequence, expert performance might be characterized by high
skill, but it is not effortless.
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Furthermore, Montero points out (and I agree) that post-performance amnesia is not an
indication that performance was executed automatically or mindlessly (Montero, 2019). Many
people often experience not remembering their drive after having commuted to or from work.
This does not mean that they were not attentive while driving. Rather, Montero argues, postperformance amnesia is a matter of memory processes, not of attention during the performances.
Logically speaking, it is simply invalid to draw an inference from the attention paid during
execution to how much of the experience is remembered. For example, it is fully possible that
cognitive resources in high-stakes expert performance are being utilized at the execution of
action itself and, therefore, not on memory. Inferring that lack of memory means lack of explicit
awareness does not follow since we have plenty of examples in which we either remember
something we did not pay attention to or forget things we did pay attention to (conveyor belt
work at a factory and the driving case being respective examples).
Recently, as an expansion of Montero’s view, several theorists within cognitive science
and philosophy have argued for a view of expert performance involving a meshed architecture
(Christensen et al., 2016; Gallagher & Varga, 2020; Høffding & Satne, 2019; Sutton et al.,
2011). The overarching idea is that cognition during expert performance utilizes a blend of
conscious, sub-personal, and pre-reflective processes. Each of these processes interacts and
causally impacts each other in real-time. The expert dancer both engage in direct automatized
environmentally embedded actions, while also from time to time, actively strategizing,
monitoring, planning, intending, etc. Hence, expert performance should be seen as a holistic
achievement of various processes- some being more explicit and effortful than others.
At this point, it should be clear that the enactive distributed control thesis of dance
improvisation I have provided fits pretty well with the meshed architecture approach. My model
utilizes affordance interaction, dynamical self-organization, and distal intention and is committed
to dynamical causal interaction between the various level of explanation. Especially appealing to
affordance demonstrates that the question of attention should not be cast in a good/bad binary.
“Attention” during expert performance is a shorthand for a slew of attentional processes across
various degrees of awareness and across various time scales (Cappuccio et al., 2019). Therefore,
we cannot simply think of self-attention as being good or bad for the process of expert
performance. A dancer and experts generally pay attention to affordances at various levels of
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interaction. Some affordances are more meta-level, such as overarching strategic affordances in a
game of chess or basketball, while other affordances are more direct and in the moment (such as
seeing an opening for a dribble or an opportunity for a fancy partner spin). Attention is a
multifaceted concept, some affordances we interact with explicitly, and others are handled purely
pre-reflectively or sub-personally.
The Problem of Self-Attention
Recently Cappucio et al. (2019) have argued that self-awareness is detrimental to expert
performance after all and that the phenomenon is simply more multifaceted than previous
accounts of sports choking. According to Cappuccio and colleagues, choking can happen to an
athlete due to a number of embodied affective and perceptual processes and due to psychological
states related to the narrative and social self. For example, an athlete might experience increased
anxiety when they feel that their social standing in the community is on the line or that their
identity as an athlete is being threatened. This is a form of narrative appraisal of the athlete's
situation that brings the athlete's attention back inwards instead of out at the situation at hand,
resulting in decreased performance. Similarly, Cappuccio and colleagues survey the slim
perceptual literature on choking and indicate that there is some initial evidence that athletes can
experience task-related objects such as a baseball as being smaller or obfuscated when under
pressure, resulting in a decrease in performance. If the athlete emotionally appraises a situation
as being a threat, a form of self-awareness in relation to the situation, then the athlete’s
perceptual processes can be affected.
The overarching point for Cappuccio and colleagues is to argue that various forms of
contextually sensitive forms of self-awareness can be detrimental to expert performance. While
much of this argument might be true of competitive sports, the argument and its data become
frustrated when looking at dance and improvisational dance. Cappucio and colleagues argue that
expert performance, in general, is highly likely diminished by a range of forms of selfawareness, especially forms of self-awareness that pay close attention to sensorimotor skills that
are normally close to being automatic and pre-reflective in action (Execution Focus Theory).
However, the empirical data on dance improvisation pushes back on this updated account of
Execution Focus Theory.
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Many improvisational dance forms, contact improvisation being a very obvious case,
involve paying close attention to the body in every movement. Kent De Spain, for example,
describes experiencing the body as having its own intentionality during dance improvisation (De
Spain, 2003).
In general, contact improvisers report that the dance is best executed when participants
pay close attention to their entire body and their partners (Kimmel et al., 2018). Additionally,
Montero calls our attention to famous cases of ballet dancers whose performances (hailed as
excellent by critics) suffered performance amnesia exactly because they were fully focused on
their bodies (Montero, 2019). Others have pointed out that the virtuosity of dance often is
brought about by deliberatively focusing one’s attention inwards towards the body. Former
professional dancer and philosopher Renee Conroy reminds us of the various conditions that
might hinder dance performance unless the dancer explicitly turns their attention towards the
body:
The dancer may be required to sustain difficult balances en pointe, to execute athletic
sequences of lifts, or to gracefully chasse and jete in a prohibitively heavy costume that
drags on the floor while also being effectively blinded by bright sidelights and traveling
spots. thus to do her job safely and with even a modicum of artistic aplomb, the dancer
must be constantly sensitive to the internal factors that affect the quality of her own
movements. (Conroy, 2012, 162. Emphasis in original)
Part of Conroy’s point is that dancers have a dual task. They must constantly be sensitive to
executing their movements and also how such movements appear as expressions to the audience
or dance partners. Dance attention then is both inward and outward directed simultaneously
without detriment to the performance. As Conroy goes on to say: “It is a shared understanding
among dancers that accessing the artistic power of dance requires a unique kind of focus on the
body as it is consciously directed through the minefield of performance conditions” (ibid, 162).
From years of personal experience, I concur that dance performance benefits from a recursive
form of dual attention both on the body and the environment.
In fact, despite various approaches, several dance phenomenologists report that paying
close attention to the body during improvisation brings out improved performance and increased
creativity (Midgelow, 2018; Sheets-Johnstone, 1966; 2011; Wait, 2019). We can think back to
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our earlier discussion of Sheets-Johnstone describing the improvisational moment as an ongoing
awareness of what possibilities (affordances) are available to the body at each minuscule
moment. Furthermore, we must remember Susanne Ravn’s empirical findings (from interviewing
Kit Johnson and other professional dancers), that all dance is done with keen attention towards
how the body is feeling that day (Ravn, 2020). These observations are corroborated by
improviser and phenomenologist Sally Doughty, who describes peak dance improvisation as
intense attention towards the body as the body is opening itself towards the world (Doughty,
2018). Attention during dance then involves multiple layers of attention, several of which are
directed inwards, as the title of Doughty’s article aptly describes “I Notice that I am Noticing.”
In other words, the improvisational dancer not only pays attention to the body but also, at times,
takes a meta-perspective on their own experience in a manner similar to mindfulness practices
(ibid, 127-128). We see this also in Goldman’s investigation of the social conditions that create
improvisation in mambo; in mambo, how various social roles and identities bring the attention
back onto the body in improvisation (Goldman, 2010). Finally, one of the generally agreed-upon
benefits of dance therapy is that dance takes the participant’s attention away from higher-order
“disembodied” thinking and brings them back into contact with the body (Kronsted, 2018; Lilly
et al., 2016; Solveig & Sabine, 2017).
I do not disagree with Cappuccio and colleagues (2019) that there are many social,
affective, and narrative factors that can negatively impact performance. Even so, the claim that
self-awareness of one’s movement execution process is detrimental to all expert performance
cannot hold. The case of dance improvisation demonstrates that many simultaneous forms of
self-awareness, including awareness of one’s movement execution, do not have to be a detriment
to performance. In fact, such self-awareness can be a catalyst for increased creativity and
technical finesse. If the attention deficit theories such as the execution focus theory were correct,
we simply should not be seeing the types of reports that we do when investigating high-level
dance improvisation.
Part of the difference in the analysis could be because Cappuccio and colleagues only
review the literature on competitive sports, but not expressive sports (such as competitive dance),
or simply just non-competitive and/or expressive activity. While I know of no such research, I
would not be surprised if there are empirically measurable differences in the detriment or
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benefits of self-awareness in competitive versus non-competitive activities and between
expressive versus non-expressive activities.
In reviewing the literature on the attentional focus effect, Wulf also argues that attention
on the external objects and the external result of movement is always better for an athlete than
focusing on a body part or focusing internally (Wulf, 2013). Wulf claims: “If movements are not
planned in terms of the intended movement effect, but in terms of specific body movements, the
outcome will always be less-than-optimal … [and] learning/improving will be less-than-optimal”
(Wulf, 2016, 338). However, this assertation comes from a flawed methodology and does not
square up with the nature of dance improvisation. As Montero et al. (2019) point out, and after
having read these studies, I agree, recent literature on the attentional focus effect defines internal
and external attention differently from what they actually empirically measure (see Wulf 2013
for review). These studies do not stay consistent in what counts as internal and external focus.
The studies purport to measure one type of internal, external attention but measure something
else entirely. For example, one study by Abdollahipour et al. (2015) claimed to measure the
difference between internal and external focus by having gymnasts pay attention to an arrow
glued to their chest while performing a backflip with a one-eighty degree turn (the external
conditions). For the internal condition, those gymnasts were asked to pay attention to their hands
during the flip. Paying attention to one’s chest versus paying attention to one's hands can hardly
be partitioned into an internal, external distinction. As someone who has performed a great many
complicated flips in my career, I can attest that in flips with a twist, both the chest, torso, and
arms are all involved in completing the flip. Paying attention to either hands or chest are both
internal forms of focus.
In debates on internal and external focus, the problem goes further than simply bad
experimental design. The claim we saw above that planning to do specific movements rather
than planning on their effects is always detrimental to performance clashes with dance
improvisation. As I demonstrated in chapter four, dancers do set a number of distal intentions as
they perform. There is an interplay between direct engagement with affordances and setting
distal intentions to modify the landscape of affordances. Part of setting distal intentions in dance
is deciding on specific movements ahead of their execution. For example, in many American
competitive improvisational dances such as breakdancing, locking, popping, house, and hip-hop,
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it is common knowledge amongst practitioners that master improvisers often rely on sets or minisets. Sets or mini-sets are short ready-mades that the dancers can deploy or execute
automatically. Many expert improvisers, as we also saw in Kimmel et al. on contact
improvisation (2018), rely on sets as distinct movement blocks they can move in and out of. In
other words, improvisers often plan a series of specific movements that they want to perform, but
the paths between those distally intended movements lay open. Consequently, the phenomenon
of dance improvisation counteracts the idea that planning specific movements is always
detrimental to performance. Here is a clear case of an embodied high skill praxis in which socalled internal attention and movement planning can benefit performance.
Furthermore, as Montero and colleagues point out, taking an enactivist approach
seriously calls into question the distinction between internal and external performance (Montero
et al., 2019). Since the environment and the body are both always part and parcel of cognition,
any attentional process will always contain those elements to varying degree. I agree with that
assessment and want to take it further; while it is true that we as agents can direct our attention,
there are always pre-reflective components to attention. Attention, by definition, always includes
foreground and a background (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012), and as we direct our attention,
various entities and processes move in and out of the background foreground. Still, these objects
do not disappear completely. This is especially the case in dance. Even when trying to pay close
attention to the somatic states of one’s body while dancing, the music, and the environment play
a role in how this attention is being executed. This is so since the attention is facilitated by
movement and especially by the music. Dancing is always a product of how the body feels, and
it's pairing with music and the environment. While various objects and entities can move in and
out of the foreground-background, attention (at least in dance improvisation) is always a holistic,
connected experience. The attentional focus effect is misguided, at least for some domains, such
as dance, because internal, external attention is not the correct way of partitioning the concept of
attention. Any time a dancer is paying close attention to their body, they must do so by also
paying attention to the environment, and whenever the attention is directed outwards at the
environment, this is done by also paying attention to the body (see Figure 25).
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Figure 25 - Attention in dance improvisation is a dynamic process in which the environment
modulates how the dancer pays attention to the body, and the body modulates how the dancer
pays attention to the environment. At any given moment, for dance improvisation to be
successful, it must contain simultaneous inwards and outwards attention. Dance improvisation is
characterized by the ongoing shifting of the body and the environment between foreground and
background. However, neither are ever completely outside the field of attention.
As Ann Cooper Albright points out, to be successful, the dancer must embody
expressions, feelings, symbols, and more, and this requires paying close attention to the minute
proprioceptive and kinesthetic details of one’s body (Albright, 1997). But importantly,
understanding what the body is expressing is also to pay attention to the environment and, to
some degree, putting oneself into the perspective of the environment (audience, other dancers,
video cameras, etc.). This claim is interestingly supported by empirical research that
demonstrates that students undergoing dance training have higher empathy scores because they
learn to pay attention to themselves through the eyes of an audience (Deans, 2016; Tembrioti,
2014).
In other words, during improvisational dance, the environment modulates how we pay
attention to our body, and in turn, the body strongly modulates what we pay attention to in the
environment. This process is recursive and cannot neatly be separated into two different acts but
are rather co-occurring.

Summary of the Model and Looking Ahead
I have argued for an enactivist account of vernacular improvisational dance; the distributed
control thesis based on dynamical systems and affordances. The model relies on sensorimotor
schemes, bodily attunement, and dynamical self-organization (see Figure 26). Since vernacular
dances are forms of life, during distributed control, dancers are heavily scaffolded by the
enveloping and regulating nature of the shared dance background. I have provided this model as
an alternative to conventional philosophy of mind and action theory since I have shown that
these frameworks are inadequate when it comes to vernacular improvisational dance.
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Figure 26 - We see the autonomous dynamical dance system embedded into the dance
background, which is further embedded into the massive hermeneutical background. Notice that
the boundaries between these spheres are semipermeable.
Again, the overall takeaway from the distributed control thesis is that vernacular dance is an
emergent system, and in such a system, the agency is highly distributed. Our everyday language
of describing the control of our actions does not neatly map onto vernacular improvisational
dance. Instead, we should think of dance improvisation as being constituted by a form of
controlled non-control; dancers are both highly regulating the emergent system and being highly
regulated by that system simultaneously.
In the next chapter, I will survey some of the cognitive science and philosophy literature
on joint action. As part of my inadequate framework thesis, I will object to the conventional
representational literature on joint action. I will furthermore expand the distributed control thesis
by demonstrating how the literature on alignment in joint action can help us further understand
group improvisational dance. This literature will especially help us understand the role of shared
attention in vernacular improvisational dance.
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6. Joint Action and Improvisational Dance
Joint action is ubiquitous throughout human life. From our very first moments, throughout
ontogeny, most learning practices, the workplace, our main mode of communicating, and of
course dance, all are characterized by joint action. Yet, research on joint action is in the grand
span of things relatively new. Only within the last thirty years have action theory and cognitive
science truly embraced the “social turn.” Thus, many philosophical accounts of joint action and
many experimental paradigms in cognitive science still wrestle with residue from the
individualized and neo-cartesian approach to cognition. In this chapter, I have three overarching
goals:
First, as part of the Inadequate Framework Thesis, I will demonstrate that the cognitive
science literature on joint action does not support a representational theory of the mind. Instead,
the empirical literature on joint action supports an embodied non-representational account of the
mind and can therefore be seen to support the distributed control thesis.
Second, I will show that the philosophical literature on joint action doesn’t quite capture
the phenomenon of improvised vernacular dance since such dance often shifts in and out of
various kinds of jointness. While the joint action literature does describe many kinds of social
activities, dance tends to morph between various forms of joint activity, frequently at a fast pace.
Joint action in dance is then better understood as a spectrum that morphs between degrees and
types of jointness.
Third, I will expand on the distributed control thesis by utilizing resources from the
cognitive science and the philosophy of joint action. In vernacular dance improvisation
alignment, group identification, and shared attention, highly scaffold the dancers shared
landscape of affordances. Such scaffolding and harmonization of affordances facilitate the
perpetuation and increasing ease of the interaction. Especially shared attention is critical for
smooth improvisational dance interaction.
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Joint Action – The Cognitive Science Approach
The Co-Monitoring Framework
Research on joint action has rapidly expanded within the last two decades. Rather than making
inferences from experiments conducted on individuals to the realm of social cognition, cognitive
science is now acknowledging interaction as a primary level of analysis (Yamaguchi, Welsh et
al., 2019). Rather than thinking of social interaction as solo cognition times two, joint action is
now being investigated in terms of mechanisms that are uniquely social.
Despite the social turn, it is important to understand (as we will see shortly) that cognitive
science still tends to posit parallel systems and parallel explanations. On these accounts, there are
largely separate mechanisms in the mind for joint action and solo action. Instead of reversing the
order to make social action primary and solo action secondary, much of cognitive science tends
to posit parallel systems and, therefore, parallel sets of explanation when looking at solo and
joint action. Consequently, it is a latent assumption in much cognitive science that revisions are
not needed for accounts of solo action considering advances made on joint action. This, however,
can be seen as a puzzling approach since our very first actions, and in fact, most of our actions as
human beings, are social actions.
Within cognitive science, joint action is typically defined broadly as an interaction where
individuals coordinate their activity for the sake of environmental changes (Sebanz et al., 2006).
Within this definition, joint action is typically carved into planned coordination and emergent
coordination (Knoblich et al., 2011, 59). In planned coordination, subjects must adhere to plans,
predictions, and shared representations of goals. In emergent coordination, the interaction is
typically characterized by the interactions themselves rather than adhering to action plans, shared
representations, and the like. For example, agreeing to hang a mirror on the wall together or
playing “Killing In The Name Of” with your garage band are instances of planned coordination.
To play a rock classic together, each member must have near-identical representations of what
the song ought to sound like, their individual task when playing, and the tasks of others (I am the
bassist, you are on guitar, Agatha does the lyrics, etc.). In contrast, concert-goers crowd surfing
an audience member to the stage during a wild song is an example of emergent coordination.
There is no pre-planned goal; not all members of the audience share the same goal or have the
same representations of what they or others are supposed to do. Rather, the coordination emerges
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out of the situation. Naturally, shared goals, task representations, joint intentionality, and other
structuring concepts can develop during emergent coordination. These are often not present at
the beginning of the interaction but are typically be generated and vanish as the interaction
continues.
On the Knoblich and Sebanz framework, much of what I have described regarding
improvisational dance would be considered emergent coordination. In effect, dance
improvisation often falls somewhere in between emergent and planned coordination. A group of
people might agree to practice their breakdancing together. This means following a set of norms
for how the practice is conducted, how it starts, and when it stops. Furthermore, there are
prespecified norms and plans regarding who controls the music, who dances with who, and when
and how to complete different practice forms (power move practice, “cypher” practice, battle
practice, and other forms). Nonetheless, much of the coordination within these planned forms is
still emergent from the participant's activity. That is, the joint coordination emerges from the
participants as they dance.
When studying emergent and planned coordination, the cognitive science on joint action
has rightly identified a number of high-level and low-level processes that are simultaneously at
play during joint action: shared task representation, shared attention, prediction, shared plans,
and others (Obhi & Sebanz, 2011; Vesper et al., 2017). Often, cognitive scientists interested in
joint action offer models for the individual cognitive mechanisms that they study. One
mechanism might be proposed for joint attention (Tomasello et al., 2005) and another
mechanism for shared goal development and intensification (Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011).
However, unified theories of joint action are harder to come by. As a recent review article
argues, cognitive science of joint action is still plagued by the problem of six blind men and the
elephant: each research team is looking at their own limited corner of the phenomenon without
stepping back to see the problem as a whole (Yamaguchi et al., 2019).
Over the years, Sebanz and Knoblich have developed a generalized account of joint
action centered around internal mental modeling, monitoring, and shared task representation in
joint action. On this framework, agents are able to align themselves with each other during joint
tasks (both planned and emergent) by comparing their own internal model of the task at hand
with a prediction of how their partners will act. Importantly for Sebanz, Knoblich, and
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colleagues, philosophical frameworks centered around language, propositional attitudes, and
shared intentions can account for long term cooperation in which agents are separated by time
and space, but such a model cannot account for the moment-to-moment interactions of joint
action (Vesper et al. 2010, 998).
Unlike dynamical systems modeling that takes coordination to be an example of general
universal organization principles, Sebanz, Knoblich, and colleagues argue that there are
mechanisms in the mind, specifically for the sake of joint action (Vesper et al., 2010). For
example, when paring experts, musicians with novices experts were able to adjust their timing to
fit the uneven pace of novices (Wolf et al., 2018). Knoblich and colleagues argue that this is due
to the expert building an internal model of how a score is supposed to be executed and an error
matrix of the novice to compare it to. In their view, human agents generate internal “self and
other” oriented representational models of joint tasks. Such models allow for the monitoring of
self and other agents to predict what will occur next and how the agent should act (Wolf et al.,
2018). For example, in a game of basketball, each agent must perpetually update a model of what
their teammates ought to do and where they ought to be on the field. Further, this model must be
constantly compared to where the teammates actually are and predictions of how they will
probably act. This, in turn, allows the agent to make inferences about how to move down the
court, when to pass, and when to go for the dunk.
Another example of cognitive science positing representational task monitoring models
for joint tasks comes from the “Simon Effect.” The Simon Effect is purported to demonstrate the
idea that agents in joint tasks represent not only their own tasks but also the tasks of their partner.
The Simon Effect occurs when in an experimental setting, a subject is asked to click a button or
withhold clicking dependent on a signal (for example, green dot means click, red dot means
withhold). On such go/no-go tasks, subjects have a significant delay in response time if the go
signal is presented spatially on the opposite side of where the corresponding button is placed. In
joint Simon tasks, two agents sit next to each other. The Simon Effect is produced if a signal
meant for one agent appears on the side of the screen of the other agent. If agent A is supposed to
click when a green dot appears, having the green dot appear on agent B’s side of the screen
significantly delays agent A’s response time.
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Joint Simon tasks and joint Simon effects are purported to show that agents represent
their own task and the task of the other agent. When signals are mixed up, the agent must check
their representation of what they are supposed to do and what the other agent is supposed to be
doing before acting, leading to the slowing down of reaction time (Sebanz et al., 2003). The core
notion is that if agents were not representing the tasks of the other agents, then there would be no
lack in reaction time, even when their own signal appears on the side of the screen belonging to
the other agent. Further, studies have shown the joint Simon effect to disappear during
competition, when participants are only monitoring themselves in order to win (Mendl et al.,
2018). In general, the Joint Simon Effect and joint Simon task framework have been reproduced
and remain popular in cognitive science (Baess et al., 2018; Dolk et al., 2014; Karlinsky et al.,
2019; Kiernan et al., 2012; Sahaï et al., 2019). Across various, experiments the general notion is
that the slow-down in reaction time occurs because cooperating agents need to represent whether
or not reacting on a current stimulus is their task or the task of the other agent.
It is worth noting that several authors have questioned the validity of the Joint Simon task
method or questioned the interpretation of their results (Dittrich et al., 2012; Dolk et al., 2014;
Prinz, 2015; Yamaguchi, Wall, et al., 2019). Thus, the field is far from homogeneous when it
comes to the question of co-representation. Furthermore, across the literature on corepresentation, there are hardly any descriptions or definitions of what it means to “represent.”
Representation could mean contentful-discrete-mental-items in the philosophy sense, or
alternatively (and more likely); that participants monitor each other’s tasks, goals, intentions,
etc., and when doing so, we can correlate such results with patterns of neuronal activity. In this
loose fashion, representation can be defined functionally (in this case, the monitoring of the other
participants), and it is simply asserted that this activity is often followed by a fairly fixed,
localizable pattern of neuron activation. Put differently; the word representation is again
deployed as a loose metaphor for what subjects are doing and not what items might exist in their
minds (Gambi et al., 2015).
For example, experimental literature has shown that agents continually attempt to
anticipate what their partners are about to say. If a confederate continually utter things against
what is anticipated, response times on various picture recognition tasks are diminished (Brehm et
al., 2019). Put colloquially, if a partner is saying nonsensical things about the pictures on their
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screen, it becomes harder for participants to correctly recognize pictures on their own screen.
Such results are taken to indicate that cooperators monitor their partner's tasks and what they
anticipate them doing in relation to those tasks. Consequently, response time is diminished
because the agent needs to weigh the incoming incongruent data against their mental
representation of how the partner is anticipated to act (Gambi et al., 2015).
While this data does further support that joint action often includes monitoring other
agent's tasks and anticipation, the data does not necessarily support a strong notion of
representation. This data could just as well be interpreted to indicate that co-agents monitor one
another and have anticipation - without invoking a full-blown mental model or the
philosophically dense notion of representation. Nothing about the behavior of monitoring other
people necessitate that agents build inference-rich mental models or that there are discrete
contentful mental items that must be computed over. Rather what such experiments and many
experiments like them demonstrate is that agents are directly sensitive to what others are doing.1
Such sensitivity to group members can be cashed out in terms of automated comportment
processes, synchronization, cultural scaffolding from the massive hermeneutical background, and
the physical dynamics embedded into intentionality. Narrative practices and basic gaze tracking
also aid in aligning the agent towards the common task with their co-agents. In general, the
enactivist distributed control thesis already contains all the resources to have a nonrepresentational account of monitoring. Through the dynamics of self-organization in social
interaction, our comportment and attention automatically become directed at our tasks and other
agents. Hence, no need to build costly mental models for each social situation.
We must remember that vernacular dances are forms of life (The Form of Life Thesis).
When we dance, agents are already enveloped in a rich hermeneutical dance background that
regulates the dancer’s bodies towards specific relationships of monitoring and attunement
towards each other. The hermeneutical background scaffold the dance participants into certain

1

While direct perception is its own subfield in the philosophy of mind investigating it here will take us outside the
scope of the dissertation.
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relationships of readiness to act, sensitivity towards others, and social affordances. Hence, there
is no need for a complex mental model.
Furthermore, the conclusion that Simon Effects mean that agents are monitoring each
other's tasks as a mental model is an invalid leap in reasoning. In Simon Task experiments, the
slowdown of reaction time could just as well happen since each agent is expecting the signal to
appear on their side of the screen because it has done so in the past. Additionally, the slow down
in reaction time when the dot appears on the other side can also be attributed to the agent waiting
to see if their partner presses the button. Knowing that my partner has been asked to press a
button on the appearance of specific stimuli and waiting to see if they do so does not equate to
monitoring or simulating my partner’s task.
In dance improvisation, many interactions (especially in dances that have a developed
dance system) rely on a stable predictive relationship between movements and responses. For
example, when the lead initiates a turn in salsa, they have expectations for what the follower will
do, namely, complete the turn. Furthermore, when doing the turn, the lead will typically monitor
how the partner completes the turn so that they can both continue smoothly. Even so, this does
not entail that the dancers have a “mental model” of the movement. Rather, there are
proprioceptive, kinesthetic, visual, auditory expectations for how such movements should feel,
look, and sound. Such expectations develop with practice and expertise and are directly involved
in the action-perception loops of our engagement with the world. As the phenomenological
tradition tells us, all acts of consciousness involve an element of protention, which is a form of
prediction of what ought to happen (Husserl, 1991). Furthermore, when we are engaged in a
social activity, we develop a sense of intercorporeity, a shared sense of each other's bodies,
which does contain a form of monitoring of the shared body (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Our actions
are, in one way or another, always directed at the future. But for all that, such attunement to the
world need not involve a model. Instead, it can be thought of in terms of attunement to the world
stemming from the needs of our body (Colombetti, 2014; Maiese, 2016; Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
Built into our sensorimotor schemes of expertise (see chapter four) is not only expertise towards
completing the solicitation of affordances but also an automatic element of prediction and futureoriented attunement.
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If this sounds mysterious, let us first consider the skill of backcountry skiing. Going
down the slope smoothly is not only to angle one’s body to overcome the current bumps of cliff
and snow directly in front of oneself, but also to do so in a way that the skier will not crash in the
very next moment. Similarly, in dance, skillfully executing a step is not just to do the movement
but to do them in such a manner that the dance partner is scaffolded into a continuation of the
interaction. Thus, there is an element of anticipation in the structure of the movements
themselves. Furthermore, executing such movements right also means constantly setting one's
body up for what might be next perceptually and kinesthetically.
As we saw, part of the dynamics of the distributed control thesis is that sensorimotor
schemes are flexible and context-sensitive. Over time as human beings become enculturated, our
sensorimotor schemes also gain a built-in sensitivity towards the actions of other agents. Each
context type specified by the massive hermeneutical background adjust clusters of sensorimotor
schemes so that their execution is done with others in mind. In short, attention and monitoring of
others is built into the dynamics of sensorimotor scheme execution.
The very artificial experimental framework from cognitive science might demonstrate to
us that partner monitoring and expectation are present during joint action. This does not tell us
how these functions are carried out in ecological settings. Such experiments might lend
themselves towards a representational mental model framework of explanation because the
settings of the experiment are set up in this way. Hence, I contend that this literature is correct in
demonstrating that many joint action scenarios involve explicit or implicit monitoring of one’s
co-agents. But despite that, such monitoring takes place in a direct and world involving fashion.
As Thelen and Smith remind us when talking about the Watts Steam Governor (see chapter
four), all the intelligence is already built into the system itself through the way the parts relate to
one another (Thelen & Smith, 1994). Similarly, claiming that participants of joint action monitor
each other's actions and have expectations for those actions does not need to involve a
representational mental model. All the prediction is already happening, mechanically,
neurologically, hormonally, chemically, etc., across the system, that is, in the world itself. As
Brooks’ slogan tells us, the world is its own best model (Brooks, 1991).
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Goals, Self, and Others
On the Sebanz and Knoblich model, at minimum, for joint action to occur, agents must
realize that a desired goal cannot be completed without the aid of another agent (it is not clear if
realize is meant to be at the sub-personal or phenomenological level). Agents do not need to
understand the other as an intentional agent (in the theory of mind sense), as long as they can
represent their own task and the task of the other agent (Vesper et al., 2010, 999). Accordingly,
for joint action, agents constantly monitor the environment and update their three-tiered model:
the desired goal (that can only be achieved by self plus other), personal tasks, other’s tasks (ibid,
999). Some joint actions do not require the monitoring of all three aspects of the model; for
example, two people can operate a water bicycle without monitoring each other’s progress. Still,
in many joint actions, all three aspects of the model must be monitored by all agents involved to
be successful. In our basketball example, the agent must represent the desired goals; the ball to
the other side of the court, get the ball into the hands of a teammate in an advantageous position,
get the ball into the hoop. Furthermore, the agent must represent their own tasks, “I need to place
myself in an advantageous position,” “I need to pass the ball when I see an opening.” Finally, the
agent must keep track of the other player's tasks; “Beans is assigned defense and ought to stay
back, Hoang is playing an offensive position and ought to be front left,” and so on. In short, on
the Sebanz and Knoblich model, joint actions typically require the monitoring of goals, self,
others.
Since prediction plays an important role in the Sebanz and Knoblich model, agents must
make themselves more easily legible to their partners. So, during joint action, agents exaggerate
their gestures, change their body language (Garrod & Pickering, 2009; 2004), give explicit
commands (Clark, 2005), invent on the fly symbols (Galantucci, 2009), all to be more
predictable to the task representation of their partners (Vesper et al., 2010, 999). Predicting the
outcome of one’s own actions and predicting what a partner will do next, thus, is a matter of
computational inference that is smoothened by low-level embodied processes and high-level
implicit processes from each partner – what is dubbed coordination smoothers.
Joint action could, in principle, take place without the coordination smoothers since,
ultimately, joint action is a matter of representing, monitoring, and predicting. Put differently, on
this model; joint action is a matter of inference. Even with minimal coordination smoothing, joint
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action could still take place. For example, one study found no significant difference between
human-human joint coordination and human-computer interaction in a random number sequence
generating task. This result prompts the researchers to argue that social factors are not
determining factors in joint cognition but rather inference-based turn-taking patterns (Maehara et
al., 2019). In other words, coordination smoothers assist joint action but do not help constitute
joint action—the opposite conclusion of the enactive and dynamic theory I have presented so far.
To parse out the model, it is important to understand that on an enactive or dynamical
systems approach, “coordination smoothers” are ontologically part and parcel of joint action,
whereas, on the Sebanz and Knoblich model, coordination smoothers simply aid representational
inference. For example, representationalists Rocca and colleagues found that agents change the
way they refer to proximal and distal space when in social interaction (Rocca et al., 2019). When
alone, participants describe proximal objects as (this/here) and distal objects as (that/there) in
relation to the reach of their hand. In social interaction, however, participants modulate their use
of proximal and distal language in relation to the partner's reach. On a typical cognitive science
model (such as Rocca et al. 2019), these results are taken to indicate that the reach of each
agent’s arms must be represented separately. These separate representations can then aid central
processing (as coordination smoothers) in deciding what the agent will do next. Nonetheless, on
an enactivist or dynamical systems approach, the same data is purported to show that the very
physicality of coupled bodies produces the difference in language use. Again, on the standard
account, coordination smoothers merely aid central processing. On enactive dynamical systems
accounts, language is directly modulated by bodies and their physical interaction. One model
mimics a computer, the other an advanced resonance plate.2
Additionally, the Sebanz and Knoblich model includes the notion of action plans. In
general, agents during joint action represent their own and the goals of others while mentally
constructing and executing action plans (Sebanz et al., 2006). As we have seen, for Sebanz and
Knoblich, successful joint action is characterized by the ability “(i) to share representations, (ii)

2

A resonance plate is a thin metal plate hooked up to an electrical current that makes it vibrate at a given frequency.
If kitchen salt is placed on such a plate, the vibrations organize the kitchen salt into complex geometrical patterns.
There is no centralized control; the design happens purely from the dynamics of self-organization.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wvJAgrUBF4w
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to predict actions, and (iii) to integrate predicted effects of own and others’ actions” (Sebanz et
al., 2006, 70). Importantly, sharing representations entails having sufficiently similar mental
models, models that include a plan for how to proceed. As emergent or planned joint action
unfolds, agents must also adjust their representational model so that it, to the highest degree
possible, is identical to the mental model of their partners. In other words, successful joint action
is predicated on having identical plans for how to proceed. It can be helpful to think of two
people carrying a couch from the downstairs living room to the upstairs guest room. If agents
have different mental models of a plan of action, the couch-carrying adventure will quickly go
awry. As often happens in such situations, each agent will (through the help of coordination
smoothers) realize what the other agent is trying to make them do, and their plan representations
will begin to mirror. Even in high-speed interactions such as sports, part of the challenge is to
ensure that teammates roughly have the same plan of action as the interaction unfolds. For
example, in soccer, if I pass my friend the ball in the hopes that she will pass it back, but she
makes a sprint for a shot at the goal, our maneuver will likely fail.
Sebanz et al. acknowledge that children have the capacity for smooth joint action and
explicitly state that joint action, therefore, needs to be sufficiently simple (2006, 71). As a
solution, they appeal to the mirror-neuron system, referring to research that indicates that
watching others perform sensorimotor tasks activates brain areas typically associated with those
tasks in the agent and activates areas believed to be associated with planning (ibid, 72). The
literature on joint action generally asserts that;
Studies on co-representation have consistently shown that people have a strong tendency
to keep in mind what their co-actors need to be doing and monitor others’ performance,
even when this impairs their own task performance. (Obhi & Sebanz, 2011, 329)
In other words, agents monitor what their cooperators are doing to ensure that everyone is
adhering to the same mental model and same plan.
Issues with the Co-Monitoring Framework
The first issue with the Sebanz and Knoblich co-monitoring framework is that many joint actions
such as improvisational dance do not have a specific set of goals and therefore do not require a
specific plan. In fact, as Kimmel et al.’s research on contact improvisation demonstrates, having
a plan and trying to make other dancers stick to that plan is very detrimental to dance
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improvisation (Kimmel et al., 2018). Furthermore, as I mentioned, while it is true that dancers do
need to monitor each other as they carry out sub-tasks such as completing a turn or a dip, such
monitoring does not entail the presence of an overarching plan. In fact, the virtuosity of many
improvisational dances is exactly in not having a plan (Conroy, 2012). At each moment of
improvisation, the “task” morphs from second to second; thus, the overarching plan and all its
mental machinery proposed by Knoblich and Sebanz would have to change with each second of
the movements (leading us back to the computational burden problem from earlier).
Again, we can bring up the idea of teleological postponement. Dance movements,
especially with a partner, are often started without a specific goal or end state in mind. At each
moment of the unfolding of that movement (scale of seconds or milliseconds), that movement
can be directed in a new direction. So, while it is true that sometimes dancers set the intention to
create a certain shape, figure, gesture, or symbol, often these emerge out of the dancer's
exploration rather than being pre-planned. The same is true, even more so in group
improvisation. The problem then is that dancers do not need to utilize an action plan to perform
well, and dancers cannot develop an action plan for most of their movements since this would
involve constantly updating that plan since its goals are constantly shifting.
According to the joint action research, we have just surveyed even small disturbances or
changes in the execution of the plan (for example, the Simon Effect), require the agent to check
their mental model and therefore slows down reaction time. If this is the case, however,
improvisation should simply not be able to be executed at the speed at which it can be executed.
In part because agents would have to at each moment check their action plan, update the action
plan, confirm that the other agents have a similar action plan, and monitor their tasks. While this
might barely be possible with two people improvising, it is hard to see how this can be the
process responsible for groups of highly skilled agents improvising together. Put more simply, in
many forms of joint action, dance included, once considered in their ecological settings, the
Sebanz and Knoblich framework becomes far too cognitively demanding. Being cognitively
demanding, we should not be seeing young children engaging in sophisticated improvised
dancing, yet this is not an uncommon occurrence.
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Joint Goal Representation, Motor Representation, and One-Offs
Butterfill argues, along with Knoblich and Sebanz, that task and goal representation and
monitoring are crucial for joint action. Even so, Butterfill points out that there is a difference
between representing a goal in which each partner has to do the same thing to achieve the goal
jointly and goals in which partners have to perform different tasks to achieve the goal (Butterfill,
2016). In other words, the type of planning and representation required for joint agency is
different from the type of representation and planning required for parallel joint tasks. For
example, in one study Della Gatta and colleagues instructed subjects to either draw circles
together or to each draw circles by themselves (Della Gatta et al., 2017). In other words, in one
condition, participants were deliberately asked to work together on one design, whereas in the
other condition, participants were asked to do the same task in parallel. In both experimental
conditions, participants were able to see what the other person was doing.
Studies have shown that when drawing shapes, watching a confederate draw does not
impact the subject’s own ability to cleanly draw the same shapes (Garbarini et al., 2013; 2016).
Nevertheless, when subjects are instructed that they are drawing something together, suddenly
having visual access to the other person's actions impairs the subject’s ability to draw shapes
cleanly (Della Gatta et al., 2017). Consequently, Della Gatta and colleagues argue that this
decline in drawing ability is due to the increased cognitive cost of having to represent the goal of
the joint task. Similar to the Knoblich and Sebanz framework, performing a joint task with one
collective goal involves each agent having to use their theory of mind (either simulation or/and
theory theory) to build an internal model of the joint goal.
Further, Butterfill argues that many high-speed, high-precision one-off joint actions
require motor simulation and joint goal representation. For example, a complicated pass in
soccer or passing a loaded breakfast trey are examples of one-off joint actions requiring speed
and precision. These actions are not (according to Butterfill) based on rhythmic embodied
entrainment but a matter of one-time coordination (Butterfill, 2018, 70).
Butterfill utilizes the literature on motor representation and motor simulation. This
literature demonstrates that most motoric tasks are guided by anticipation. For example, the
strength at which an agent grips an egg is dependent on how far the agent expects having to carry
the egg (Kawato, 1999). Hence, consistently subjects grab the egg with a lighter grip when the
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egg is simply going a short distance from carton to bowl versus when the egg needs to be
transported across the room. In general, motoric action has been shown to involve this form of
anticipation, in which the goal and expected obstacles of the action seemingly dictates how
various variables such as grip, trajectory, speed, etc. are carried out (Rosenbaum, 2010).
Therefore, theorists have conducted experiments and argued that motor control is generally:
a. Guided by anticipatory processes.
b. Anticipatory processes are achieved through representations of goals and obstacles.

Not unlike the phenomenological claim that consciousness is guided in part by protention the
sub-personal processes of motor control are always adjusting the current execution in relation to
what is anticipated and the desired aim; and this process happens through rapid updating of
representations (Costantini et al., 2014; Daniel M. Wolpert et al., 2003; Gerben Rotman et al.,
2006; Johansson & Flanagan, 2003).
Motor representation, however, not only takes place during solo action. Butterfill argues
that one-off joint actions are characterized by agents using motor representations to anticipate the
actions of their co-agents in relation to the joint goal (butterfill, 2018, 71). For example, similar
to the mirror neuron system, studies have shown that the same systems involved in anticipation
of one’s own actions are involved when observing other agents carry out actions (Kourtis et al.,
2013).
Butterfill observes that joint actions that are guided by repetition and entrainment are
typically rapid and very precise. For example, musicians can entrain with almost no or little
difference in their actions. One-off actions, on the other hand, tend to be less precise, slower, but
more flexible. Think, for example, of the speed at which one person might pass a tray full of
breakfast items to another (perhaps across a kitchen island). Such an action (according to
Butterfill) is, while slower and more imprecise, open to more flexibility than typical entrainment
heavy joint actions. Thus, Butterfill argues that the trade-off between speed and precision, to
flexibility, comes from the mind having to conduct a motor simulation of the other person's
actions in relation to the joint goal, which must also be represented (Butterfill, 2018, 72). As
Butterfill argues:
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Motor representations can specify outcomes such as grasping or transporting a fragile
object, and even sequences of such outcomes (see, e.g. Fogassi et al. 2005). But they
cannot specify outcomes such as selecting an organic egg or testing for freshness: motor
processes and representations are mostly blind to things so distantly related to bodily
action. A further conjecture is that processes involving more abstract goal representations
typically (but not necessarily always) place greater demands on cognitive resources,
which typically (but not necessarily always) results in lower precision. (ibid, 72)
The more complex a joint action becomes, for example, if intentions and reasoning are also
needed, the more computationally demanding the joint action. Speed and precision in highly
complex joint action go down because they are more cognitively demanding. Thus, the cost of
flexibility is the loss of speed and precision. Most complex one-off joint action includes not only
motor simulation but also co-task representation, shared attention, and shared intentions.
Butterfill argues that actions such as smoothly executed group toast (clinking glass together
without spilling wine) could not happen at a rapid pace and precision because they are
representationally and computationally demanding.
In part, the demanding nature of one-of joint action comes from the idea that each agent
involved not only represent their portion of tasks involved in reaching the joint goal but that each
agent represents the entire motor plan of action:
One agent’s preparing (to some extent) to perform all of the actions that will comprise a
joint action ensures that the resulting motor plan for her actions will be constrained by
her motor plan for the others’ actions. And, given that she is sufficiently similar to the
others and that the possibilities for action are sufficiently constrained in their situation,
her motor plan for the others’ actions will reliably match their motor plans for their
actions. So one agent’s preparing to perform all of the actions has the effect that her
motor plan for her actions is indirectly constrained by the others’ motor plans for their
actions. (ibid, 76)
We learn that representing one’s own actions is not enough because that does not ensure that the
approach of all the agents involved will coherently mesh. In consequence, by having each agent
represent everyone’s tasks in relation to the joint goal, once own tasks in the plan is mutually
constrained by everyone’s tasks. Thus, while being more cognitively demanding because more
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must be represented, representing everyone’s task ensures coherent action through mutual
constraints. Again, the representational and computational demands of such a process are
supposed to explain why complex one-off joint action is flexible but slower and imprecise.
Importantly Butterfill specifies that representing a goal of an action includes representing
the type of action, its target, the manner in which the type of action is executed, and its relations
to other representations (Butterfill, 2019, 3). For example, a goal representation might include
the following; I-hit-the-ball-hard-to-score-a-home-run. Hitting the ball is the type of action, hard
is the manner in which the action is carried out, the ball is the target, and a home run is the
purpose of the action. In total, these characteristics and possible others must be in place when
representing a task or a goal.
Furthermore, Butterfill argues that having a complex goal representation automatically
also triggers representations of the expected outcome of the goal. This representation of the
expected outcome is constantly monitored and compared to incoming sensory stimulation (ibid,
12). The result of the updating from sensory stimulation compared to the expectation, in turn,
modulates the current goal representation. As agents track the goals of other agents, they can
update their “understanding” of what the agent is doing as the task is being carried out. Goal
representations are malleable so that mistakes, sudden changes, or other factors can modulate the
goal representation. On this model, running many goal representations at once during complex
joint actions can be quite cognitively demanding.
Finally, it is important to understand that Butterfill and colleagues further argue that task
representation and goal representation is often divided into representations of sub-tasks and subgoals (Clarke et al., 2019). The representations occurring during complicated one-off joint tasks
such as quick passes in sports are typically nested within goal tracking and task representation
regarding the larger task. Hence, sports contain representational goals and task tracking
processes that repeat and must cohere on the immediate time scale and the overarching time
scale of the activity.
Issues with the Butterfilll Approach
As we have seen, Butterfill argues that one-off joint action that typically happens within
the scale of seconds is more imprecise than entrainment tasks because they are not based on
repeated patterns. However, dance interactions are frequently a rapid series of one-off joint
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actions while being far more precise than the timescale of seconds. Rather these high precision
and high-speed actions happen within tens of a second. Yet, Butterfill argues that one-off joint
actions are supposedly slower and less precise because the agents must build anticipatory motor
representations of their partners actions and goals and adjust accordingly (Butterfill, 2018, 72).
Per contra, higher level dance is a clear example of a process that can contain many one-off
actions and happen at the speed and precision level that Butterfill finds unachievable for one-off
joint action. Evidently, vernacular improvised dance speaks directly against the argument of
inferential motor representation.
As we saw, Butterfill argues that each agent involved in one-off joint actions must
represent the tasks and trajectory of everyone involved in the action and their collective goal.
Again, the case of dance speaks against this argument. For improvisational dance, there is no
joint goal to represent, and there is no straightforward plan or tasks to represent. Each moment in
which a one-off joint dance sequence or move is performed, the agent would have to represent
everyone’s task and goal. No such goal is to be found in open-ended expressive and
meaningfully lose activities such as dance. Consequently, on the Butterfill model, the cognitive
system would not be able to act with others since there are no identifiable goals to move towards.
While one could argue that dance is a special case and therefore does not speak against
the general framework of joint action, it would be odd to posit that something as culturally
ubiquitous and in some sense mundane as dance would have its own separate cognitive
mechanisms. The vernacular improvisational dance case demonstrates that many joint one-off
tasks can achieve speed, precision, and flexibility. Nonetheless, such precision supposedly
should not be possible since goal and task representation is too cognitively demanding. Then we
are either forced to say that joint goal and task representation is not cognitively demanding or to
find a different explanation than task and goal representation.

The case of Interbrain synchronization – What Does It Tell Us About
Cognition in Joint Action?
As we have seen, the idea of shared representations, monitoring, and shared action plans play a
central role in standard cognitive science theories on joint action. As previously mentioned, the
notion of representation is invoked generously in this literature but often without explicit
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definition. Next, we will look at a blooming sub-field of neuroscience research that can help us
settle disputes in the cognitive science of joint action, namely interbrain synchronization.
What has been dubbed “second-person neuroscience” studies how brains mirror,
synchronize, and generally tend to behave similarly during human interaction. Interbrain
synchronization occurs when two or more agents engage in social activity or outright joint
action. In this phenomenon, neuron activation patterns fall into patterns amongst others of being
in-phase (mirroring), antiphase (opposite), or off phase (other patterns of synchronization). In
other words, when agents interact, lawful observable patterns of neuron activation occur across
brains (Dumas et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2020). However, it is crucial to keep in mind that these
mechanisms are separate from mirror neuron activation that typically has to do with observing
others' actions (Redcay & Schilbach, 2019). While mirror neuron activation can be involved in
interbrain synchronization, the point is that interbrain synchronization happens across various
areas of brains in social interaction, and not only during observation (Schilbach et al., 2013). For
example, studies have shown that on drawing tasks, when dyads are doing better on the task,
they have higher levels of interbrain synchronization (Cheng et al., 2019). Interbrain
synchronization takes place during handholding and has been shown to aid in pain mitigation
(Goldstein et al., 2018). Further, during an ongoing EGG study of actual college classrooms,
interbrain synchronization was higher during periods of high student engagement (Dikker et al.,
2017). In other words, the more engaged students are with a class, the more their brains engage
in similar neuron firing activity. Additionally, interbrain synchronization tends to be stronger
between romantic couples than strangers and stronger during and after periods of eye contact and
positive affect (Kinreich et al., 2017). Further, repeated eye contact and joint attention have also
been shown to increase interbrain synchronization (Swethasri Dravida et al., 2020). Finally, a
wealth of studies have repeatedly shown the presence of interbrain synchronization in
sensorimotor tasks and across sensorimotor areas of the brain (Repp & Su, 2013).
While interbrain synchronization is by now a well-documented phenomenon, it is not
clear what this body of research tells us regarding the cognitive structure of joint action. Similar
to joint Simon effect tasks or partner anticipation tasks, studies on interbrain synchronization do
not necessitate the existence of mental models or representations. For example, recent studies
show clear interbrain synchronization when participants engage in joint tasks in which the task
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itself is set up so that participants are forced to imagine what actions the other person needs to
perform (Astolfi et al., 2020). However, cleverly designing an experiment so that participants are
functionally forced to monitor their co-agents does not tell us anything about how that
monitoring is achieved. Assuming the existence of representations or a centralized mental model
from interbrain synchronization simply is a logical leap. From interbrain studies, we can rightly
infer that human bodies resonate and synchronize across a myriad of biological processes, one
such process being neuron activation. But despite this, neuron activation does not necessitate
representation. Again, unless that is all that is meant by a representation, in which case
representation just is a heuristic for patterns of activation.
Per contra, the literature on interbrain synchronization speaks equally in favor of a
dynamical systems synchrony and resonance-based account such as the distributed control thesis.
The fact that brains synchronize across social tasks is exactly the kind of phenomenon we should
see given embodied coupling and self-organization.
While many kinds of joint activity do indeed require the behaviors described in the
general Sebanz and Knoblich framework (action plans, co-monitoring, task awareness, shared
task awareness, etc.), the evidence does not necessitate that these functions are achieved through
mental models, representations, or inference based centralized control. Again, the same body of
literature (both interbrain synchronization and joint action literature) can be used to point to a
dynamical enactive explanation through mechanisms that are cognitively cheaper and more
efficient such as self-organization, resonance, and synchrony. For example, the brain as an organ
of resonance has gained increasing traction over the years (Anderson, 2014; Fuchs, 2018;
Gibson, 1968; Kelso, 1995; 2012; Raja & Anderson, 2019; Ryan & Gallagher, 2020). Thus, the
growing number of studies that demonstrate interbrain synchronization only reinforces the
hypothesis that the brain is an organ of resonance and synchrony rather than a centralized
representer.
Additionally, the joint action literature attempts to explain ecological activities of
interaction through non-ecological settings. We can, therefore, further question the validity of
many of the approaches within the cognitive science of joint action. Do joint Simon tasks
actually tell us anything about how joint actions are achieved in fully contextual situations? One
problem with experimental designs such as joint Simon tasks is that the very design of the
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experiment forces the participant to act in ways that automatically reinforce the hypothesis. Put
differently, many experiments such as joint Simon tasks have confirmation bias built into the
experimental design. This is in part because these experiments do not measure joint action in the
wild.
Overall, in my tour through the cognitive science literature on joint action, I have shown
that the empirical results from various experiments speak in support of monitoring and
anticipation, but not necessarily of mental models. These experiments do just as well in
supporting a dynamical non-representational framework. What we should take away from this
literature, then, is that monitoring processes scaffold the unfolding of joint action, such as
improvised vernacular dance. Part of being in the mode of distributed control during dance is to
be in a relationship of constant sensitivity towards others; our movements happen through the
awareness of the movements of others. This kind of sensitivity is a point I will return to again in
the next section on the philosophical joint action literature, and especially in the section on
shared attention; as we shall see shortly, the ongoing sensitivity towards others scaffold dance
interaction in shifting in and out of various forms of jointness.

Joint Action – The Philosophy Approach
The philosophical literature on joint action centers around the notion of intention, and in
particular, the concept of shared intention. Many thinkers argue that in some shape or form, joint
actions are characterized by agents having shared intentions. Saying so, that is where the
agreement tends to end. Are shared intentions individual intentions within each agent (Searle,
1990), are they commitments between agents (Gilbert, 1992; 2000; 2003), perhaps the meshing
of plans and subplans are necessary for shared intentions? (Bratman, 1993; 1999; 2014). Do we
need a nested network of shared and individual intentions in different modes? (Tuomela, 1991;
2005b; 2007a; 2018). How exactly does one share an intention? (Velleman, 1997). Perhaps
shared intention is really a matter of shared attention? (Tomasello, 2019). Needless to say, the
list goes on. In what follows, I will sketch some of the influential approaches to joint action
within mainstream philosophy. Following this summary, I will point to problems with this
research when talking about improvised vernacular dance. Finally, I will expand the distributed
control thesis by building on Tomasello’s account of shared attention.
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My overall conclusion in this section is that theories of joint action in philosophy do not
perfectly match vernacular dance improvisation. Most often, dance improvisation rapidly morphs
in and out of various kinds of relationships of jointness. So, while each theorist in this literature
can describe some instance of joint dancing, the most common situation is that dance morphs
between the ways these accounts describe joint action. Again, the point is that in improvisational
dance, there is an ongoing sensitivity towards others that aid the interaction in rapidly changing
the kinds of relationships that are present in the dance space. In this section, I will draw
especially from examples of vernacular dances that are performed in large crowds, for example,
club dancing, techno raves, or Latin American dance crowds.
I begin with four of the cornerstone thinkers in the shared intentions literature, Searle,
Tuomela, Bratman, and Gilbert. Unlike the literature we surveyed in the previous section, these
thinkers are not necessarily concerned with how moment-to-moment joint interactions are
brought about. Rather, these thinkers are mostly concerned with the states of affairs that must be
in place for actions to be considered “joint actions.”
Searle famously argues that joint action is characterized by a special form of intentions,
namely we-intentions (Searle, 1990). These are special mental states that cannot be reduced to
individual intentions; we-intentions are irreducibly social. An agent does not intend to bake a
cake and also intends that you bake a cake. Rather the agent intends that we bake a cake together.
On this account, for an action to be truly joint, agents involved must all hold identical or
relevantly similar we-intentions. On Searle’s account, we can expect that dancers must each hold
relevant we-intention that “we dance together.” In fact, Searle’s famous thought experiment
regarding the existence of we-intentions is centered around dance:
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a park.
Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally
located shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence ‘‘I am running to
the shelter.’’ But for each person, we may suppose, that his or her intention is entirely
independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case there is no collective
behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a common
goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people . . . are part of an outdoor ballet where
the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common point. We
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can imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in the two cases;
people running for shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet
dancers. Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly
different internally. What exactly is the difference? (Searle, 1990, 402-403)
The intuition here is that while the movements are the same, one case seems to be social and the
other non-social. Thus, Searle argues that what distinguishes mere group behavior from joint
action is that each agent holds the correct mental state, namely an intention that we perform
action x.
Furthermore, for Searle, we-intentions can guide behaviors in a fashion different from
individual intentions. Namely, individual intentions can often be traced back to we-intentions,
but we-intentions supposedly cannot be traced back to individual intentions (ibid, 404). For
example, being on a football team, a player might have individual intentions to run up the side
and pass the ball to their teammate. However, this individual intention can only come about
because there is a we-intention in place to play football amongst all the players. Even so, a player
cannot play football if other people do not intend to do so. For Searle, the difference between
joint action and non-joint action is often a metaphysical difference: it is a matter of looking
“inside” the different agents to see if they have the correct we-intentions.
Importantly, “shared” intention does not mean shared in the same way that you and I can
use the same spoon to eat from a tub of ice cream. Rather, shared here means having sufficiently
similar we-intentions. No hive mind or physical sharing of intention needs to be invoked.
Tuomela further expands the notion of we-intention by introducing the notion of the wemode. Again, the shared in shared intention means that each participant has sufficiently similar
but individual mental states. For Tuomela, joint action is characterized by individuals intending
from the perspective of the group. That is, individuals set their own intentions, but those
intentions are developed from the hypothetical perspective of one joint agent. Furthermore, there
must be common knowledge amongst group members that each member intends from the wemode (Tuomela, 2005). Tuomela provides the following description of the conditions for joint
action:
A member Ai of a collective g we-intends to do X if and only if:
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(i) Ai intends to do his part of X (as his part of X);
(ii) Ai has a belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional
performance of X will obtain (or at least probably will obtain), especially that a right
number of the full-fledged and adequately informed members of g, as required for the
performance of X, will (or at least probably will) do their parts of X, which will under
normal conditions result in an intentional joint performance of X by the participants;
(iii) Ai believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members
of g (or at least among those participants who do their parts of X intentionally as their
parts of X there is or will be a mutual belief) to the effect that the joint action
opportunities for an intentional performance of X will obtain (or at least probably will
obtain);
(iv) (i) in part because of (ii) and (iii). (ibid, 340)
On Tuomela’s account, each agent must understand that they are part of a group (group
identification) and must have the capacity to reason from the perspective of that group. Each
member sets their own individual intention to do their part to the benefit of the group. Each
member knows that this is the case and therefore reason their way to performing a joint action.
For example, for three people to lift a couch upstairs, we each reason from the perspective of the
group what we ought to do and know that the other group members are also doing so.
The important thing to understand is that group action can be carried out from the
perspective of the we-mode or the I-mode (Tuomela, 2007b). In the we-mode, each member
reasons and sets intentions from the perspective as if they were all one agent. Accordingly, what
is good for the group is taken into consideration. Even so, in the I-mode, agents understand that
they are members of the group, but their intentions are about individual concerns in light of their
group membership (Tuomela, 2005a). For example, given that “I” am a member of the board,
what must I do next? From the perspective of the group (the we-mode), I intend to protect and
maximize the investments from the worker's pension fund. Or perhaps, given my membership of
the board (I-mode), I intend to maximize the worker's pension fund to fill my own pockets. So,
group action can be achieved from the we-mode and the I-mode; nevertheless, we-mode actions
are the ones that contain we-intentions and therefore count as truly joint actions.
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Bratman offers an account of joint action that is free of we-intention but still relies
heavily on common knowledge and especially planning. For Bratman, shared intentions are still
a matter of each person holding the right individual mental states (again, no-hive mind, and no
sharing of token mental states). On this view, we can explain shared intention purely in terms of
individual mental states and intentions. Bratman provides the following set of conditions for the
constitution of joint action:
We intend to J if and only if
(1) (a) I intend that we J; and (b) you intend that we J.
(2) I intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a and 1b, and meshing subplans
of 1a and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a and 1b, and
meshing subplans of 1a and 1b.
(3) 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us. (Bratman, 1993, 106)
For Bratman, for an intention to be shared, two or more agents must have the same
individualized intention, but everyone must know that this is the case. Further, for action to be
joint and intentions to be shared, each agent must adjust their plans and sub-plans so that they fit
the overarching intention to J and so that agents do not impede each other’s plans and sub-plans.
Therefore, joint action becomes a matter of making, following, and not impeding plans.
In his later work, Bratman further expands his account in the hope of being able to cover
both temporally large-scale joint action such as painting a house or having a joint savings
account as well as short term dynamic joint action such as making a pass during a basketball
game (Bratman, 2014, 4). In other words, the same intentional structure should be in place
during joint action regardless of time scale and even spatial distance. Bratman expands the view
and separates it into five conditions: intention, belief, interdependence, common knowledge, and
mutual responsiveness. Hence, for Bratman, we get the following mental framework that must be
in place during joint action:
A. Intention condition: We each have intentions that we J; and we each intend that we J
by way of each of our intentions that we J (so there is interlocking and reflexivity) and by
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way of relevant mutual responsiveness in sub-plan and action, and so by way of subplans that mesh.
B. Belief condition: We each believe that if the intentions of each in favor of our J’ing
persist, we will J by way of those intentions and relevant mutual responsiveness in subplan and action; and we each believe that there is interdependence in persistence of those
intentions of each in favor of our J-ing.
C. Interdependence condition: There is interdependence in persistence of the intentions of
each in favor of our J-ing.
D. Common knowledge condition: It is common knowledge that A.-D. And there is
shared intentional activity, and so modest sociality, when:
E. Mutual responsiveness condition: our shared intention to J leads to our J’ing by way of
public mutual responsiveness in sub-intention and action that tracks the end intended by
each of the joint activity by way of the intentions of each in favor of that joint activity.
(Bratman, 2014, 152)
Bratman is underscoring the role of mutual responsiveness. Despite intentions being held
individually, there is common knowledge that each person holds sufficiently similar intentions.
Furthermore, it is a robust belief amongst each agent that as long as they do their part and
continue to hold the shared intention, so will everybody else. In other words, each member
perpetuates the intention because they are convinced that everybody else is also doing so.
Additionally, holding mutual beliefs and shared intention implies that each agent must
flexibly make and update their plans so that their plans and sub-plans are in constant accordance
with all other group members. For example, if four people are holding out a blanket so a man can
jump out of a burning building, each person must continue to believe that it is the intention of
everybody else that they hold out the blanket to catch the man. Furthermore, each person will
adjust their plans according to the joint intention. Person One might have the sub-plan to hold the
blanket tight and lean with their body weight. However, as Person One realizes that Person Two
on the opposite side is not doing the same, person one adjusts this sub-plan so that they don’t
pull the entire blanket to one side. As each person adjusts their plans and sub-plans, they
experience the other members doing the same, and the commitment to Plan J is enhanced.
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Through the commitment to adjustment of plans and reflexivity, the four people catch the man as
he jumps from the burning building.
On this account, joint action, whether on the fly or over long time scales, involves agents
acting on a nested hierarchy of plans. A basketball pass includes the agent's overall intentions
that “we play the game,” “we beat the opponent,” as well as sub intentions such as motor
intentions to dribble and pass. Further, higher-order strategic thinking such as “being defensive”
or “their defense is weak on the left” is also involved in the nested intentional structure.
It is important to understand that Bratman is not claiming that each of the conditions A-E
are explicitly being thought by the agent. Rather, the account is meant to illustrate a structure of
thought and interaction that must be in place during joint action, a state of affairs. Bratman is
describing a general structure of sociality that he believes is in place during joint action. Thus,
the account is about the overarching structure in place during joint action rather than being a
strict account of what mental states are present “in the head.” Therefore, some processes of A-E
might be sub-personal or simply implicit within the structure of interaction itself.
So far, we have visited we-intentions, we-modes, and planning. However, commitments
are also an important aspect of many joint actions. So much so that Gilbert has argued for an
account of joint action with the central concept being commitment (Gilbert, 1990). On this
account, joint action is characterized by each agent making a commitment to forming a group
with a common goal. Being so, making such a commitment does not have to be verbal;
commitments can also be made implicitly through gestures and the like. Regardless, when agents
make commitments to forming a group, agents now have responsibilities they must uphold. In
light of such responsibilities, agents can also take each other to task if the commitments are not
being upheld. Put differently, joint action is characterized by an emergent social contract. Gilbert
summarizes commitments in the following fashion:
(1) [Holism] A joint commitment is a commitment of two or more people.
(1a) [Answerability] Each party is answerable to all parties for any violation of
the joint commitment. This is a function of its jointness.
(1b) [Creation] Creation of a joint commitment requires the participation of
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all the parties. A joint commitment cannot, then, be created by a single
party acting unilaterally. (Gilbert 2015, 40)
Joint actions begin with the establishment of a commitment that each member must consent to
and to which each member must keep the others accountable. On this model, agents can have a
variety of individual intentions; it is, however, the commitment to a group with a certain goal
that makes the action joint (Gilbert, 2003). More specifically, Gilbert argues that joint action is
constituted by the commitment to a plural subject (Gilbert, 2015). Being a plural subject means
that each participant commits themselves to as much as possible to act as if one agent with the
same goals:
To focus on a particular example, what is it to intend as a body to do something? This can
be spelled out roughly as follows: It is to together to constitute, as far as is possible, a
single body that intends to do that thing. (ibid, 64)
Plural subjects then are groups of agents that, despite potential spatial and temporal distance,
attempt to act as one body aimed at a certain set of goals. As long as there is a commitment
(explicit or implicit) and its corresponding social contract between agents, an action can be said
to be joint. Hence, Gilbert's account describes a normative framework that emerges between
human agents as they act jointly. Regardless of what intentional structures might take place,
“internally” actions are joint when agents act and speak as if representing one physical body
(Gilbert, 2020). In an important sense, like Bratman, Gilbert’s account can be said to be fairly
cognitively and metaphysically agnostic. What matters is that humans conduct themselves
according to a variety of plural subjects that they commit themselves to and that such
commitments include the possibility of reprimanding or being reprimanded should an agent not
live up to the responsibility of their commitments. Again, we see an account of joint action that
lists a specific state of affairs for action to count as joint.

The Morphing of Joint Actions in Dance Improvisation
In this section, I will outline a more dynamic approach to joint action. Many cases of
vernacular improvised dance do not fit neatly onto the models of joint action provided by Searle,
Gilbert, Tuomela, and Bratman, in part because these accounts are typically synchronic. The
issue is not that these accounts can never capture joint action during dance. Instead, the issue is
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that vernacular dances often merge in and out of being different kinds of joint action; we need to
understand joint action diachronically. Furthermore, sometimes the dancing only reaches the full
“jointness” that the above accounts require very late in the interaction. My goal is not to throw
out the baby with the bath water; these approaches are not totally misguided. Rather, when
talking about dance, we should think of joint action as a matter of type and degree that morphs
depending on the dynamics of the current interaction. Sometimes dance interactions are more
Bratman like, other times, they are Gilbertian in nature. At other times they don’t quite fit these
descriptions at all. I will show that sometimes dancers have shared intentions, sometimes they
form a committed plural subject, other times they have meshing plans and sub-plans, but these
are usually ephemeral states that morph as the dance interaction progress. As part of the
distributed control thesis, the various enactive affordance-based interactions that take place drive
forward the morphing between the various kinds of joint action in improvised group dance.
The first thing we must make clear is that the standard accounts in the joint action
literature are too cognitively demanding to handle complex on-the-fly interaction. As several
authors have argued, the lists of necessary and sufficient conditions found in accounts such as
Bratman, Tuemola, or Gilbert require higher-order sophisticated inferential thinking and a fullblown theory of mind (Tollefsen & Dale, 2018). However, young children seem to engage in
joint action perfectly well, and so do many non-human animals (Tollefsen, 2005). Furthermore,
many human-animal interactions seem to be perfectly good joint actions (Merritt, 2020). I shall
not rehash these arguments since others have already done an excellent job.
Most importantly, for our purposes, is that during fast-paced on the fly coordinated
action, there is simply not the time or need to mutually think from the we-mode or consider one’s
responsibilities as a plural subject. The processes described by Bratman, Gilbert, Tuemola, and
others revolve around seeing oneself and the other agents as jointly aiming at some goal (through
a very intellectually sophisticated apparatus). This might be good and well if the agents are
following a hollandaise recipe3 and know the end-state of the process. The agents can engage in
inferential thinking and planning and then execute the shared intention by beginning to make

3

For some reason making sauce together has become a canonical example throughout the literature.
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sauce together. In contrast, vernacular improvised dance is fast-paced, requires one’s full
attention, and usually does not have a set end-state in mind.
So, the account I wish to deliver here thinks of shared intentions, shared commitments,
and the like as already built into the diachronic mechanics of the distributed control thesis. The
enactive participatory sense-making dance system already contains the various aspects of joint
action built-in. Instead of thinking from the we-mode, or the perspective of the plural subject,
these forms of commitment are already built into the dance interactions themselves as they
unfold. The hermeneutical dance background, the organizing principles of the dance, including
the dance system, already have group commitment build into their various interactions. To
perform the dance correctly in accordance with its organizing principles is already a form of
action that forms a plural subject, has inbuild commitment, and takes the group perspective into
account. The creation of a plural subject, for example, is already part of the cultural apparatus of
many vernacular dances (The Form of Life Thesis). In line with my argument regarding the
Watt Steam Governor, commitments and shared intentions do not need to be separate mental
states when they are already built into doing the activity. To dance together is; to form a plural
subject, to share an intention to dance, to have certain commitments, and to act in the best
interest of the temporary emergent joint system.
Similarly, with regards to meshing plans and sub-plans, these are already built into many
dance interactions. As we saw in chapter four, improvisational dance can be largely
characterized by its self-organizing, dynamical relations of synchronization and affordance
exploration. Thus, much of the structure of social interaction that develops in dance
improvisation is a product of physical dynamical processes. The various sensorimotor schemes
deployed by dancers enveloped in the process of distributed control already have a built-in
sensitivity towards joint activity. Having one’s sensorimotor schemes and one’s landscape of
affordances regulated by organizing principles includes a sensitivity towards others. So, when we
describe a joint action as containing plans, sub-plans, and the common knowledge condition, we
are deploying a more coarse-grained description of sensorimotor scheme interactions and
synchronization processes.
Part of the story I am telling here is that Bratman-style joint action (I intend that we J,
you intend that we J, etc.) begins with low-level alignment processes and is built through
231

interaction (more on this in the next section). It is the interaction itself that creates the intentional
state of affairs. Not the other way around. Bratman’s account describes a general state of affairs
that he believes must be in place for actions to be considered joint. Still, he does not tell us much
about what underlying mechanisms bring about this state of affairs. In the case of dance, the
many low-level synchronization processes and participatory sensemaking of the distributed
control thesis are what bring about the joint action state of affairs.
So, Bratman is right that joint action in cases like dance does contain a great deal of
mutual reflexivity towards one another; this is all captured in the mechanics of the dynamical
system unfolding. But we must remember that this does not entail that there is a representational
mental state in play that accounts for the reflexivity. Again, we can think back to Watt’s Steam
Governor; the system does not need to represent anything because it simply intelligently does the
job through its physical mechanics. Similarly, a joint dynamical dance system does not need
additional mental states since the mechanics of sensorimotor scheme interaction already does the
job. Again, Bratman is right that joint action as a state of affairs (at least in the case of joint
dance) contains mutual reflexivity, and each member perpetuating the interaction. Even so, such
a state of affairs is already built into the dynamics of interaction and requires no additional
mental states.
Here we must take note that Bratman’s theory can only be applied as part of the most
coarse-grained analysis of dance interaction. If Becca and Ed are dancing together, it is true that
each “intend that we dance.” They both have a distal intention to dance. Yet, it cannot be the
case that with each step, Becca intends that we two-step, and Ed intends that we two-step since
this would lead to the problem of computational overburdening that we covered in chapters two
and three. We can think of the we-intend to dance as the most overarching organizing principle
of joint vernacular dance. Entering into a perpetuated interaction in which both intend to dance is
an overarching state of affairs already built into the structure of acting on social affordances. A
dancer does not need to “know” in any explicit or representational sense of the word that the
other person is committed to “J-ing” their actions are enough. Put differently; I do not need to
know that the other person is committed to joint action when we are jointly acting together. That
commitment is already built into the structure of our interaction; it is already part of the
unfolding of sensorimotor schemes within the hermeneutical dance background.
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Overall, we can say that Bratman’s account in a very coarse-grained fashion describes
the basic state of affairs that takes place when agents engage in vernacular improvised dance.
However, as we shall see in a bit, dance interaction often morph in and out of neatly fitting this
description of joint action. First, however, let us have a look at Gilberts account in relation to
vernacular improvised dance.
Plural Subjects and Shared Commitments in Improvised Dance
The sense of joint agency that is phenomenologically experienced by dancers can be seen
to speak in favor of Gilbert’s notion of a plural subject. Gilbert’s plural subject is bound together
by responsibilities and the possibility of being reprimanded when members of the plural subject
do not uphold their part of the shared responsibility in relation to the task. For example, when
walking together, one participant is entitled to fuss at the other participant if that person walks
way faster and ahead of the first participant “Hey, I thought you wanted to walk together!”
(Gilbert, 1990).
In vernacular dance improvisation, agents follow the norms and rules set by the
organizing principles of the dance and the hermeneutical dance background (The Form of Life
Thesis). In doing so, the dancers often start to experience being a plural subject. For example,
when dancing in a crowd, the participants often experience a sense of group identity or oneness.
Such identification further perpetuates the commitments shared amongst the dancers,
commitments given to them by the organizing principles of the dance.
While the plural subjects of vernacular dances often have built-in social contracts, these
tend to vary depending on the interaction taking place. For example, if a breakdancer “calls out”
another dancer (signal to them that they want to compete), failing to initiate a proper response is
typically seen as disrespectful or disgraceful, especially if the invitation is rejected by a seasoned
dancer. In many less combative dance forms failing to fulfill a norm mid-interaction typically
just means the dancer must work on their technical and social skill. This, however, is not seen as
a moral failure. The overarching point is simply that Gilbert’s account has a built-in
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answerability clause, which is often present to varying degree depending on the types of dance
interactions that are taking place.
Morphing, Degree, and Type
We have seen that both Gilbert and Bratman’s accounts capture some general coarsegrained truths about social improvisational vernacular dance. Next, we will see how vernacular
improvised dance interactions often morph in and out of various kinds and degrees of jointness
as part of the distributed control thesis.
Improvisational dance interactions are characterized by fluctuating levels of
synchronization and commitment depending on various dynamical factors such as the music, the
previous songs played, exhaustion, who one is dancing with, the mood, and the list goes on
(Ellamil et al., 2016; Goldman, 2010; Rietveld, 1998; Salkind, 2018). In such settings, the agents

Figure 27 - A group of dancers engaged as dyads and solo dancers. Each dyad is directly
engaged with their partner and indirectly engaged with those within proximity. As a whole the
dancers constitute one joint system as all dancers directly or indirectly impact one another.
While not all dancers are doing something directly together, the group can still be said to be
doing one joint action as a group. In such a system there are several intentions present, some
which might be identical and others not. Furthermore, not all members have shared
commitments or common knowledge regarding each other’s intentions and commitments. Yet the
group is dancing together as a unified system in a unified activity.
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present can be said to hold a variety of commitments without any detriment to the joint
improvisational performance. Each agent dancing can be seen as concentric circles of intentional
activity that might mesh perfectly with some agents (typically those in close physical proximity
to them) while fitting less and less with other agents. Still, the totality of all agents present and
their activities do produce one coherent system (see Figure 27). A prime example is a nightclub
or house party with a designated dance floor. Participants in such settings typically manage to
(sometimes with more or less grace depending on the crowd) develop a social structure in which
agents are both engaged directly in pairs or groups while also being engaged with the group at
large. Think of the club goer who is dancing but with no one in particular, yet as part of the
group. Next to them might be a couple or a triad intentionally dancing together, sharing the
intention that “we dance together” and might have their own sub-plural-subject. Across from
these people is the lurker who is not intending to dance but following along anyway, so to stake
out a person to flirt with. Such behavior is joint since each agent influences other agents, but
each agent is interacting with each other to varying degree.
The lurker might not have a commitment to keeping the interaction going or an intention
that we dance, but is still part of the interaction. The triad is interacting with each other and
probably hold shared commitments and the shared intention that we dance. Finally, the lone
dancer might simply intend to dance or is perhaps just being carried along by the movements of
the crowd. In any event, all members of the example end up constituting one joint system and
will likely switch who they are interacting with and how they are interacting over time. For
example, someone from the triad ends up dancing with the lurker; the lone dancer grabs someone
else from the triad, the third person is now a lone dancer. So on and so forth, the interactions
morph and at varying speeds.
Any particular dancer might share intentions with the persons closest to them, but not
with the group three steps further away on the dance floor. Yet all dancers might still have
formed a sense of a plural subject in virtue of dancing in the same space and being reactive to
one another and the same music. On the club dance floor, people might have a varying set of
plans and sub-plans, but people are generally not privy to each other’s plans.
Part of the picture I am painting here is that many vernacular dances morph in and out of
being group behavior and being joint action (often at a fast pace). People surrounding each other
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on a dance floor (say in a nightclub) typically do not intend to do anything with each other
specifically. There is no shared knowledge that any agent will or must continue to dance, and
there is no moral responsibility that dancers continue to dance. Yet there is within the
participants a strong sense that we are doing something together (Kronsted, in press), and
coordinated action emerges both at the level of the entire crowd and locally within the crowd (for
example, if a dance circle forms, or if one person is making some particularly interesting moves
on the dance floor). In short, we can say that the general attitude of such a crowd is “let’s see
what happens.” It is important to understand that in such a dance scenario, the agents involved
are mutually responsive to each other's intentional movement. Nevertheless, this responsiveness
does not stem from intending to do the same thing other than at the broadest level of analysis “to
dance.” The crowd dynamics are all a product of each agent bringing their movement to the floor
with an open-ended attitude. In such open-ended structures, sub-groups of dancers will often
merge in and out of dancing with each other as joint action and dancing as crowd behavior.
There is an open-ended soup like intentional structure to much vernacular
improvisational dance, it morphs in and out of group behavior and joint action, and in many
cases, it is simultaneously a bit of both (for example, If I am dancing directly with one person but
also being responsive to the people around us). As dancers act on various affordances and the
improvisation unfolds, they might find themselves in quickly shifting situations in which they are
dancing with someone in particular, then by themselves, then in a group, then back to the first
person, then on to someone new.
The rapidity of these shifts naturally depends on the type of dance. Some vernacular
dances are slow and have explicit rules for how to switch between types of activities. Other
dances, such as dancing at a rave, have implicit guidelines for shifts in the activity and are often
more fluent in their shifting. Regardless, vernacular improvisational dance tends to morph in and
out of various ways of being joint and non-joint action.
It is very important to underscore that because of the dynamical and emergent nature of
joint improvised dancing; it is not always up to the dancers themselves what state of jointness the
system is currently in; more often than not, the totality of the interaction gains its own emergent
dynamics. Put colloquially; the interaction has a mind of its own. It is often the crowd system as
a whole that dictates the individual dancer’s intentions and not the other way around.
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Overall, the literature on joint action can be a useful analytical tool when looking at
improvised group dance, as long as we understand that these analyses are typically coarsegrained, already built into the movements, and subject to a shifting structure. In the next section,
I will further expand on this claim by elaborating on the role of perpetual sensitivity towards
others.

Shared Agency and Group-Identification
In this section, I will look to the literature on shared agency and group identification to further
build the claim that joint action in vernacular improvised dance is a dynamic process that morphs
in and out of various forms of commitment, intention, and so forth. Part of being in the mode of
distributed control is that interactions morph in and out of different forms of jointness, and
importantly such morphing is facilitated by shared attention and group identification. Vernacular
improvised dance is characterized by an ongoing sensitivity towards others created through the
process of alignment, especially shared attention.
Group identification refers to how agents obtain the understanding that they are a
member of a group. For example, in the clubbing case from earlier, how do participants get to
identify with the group despite their varying motivations and intentions? Group identification has
been posited as crucial to the development of shared agency and joint action. For many thinkers,
there is no joint action before there is group identification. In other words, it is necessary for
agents to understand themselves to be part of a group before they can engage in joint action.
Group identification, however, is tricky because it seemingly requires complex theory of
mind (TOM) capabilities. Yet young children who have yet to develop a TOM can still engage in
sophisticated joint action without any issue. In fact, empirical research demonstrates that children
as young as eighteen months can engage in joint action in which the other agent is more than
simply a social tool (Chen & Tommasello, 2006, 2012). Consequently, theories of joint action,
joint agency, and group identification must be minimal enough that they can accommodate
children and other agents who do not have a complex TOM (Tollefsen, 2005).
The traditional theories of joint action surveyed above struggle with accounting for
interactions between children, humans, and animals, cognitively differently-abled agents, or even
cases of emergent joint action between strangers. The problem is that these theories posit too
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demanding of an intention belief architecture in joint actions. To accommodate these worries,
Pacherie proposes a joint action “lite” account (Pacherie, 2013). On this model, group
identification quickly enables the creation of shared intentions:
Two persons P1 and P2 share an intention to A if:
(i) each has a self-conception as a member of the team T, consisting of P1 and P2
(collective self-framing);
(i’) each believes (i) (group identification expectation);
(ii) each reasons that A is the best choice of action for the team
(team reasoning from a group viewpoint);
(iii) each therefore intends to do his part of A
(team reasoning from an individual viewpoint).
(Pacherie, 2013, 1833)
In this model, the first steps (i) and (i’) account for group identification and allows for the agents
involved to engage in ongoing action. Thus, identifying with a group allows each agent to reason
from the perspective of a joint agent (step ii) rather than from their individual singular
perspective. Group identification further initiates the monitoring of other group members:
sharing an intention to “A” and do one’s own part (step iii) requires the explicit monitoring of
other agents and their tasks. On the joint action “lite” account, joint action begins with group
identification, and group identification enables the rest of the shared intention structure.
This is in line with experiments that demonstrate that when two agents are presented with
a (Hi-Lo) game theory dilemma, as long as they compete, there is no appropriate action since the
task requires the participants to make a fifty-fifty guess of what the other person will do. Now, if
participants identify as a team that must jointly maximize their gains, participants can reason on
behalf of the team, and the task becomes solvable (Peterson, 2017). Consequently, identifying as
a group allows for agents to easily predict what others might do and act accordingly—group
identification functions as a catalyst for other cognitive processes required for full-blown joint
action.
238

Note here that coming to identify with the group does not have to be an explicit decision,
thought, or process. Rather, whether child, adult, or another kind of agent, group identification
can, in principle, be brought about from bottom-up biological and cognitive processes.
Nevertheless, the shared intention “lite” approach has been criticized for still being too
cognitively demanding. Salice and Miyazono (2020) argue that the process of group
identification is subdivided into two parallel processes, one more, the other less, cognitively
demanding. On this view, group identification consists of an adaption of the we-view and a
transformation of self-understanding. When an agent adopts the “we” perspective, they are able
to reason on behalf of the group as if the group was one coherent entity. Adopting the weperspective is cognitively demanding because it requires, among other things, well-developed
task monitoring and TOM (ibid, 6). Further, understanding oneself as being part of a group
includes a sophisticated level of abstract thinking.
Transformation of self-understanding, on the other hand, is cognitively cheap. The agent
simply comes to understand that they are part of a group without necessarily having to engage in
any abstract thinking on behalf of the group. In other words, an agent can understand what they
should do next given their membership of a group; this, however, does not entail that they can or
need to think about what the group should be doing as a whole. For example, in a kindergarten, a
child can understand that they are a member of the group “students,” and therefore, certain rules
of conduct apply. Yet, this does not mean that the child understands how the students as a group
could organize to bargain for cookies at lunch. The child simply understands that “being a
member of X entails me behaving a certain way.” For children and some other agents, a
transformation of one’s self-understanding as being a member of a group is often enough to
support rudimentary joint actions.
Given that group identification is supposed to be cognitively cheap, a transformation of
self-understanding cannot be a doxastic process – that is, group membership is not a matter of
belief (ibid, 12). Rather, Salice and Miyazono propose that group membership is a matter of
Pushmi-Pullyu Representations (Milikan, 2005; 2004). Pushmi-Pullyu representations (being a
close cousin of affordances) are representations that are not propositional in nature; rather, they
simply direct behavior.
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The argument then, according to Salice and Miyazono, is that group membership in the
most rudimentary sense is a matter of understanding one’s situation in terms of new PushmiPullyu Representations (2020, 13). It is worth noting that while Salice and Miyazono explicitly
reject Milikan's account of propositional content, they still invoke the notion of Pushmi-pullyu
representation. Nonetheless, they do not explain how this augmented contentless version of the
concept is supposed to work (ibid, 14) or how their notion of Pushmi-pullyu representation is any
different from affordances.
In any event, the argument is that low-level processes such as joint attention, shared body
language, inclusive language use, similarity in appearance, being pinned against another group,
and so on, triggers a transformation of the agent’s self-understanding so that they come to
identify with a certain group. In particular, joint attention seems to be one of the strongest
catalysts for the transformation of self-understanding into group identification:
In fact, there is only a small step from (a) being aware of something together with another
individual to (b) being aware of belonging to a group (as ephemeral as one wishes), with
the other individual partaking in the same episode of joint-attention: this group would be
formed by the co-attenders. (ibid, 14)
The key claim is that on this model, many low-level processes are presented to the agent in the
form of Pushmi-Pullyu representations, and those representations direct a transformation of the
agent's immediate self-understanding from being “alone” to being a member of some “minimal
group.” Once this process has begun, the environment will then be seen in terms of other
Pushmi-Pullyu representations that are socially directive in nature.
We can here simply replace Pushmi-Pullyu representations with affordances. The
important takeaway is that low-level processes can quickly change an agent’s perspective to that
of the group perspective. This is so, even if the group is short-lived and ephemeral. So, in the
rapidly shifting landscape of improvised vernacular dance, low-level processes are responsible
for dancers shifting into the various short-lived relationships of jointness. As agents change their
perspective to the group perspective, they come to have a shared landscape of affordances
through which they can interact. Even brief glances of shared attention can, therefore, quickly
prepare dancers to act on the same affordances.
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Many theories regarding joint action are heavy-handed and cannot explain the gradual
movement from strangers simply being together to full-blown group action. For example, many
poor souls have been forced to attend work-related team-building retreats. Such experiences are
typically awkward in the beginning but aim to create a fully developed group agent at the end. It
is fully deliberate that team-building exercises on such retreats begin with ice-breaking exercises
that force participants to share attention and other low-level processes. Starting with joint
attention will facilitate the process to adopt a full group perspective and group agent.
Tollefsen and Dale propose a similar approach to joint action based on low-level bottomup processes (Tollefsen & Dale, 2011). Unlike Salice and Miyazono, this approach does not
depend on the notion of representation. Rather, this approach centers around the dynamical
systems term “alignment.” In short, the notion is that during an interaction, human beings begin
aligning with one another as their gaze patterns, posture, speech rhythms, attention, gestures,
heart rate, galvanic skin response, and many other low-level processes begin to mimic and
synchronize (the same processes that we covered in chapter four). Many encounters of fullblown joint action start simply as alignment processes that eventually scaffold and allow for the
creation of shared intentions, commitments, and other high-level mental states.
Part of the problem with some of the traditional theories of joint action is that they
function at a very high level of explanation, namely at the functional level of higher-order mental
states such as shared intentions, commitments, and the like. As Tollefsen and Dale point out:
Philosophical accounts of joint action seem to assume that implementation is a non-issue.
The implicit reasoning seems to be something like this: provided high-level conditions
are met (appropriate shared intentions, etc.), it is irrelevant what specific cognitive
processing phenomena give way to them. (ibid, 389)
In short, typical theories of joint action have been agnostic regarding the underlying cognitive
processes that might bring their framework about. This is a problem since an investigation into
the low-level process of joint interaction typically does not support the traditional theories of
joint action. In other words, Tollefsen and Dale are pointing out that a theory cannot be agnostic
about underlying processes if those processes are, in fact, contradictory to the theory.
Consequently, one upshot is that theories of joint action must be in communication with the rest
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of cognitive science and that both low and high-level theories of joint action must be mutually
constraining (ibid, 390).
Having looked at Tollefsen and Dale, and Sallice and Miyazono, we can integrate these
bottom-up approaches with joint vernacular improvised dance. Although, it is important to note
that I do not endorse the use of Pushmi-pullyu representation. Rather, I will continue to speak in
terms of affordances. The important take away is that we need a story of how low levelprocesses can give rise to higher-order states of affairs such as the one’s proposed by theories of
joint action.
We can use the literature on group identification and shared agency to understand joint
improvisational dance as a spectrum that ends in higher-order mental states. What this literature
demonstrates is that low-level and often automatic processes are enough to generate a growing
sense of being a group member. Furthermore, initiating the sense that one is a member of a group
changes the landscape of affordances available to the agent. Thus, in dance interaction, as bodily
processes begin to align and attention becomes increasingly shared, there is a transformation of
perspective to being part of a group. This transformation does not mean that the dancer must
reason from the perspective of the group; “reasoning” from the we-mode is a cognitively
demanding process that is far too slow and propositional to be the case in dance interaction. In
fact, it is never clear what the “right” action is from the perspective of the dance group; is it
beneficial to the group if I do the Pas de Bourree right now? Rather, understanding or feeling
oneself as part of a group changes the landscape of affordances available to the individual dancer
here and now. There is no need for higher-order cognitive processes. Being a member of a group
presents affordances while foreclosing others (see Figure 28). So, while many dance interactions
can and sometimes do end up involving shared intentions and the like, these are strictly speaking
not necessary. Much of the interaction can take place just through low-level processes.
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Figure 28 - Using the low-level alignment approach, we can characterize joint action as a
trajectory towards increasing complexity. Here we see an idealized trajectory of a joint action
dynamical system. The orange line represents a change in affordances, while the icons show at
each stage the various processes that are being added to the system. At each stage, the available
affordances change as a function of the low-level alignment processes and high-level processes
being introduced. Shared attention enables embodied synchrony, which in turn enables
vocalization, goal setting, and so on.
Again, the argument I am advocating for is that we need to treat joint action as a dynamic
process that morphs in and out of various forms of joint action. Many vernacular dance
interactions start with low-level alignment processes and do not get to the stage of shared
intentions or shared commitment until later in the unfolding of the dance. When I am hanging
out with my childhood friends, and we are playing Magic the Gathering as we have been since
4th grade, we are engaged in thick joint action. Not only are there cultural, social, and unique
group norms in place, such an interaction is also slow enough that participants can think through
243

the We-mode or I-mode, perform task monitoring, set explicit and implicit goals, and so forth. If
I am dancing with a stranger in the line at H&M (because James Brown comes on),4 then the
interaction is thinly joint. In such a case, there is no “we” to think through since the “we” is still
developing. There is no shared history between us, and so we must rely on generalizable cultural
norms (which we are currently breaking by dancing in a store), shared attention, embodied
synchronization processes, and so forth. Furthermore, in such a situation, there is no common
knowledge regarding what is intended, when to stop, or even how to continue since such an
interaction is almost completely novel territory.
When studying dance and human interaction more generally, it becomes clear that a
necessary and sufficient conditions approach cannot adequately cover all of the variety of human
interaction. Rather, in the case of dance, it is more fruitful to think of human interaction as
dynamical and impacted by a plurality of interconnected factors that morph between different
forms of jointness. When dancing in a crowd, we have different relationships with the various
members of the crowd and to the crowd as a whole. Furthermore, as the dance continues, shared
intentions might develop between sub-sets of dancers. Similarly, the various commitments in
place also change as the dance interactions go on; if I am part of a sub-group of agents who is
lifting someone (for example, doing the Jewish chair lifting dance “Hora”), then I have a
temporary commitment to not drop that person. Shared intentions, shared commitments, and the
like morph as the interaction morphs. I might not have intended to lift the person in the chair, but
as I am being pulled with the crowd to carry the chair, suddenly, I am part of a sub-plural-subject
with a joint commitment to lift the person in the chair. Lifting the person also comes with a
social contract to not drop the person. As the person is being lowered, the dynamics morph into a
different social situation.
In Searle’s (1990) original example, a group of people in a park run in a coordinated
fashion to shelter as it suddenly begins to rain; an example of group behavior. For Searle, if a
group of dancers as a contemporary art piece did exactly the same movements, it would be a case

4

This did indeed happen to me at the 5 th Avenue H&M in New York City. As I was waiting in line to buy T-shirts,
James Brown’s Get on The Good Foot came on. The woman across from me in the line started two-stepping, and for
the next three minutes, we were dancing in the line. She got rung up at the counter, walked out, and we never saw
each other again.
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of joint action because the dancers intend to do it as a group. Searle’s example treats joint action
as a dichotomy. My point is that more than often, it is more complicated than a dichotomy. Many
dance interactions might start as group behavior and, through the behavior, become joint action.
Simultaneously, many dance interactions shift between being group behavior and joint action.
Even still, some dance groups doing group behavior contain sub-groups doing joint actions.
Often members will smoothly merge in and out of groups and sub-groups, switching between
doing group behavior and joint actions. Frequently, it is the emergent behavior of the group that
dictates the intentions of the individual (a form of vertical causality).
As I showed earlier, vernacular dance interactions are often like mixing paints; they
fluently move in and out of group behavior and joint action. This happens across both long- and
short-time scales, and some interactions don’t always neatly fit into either classification. The
important takeaway is that low-level processes such as shared attention can easily facilitate
group identification. In turn, group identification strengthens the ongoing dynamical dance
system and helps dancers perpetuate the interaction. From the moment we first start awkwardly
stepping our feet in timid unison to the end of the night when we are flamboyantly spinning and
twirling one another, dance exists on a spectrum of jointness. On the distributed control thesis,
various embodied interactions modulate shared attention which facilitates group identification
making further perpetuation of the interaction increasingly smoother. In turn, the emergent group
dynamics as a whole push back on the individual and shape their intentions – a recursive loop of
bottom-up and top-down causation. Next, I will focus specifically on one of these low-level
embodied processes, namely shared attention.

Shared Attention and the Distributed control Thesis
In this section, I will return to the issue of shared attention and demonstrate how shared attention
plays into the distributed control thesis. Overall, I will argue that shared attention highly
regulates the action affordance loop in joint dancing and help dancers establish distal intentions.
Existing comfortably within both empirical cognitive science and philosophy, Michael
Tomasello has contributed to the literature on joint action for three decades. I will specifically
look at Tomasello’s most recent account that he takes to be the culmination of his work so far
(Tomasello, 2019). Namely, I will look at his account of joint action based on shared attention.
The shared attention approach to joint action is based on numerous empirical studies of children,
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great apes, and direct comparison studies between the two. Furthermore, this account borrows
components from Bratman, Gilbert, Searle, and Tuomela. The shared attention account seeks to
elucidate what is unique about human cognition and ontogeny. In short, the answer lies within
human social cognition and the scaffolding process that takes place during human ontogeny.
Humans are unique because of the pervasively social and cooperative way that we cognize and
act. While I will look at the shared attention account of joint action, I will not have anything to
say about human ontogeny or uniqueness. I limit the scope of my investigation to what shared
attention says about joint improvisational dance. As part of the distributed control thesis, I will
use the notions of triangulation in shared attention to demonstrate how shared attention
recursively guides the interactions of improvising dancers by shaping their landscape of
affordances.
On the Tomasello account, full-fledged joint action is constituted by a number of subprocesses that are developed in steps through human ontogeny. The central concept is that shared
attention is responsible for developing the cognitive ability to understand the world in terms of
subjects and objects. Built into the practice of shared attention is the development of a theory of
mind (TOM) and the realization that there is an objective perspective-less world (a view from
nowhere) (Tomasello, 2019, 45).
The important concept is triangulation. When humans share attention, they share the
attention of a common object. Shared attention, then, is the process of aligning each agent’s
perspective towards a common object and both simultaneously being aware that each agent is
aware of the object and aware of the other agent being aware of the object (see Figure 29).
Through this process, a concept of “we” is developed; each agent is aware of their own
perspective, the perspective of the other, and that they are both sharing the object. Sharing
attention also makes each agent aware that the object exists independently of either of their
perspectives. In consequence, through the practice of shared attention, the world becomes
triangulated into own-mind, other-mind, and mind-independent objects. Most importantly for our
discussion, it becomes possible to adapt the perspective of the “we” (ibid, 46).
Tomasello argues that when children learn to share attention, they not only learn TOM
and objectivity, they also learn to take in all three perspectives at once in one “single
representational format” (ibid, 88-89). While the nature of representation or “format” is not
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elucidated, the core notion is that human agents can represent their own perspective, the
perspective of others, the perspective of the group, and the objective perspective at once. That is,
all four perspectives can be held in one unified representational model of the world. By holding
all four perspectives at once (self, other, us, objective) in the same cognitive “workspace,”
human agents can make an inferential decision on how to behave in joint tasks. Further, the joint
single representational format in the workspace further allows human agents to make
developmental sub-personal realizations related to ontogeny (for example, realizations such as
the golden rule).
Through a myriad of studies, Tomasello demonstrates that basic mechanisms of emotion
sharing and gaze following in infants (younger than nine months) develops into shared attention
(nine months and older), which then scaffolds the ability to learn full-blown theory of mind,
perspective-changing in language, and objective thinking (ibid, 86). Through social scaffolding
that begins in basic interactions between child and caregiver (proto conversations), humans
slowly learn to align their attention with others and negotiate joint attention through interaction.
Through empirical research, Tomasselo demonstrates that the core difference between
human and great ape cooperative joint action is within perspective-taking. While great apes do
have a basic TOM and can therefore understand what other people are experiencing, great apes
cannot simultaneously hold their own and the perspective of the other agent (ibid, 57, 193). Great
apes are incapable of reasoning from the we-mode; thus, their cooperation is only aimed at each
agent getting what they want, rather than the group getting what it wants. In other words,
Tomasello invoking Tuomela (2007), argues that great apes can only think from the I-mode
(Tomasello, 2019, 195). This indicates that at the heart of joint human action is the triangulation
process of shared attention so that agents get to reason from the we-mode and act as joint agents.
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Figure 29 - Shared attention. Person A is aware of the common object and aware that Person B
is aware of the common object. Symmetrically, the same is true of Person B. Each person is also
aware that they are both aware of their alignment. In sum, each person is aware of their own
perspective, the other person's perspective, and that the common object exists outside of either of
their perspectives.

Consequently, the foundation of joint action is collective intentionality, and collective
intentionality is constituted by joint attention. In fact, joint attention is the process that
establishes the “we mode” of perceiving the world between agents (ibid, 59-60). The shared
attention theory shares many aspects with the Sebanz and Knoblich approach, especially with
regards to monitoring co-agents. However, Tomasello demonstrates that shared attention is not
simply an interaction smoother that enables inferential thinking. Rather, shared attention is the
underlying mechanism that makes joint action and inferential thinking possible. This is
particularly supported by the fact that children raised without social interaction do not develop
the ability for joint action.
Despite immense variation in social experience, children across the world develop along
the same timeline (including the cognitive leap at nine months) and understand false-belief tests
and perspective taking the same general way around the same time. Only later in life do more
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abstract cultural narratives and folk psychology provide an explicit explanation of “the mind”
that the agent can use when explicitly asked to explain minds (ibid, 62).
From the ability to share attention emerges the ability to form a joint “we” (ibid, 191).
Joint action involves the ability to keep the perspective of others in mind as agents form a joint
goal. Unlike great apes who can only use each other as living tools, human infants (nine months
or older) make themselves cooperative with one another by switching between perspectives.
Hence, through shared attention, agents can keep track of a joint goal while switching between
own, other, and the joint perspective. Further, while great apes do not reengage their partners if
the jointness of collaboration is lost, humans overwhelmingly try to reengage their partners and
reestablish shared attention (ibid, 197). For example, during play, if the activity is interrupted,
great apes usually will not attempt to re-align their playmate’s attention. In contrast, human
children often point, whimper, pull, beg, and so on if the playful activity is abruptly interrupted
(interestingly, cats and dogs will also try to reengage their playmates). Thus, in joint action,
shared attention is the mechanism that ensures the recursive meshing of goals, plans, and subplans that we saw in Bratman’s recursive planning account of joint action.
Furthermore, joint commitment plays an important role in the shared attention account.
Still, joint commitments are predicated upon the agents being able to engage in the process of
shared attention. While it is true that many joint actions are manifested and steered through a
joint commitment, developmentally speaking, such commitments cannot get off the ground
without the ability for shared attention.
Even in fully developed adults, joint commitments are typically executed through the use
of shared attention. Collaborators must use joint attention and the negotiation of perspectives to
ensure that the other person is staying on track, continues to be true to the joint commitment, and
update the commitment in light of new environmental challenges (ibid, 204). Tomasello agrees
with Gilbert that in much of adult joint action, shared commitments are necessary. All the same,
shared commitments are predicated upon a more rudimentary social cognitive process based on
shared attention. Thus, reasoning from a “we” perspective as one joint agent and making
normative shared commitments about that agent is based on underlying processes of
triangulation through shared attention.
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Tomasello agrees with Gilbert that there is a normative component to joint action and that
this normativity is built into the relationship of collective intentionality. Around the age of three,
children have learned through the mastering of shared attention that the world is full of other
agents and that the needs and desires of these agents must be taken into account. Hence, around
this age, children begin to invoke normative demands, assign roles, assign tasks, monitor tasks,
punish anti-group behavior, and reward prosocial behavior.
Recursive Shared Attention in Distributed Control
Before I apply the notion of shared attention and triangulation to my account of vernacular dance
improvisation, I will mention that I do not agree wholesale with Tomasello’s theory of joint
action. Theory of Mind is a much-contested concept that I do not have the time to dive into here.
The account also utilizes mental representations, which at this point, should be clear that I do not
endorse. The important resource that I do draw from in the shared attention account is the
facilitating role of triangulation in shared attention.
As we have seen, shared attention is a rudimentary ingredient in social interaction.
Shared attention allows for the understanding of a joint perspective and group identification
through the triangulation of a shared object. In vernacular improvisational dance, the shared
attention is typically drawn towards the music. However, the triangulated object can also be parts
of the body, the body as a whole, or physical objects in the dance environment.
Being aware of the same entity (music, body part, object, etc.) and being aware that other
dancers are aware helps facilitate a shared landscape of affordances. Interacting with such a
shared landscape of affordances enforces the sense with each dancer that they are, in fact,
responding to the same affordances and further helps shared modulation of the landscape of
affordances.
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By using select movements, dancers can direct the field of shared attention, thereby
bringing forth new sets of affordances. For example, Boogie Wonderland (Earth, Wind, and Fire,
1972) comes on, and Ben does an outstretched pointy disco arm (see Figure 30). Figure 30 - By
using the pointed hand gesture as “Boogie Wonderland” comes on, the dancer on the right
regulates the shared field of attention. Both dancers are aware of each other, the hand gesture,
and the music. This moment of shared attention makes disco a temporary organizing principle

Figure 30 - By using the pointed hand gesture as “Boogie Wonderland” comes on, the dancer on
the right regulates the shared field of attention. Both dancers are aware of each other, the hand
gesture, and the music. This moment of shared attention makes disco a temporary organizing
principle that shapes the landscape of affordances.
that shapes the landscape of affordances. By reacting to the cultural affordances brought forth by
the disco song, Ben is now directing his dance partner's attention towards the edge of his finger
and towards a salient feature of the music (namely, that it is disco). The disco movement has
created a shared field of attention towards the outstretched hand and the disco features of the
music. This new shared field of attention then generates for both dancers a new range of
affordances.
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From the example, we learn that there is a recursive loop between movements, shared
attention, and affordances. Shared attention provides access to affordances, affordances give rise
to movements, and movements, in turn, reconfigures the shared attention (see Figure 30).
Such a self-enforcing feedback loop not only help the dancers develop a stronger sense of
group identification with their partners and other people in the space, but it also facilitates the
further creation of distal intentions that can function as organizing principle to improvise around
(ah yes, we are doing disco movements now). Adhering to organizing principles further constrain
and guide the direction of future fields of shared attention, affordances, and movements
executed.
Going through the shared attention, affordance, movement loop quickly aids dancers in
adopting the “we” perspective, further strengthening their coupling as a dynamical system.
Developing a robust sense of a plural subject begins with shared attention guiding the dancers
towards the relevant affordances.
In the distributed control thesis, the shared attention, affordance, movement cycle further
adds to the distributed nature of vernacular dance improvisation. Since all dancers are moving
simultaneously and are all adding to the system with their movements, where the shared field of
attention will go is not always predictable. If Abby makes her John Travolta point and Ben
makes an Uncle Sam’s point,5 the field of shared attention will emerge as a product of those
movements – a field covering a configuration of bodies, music, and meaning that neither strictly
speaking intended on their own. Yet, the shared field of attention still allows for the perpetuation
of affordances and movement. Hence, shared attention is a recursive emergent phenomenon that
strongly modulates dancers during social vernacular improvisational dance. Various embodied
and dynamical processes modulate the dancer’s shared field of attention, and that field, in turn,
modulates the field of affordances that dancers can use to interact.
I argued earlier in this chapter that dance interactions often merge in and out of various
degrees of jointness. In each case of such merging shared attention plays a role in facilitating the
interaction. Sometimes dancers both “intend that we dance together” other times, they might be

5

A pointing movement developed in the 1970’s inspiried by the World War II poster “Uncle Sam Needs You”
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interacting in a space with each other or near each other without intending to strictly speaking
move “together.” In either case, the smooth unfolding of these interactions and moving between
them is at a rudimentary level modulated by the shared field of attention.
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7. Conclusions and Future Applications
In this final section, I will briefly summarize the overarching conclusions I have drawn in this
dissertation. Then I will prospectively indicate how my enactivist account of dance
improvisation can be used to develop a theory of aesthetic appreciation for vernacular dance
improvisation. In doing so, I also make some suggestions for how we should generally
reconceptualize the notion of “skill.” I end with some suggestions for how my framework can
also be used to better understand the effectiveness of dance therapy.
Summary of the Three Theses
In this dissertation, I started by demonstrating that vernacular improvisational dances are not just
a collection of steps; rather, they are forms of life that we embody as we dance (The Form of
Life Thesis). Vernacular dancing is culturally rich and saturated with meaning and, for many of
its practitioners, a salient if not the most salient component of their lives. Vernacular improvised
dancing is a practice that concerns itself with the aesthetic (with the experiences of those
involved) without necessarily being art. Consequently, it is more apt to look at such practices as
instances of everyday art or everyday aesthetics. As part of the form of life thesis, vernacular
dances produce not only aesthetic experiences in their participants but also serve many
enculturation functions (collective memory, the teaching of norms and customs, entry point into
adulthood, religious rituals, and the list goes on).
Despite the importance of dance across all societies, very few of our theories of the mind
have been able to adequately account for dance. I have shown how conventional philosophy of
mind, predictive processing, action theory, cognitive science, the cognitive science of group
action, and the shared intentions literature all struggle in various ways with accounting for
vernacular improvisational dance (The Inadequate Framework Thesis). In broad strokes, part
of the problem with these various fields is that they all deploy the notion of mental representation
and assume that the main purpose of the mind is detached information processing.
As an alternative proposal, I begin from the enactive perspective that the core function of
the entire organism is to constantly act to uphold the process of autopoiesis. Once we look at
vernacular improvisational dance through the physics of dynamical systems and the framework
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of enactivism, we get a very different account of dance; one based on the direct engagement with
the world. Vernacular dance improvisation is a self-organizing dynamical system in which
agents provide each other with social affordances through a slew of embodied processes,
including shared attention. On such a model, the dichotomy of being in control or not being in
control of one’s actions does not map onto the phenomenon since in dance agency is highly
distributed across the entire system; improvisational dance is a form of controlled non-control
(The Distributed Control Thesis).
The Fourth Thesis; the Aesthetic Appreciation Thesis
The model of vernacular dance improvisation that I have created does raise several questions.
Questions that immediately come to mind pertains to praise, blame, and aesthetic evaluation. For
example, who are we to blame when a dancer makes a mistake? Who do we praise when a dance
is particularly impressive? How do we aesthetically evaluate the artistic merit of a dancer if they
are not in control of their actions in the conventional sense of the phrase? Distributing the
agency, as the distributed control thesis does, seems to cause a series of conundrums.
My words here will be prospective; I do not wish to “solve” these problems in the last
pages of the dissertation. Rather I will sketch an outline for how to approach these problems in
future research. I will begin with the problem of aesthetic evaluation.
How do we evaluate the merit of a performer if their performance is constituted by
radically distributed control? The answer lies in our understanding of the concept “skill.” On a
naïve account of aesthetic evaluation, one might think of the performer as someone who imposes
their agency onto the environment, and it is the prowess of this internal force expressed in the
world that we evaluate. Instead of looking at skill as something that goes purely from agent to
world, we need to think of the performer's skill as something that also goes from world to agent.
I suggest that part of what we evaluate when we evaluate the merit of a dance improviser is how
well they let their body be a conduit for various dynamical couplings. Being sensitive to the
minutia of the various dynamical couplings in the environment is not an easy task. Neither is
upholding these coupling relationships or asserting oneself onto the world while upholding those
finetuned coupling relationships.
When we evaluate the improviser, we are (amongst other things) evaluating how finely
attuned coupling relationships they can establish and maintain. We are evaluating how finely
255

they can let the environment regulate their body and how well they can simultaneously regulate
the environment. For example, an expert improviser can act on the affordances provided by
drums, bass, guitar riff, sound effects, and many other aspects of the music that are not available
to the novice. The novice is typically barely able to stay on beat. The expert is also able to let the
mood, fluctuations, and rhythm of the music adjust their entire composure. Similarly, the expert
is able to react to the most minute intentions presented by their co-dancers. The novice can often
not understand which turn they are being directed into unless the expert heavy-handedly turns
their body. Bad improvisational dancing on this aesthetic model is a matter of being unable to
maintain sophisticated dynamical coupling relationships. In a similar vein, once we realize that
virtuosity is about coupling relationships, we are also capable of assigning blame. If a dancer
makes a mistake (say they stumble, step offbeat, or accidentally flaunt a rule or norm), we are
still justified in assigning some degree of the blame since the mistake might have come about
from the inability to act on the appropriate affordances. All in all, for future projects, I suggest
developing a framework of aesthetic appreciation for vernacular improvised dance that is
centered around how well the improviser creates and maintains various dynamical couplings;
that is where the magic is found.
Consequences for Dance Therapy
Dance therapy is a growing field that is increasingly used in health systems across Europe, Asia,
and Australasia. While dance therapy is deployed in the United States, the privatized nature of
American healthcare makes it a frequently less endorsed form of therapy. Regardless of its
popularity, it is still not always clear what is effective about dance therapy in relation to various
psychopathologies (Kronsted, 2018). There seems to be a consensus that dance therapy works
but not how it works (Solveig & Koch, 2017).
A future framework for dance therapy build around the distributed control thesis can
conceptualize dance therapy, among other things, as a therapy that re-engages the participant
with the world. Several psychopathologies (including PTSD and schizophrenia) create a
phenomenological experience of being disembodied and out of synchrony with the environment
(Mills and Daniluk, 2002). The synchronization relationship and the body-directed forms of
attention found in dance improvisation aid the participant in strengthening their coupling
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relationships to the environment and falling back into synchrony through the body. We can
metaphorically say that dance therapy on this model re-embodies the participant.
In dance improvisation, the participant must be engaged with their own embodiment and
experience the world through their embodiment, else the interaction fails. Thus, dance therapy
re-teaches participants who are alienated from their bodies how to experience the world through
their embodiment. On this point, it is also important to note that some pathologies make subjects
experience their body without agency. Dance improvisation as therapy reengages the subject
with their body and allows them to re-experience their body as a locus of agency while also
experiencing the impinging force of the world onto the body.
The nature of the distributed control thesis tells us that participants can feel both agential
and regulated by the environment simultaneously. In this way, dance improvisation provides an
opportunity to aid participants who suffer from the difficulty of letting go of control. For
example, traumatized patients who have suffered domestic abuse growing up often have a
difficult time relinquishing control. Dance improvisation as therapy provides a safe way to
slowly practice the relinquishing of control since dance improvisation is both the experience of
being in control and not in control; controlled non-control.
The overarching takeaway is that while other therapies such as cognitive-behavioral
therapies address patients at the rational, narrative, and propositional scale, dance therapy is a
form of therapy that works through the body’s engagement with the environment, and therefore
engages a more primordial aspect of the participant.
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